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Michael Harrington

Congress Turns Toward the Right
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WINTER 1978

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Rodolfo Walsh

Terror and Greed in Argentina

A Writer Bears Witness

One year after the military junta seized power in Argentina the writer Rodolfo Walsh addressed an Open Letter to the members of its ruling junta: General Jorge Rafael Videla, Admiral Emilio Massera, and Brigadier General Orlando Agosti. The letter circulated clandestinely. The very next day—March 25, 1977—Rodolfo Walsh was taken into custody, and three armored Army trucks destroyed his home in San Vincente, in the Province of Buenos Aires. Since the author's arrest became known, numerous appeals have been addressed to the junta, urging that Walsh be set free or, at least, that he not be executed. Rodolfo Walsh still is in prison.

For reasons of space we have cut Walsh's letter, omitting detailed illustrative material. —EDS.

Press censorship, the persecution of intellectuals, the search of my home, the assassination of my dearest friends, and the loss of a daughter who died fighting you—these are a few of the facts that oblige me to resort to this form of clandestine expression, after having, over a period of almost 30 years as writer and journalist, stated my opinions publicly.

The first anniversary of the military junta has provided the occasion for official speeches and statements in which a balance sheet of governmental action has been essayed; in all instances, what you call successes are in fact blunders, what you acknowledge as blunders are crimes, and what you pass over in silence are disasters and calamities.

On March 24, 1976, you overthrew a government of which you were part, and to whose unpopularity you had contributed as executors of its repressive policies. That government was to have ended its term in office followed by elections that were to be held nine months later. Therefore, you did not only annul the transitional mandate of Isabel Martinez de Peron, but also the possibility of a democratic process through which the people would have remedied the evils that you have perpetuated and aggravated since.

Although illegitimate in its origins, your government could have won legitimation by reviving the program that 80 percent of the Argentine people approved in the 1973 elections. That program continues to be the objective expression of the popular will and the only possible import of the "national being" you so often invoke.

You chose the opposite path, relying on the ideas and interests of minorities that paralyze the development of productive forces, exploit the people, dislocate the nation. Such a policy could be imposed—temporarily, at best—only by suppressing political parties, putting the trade unions under military control, muzzling the press, and instituting the most profound system of terror that Argentine society has ever known.

Now 15,000 persons have disappeared, 10,000 are imprisoned, 4,000 are dead, and tens of thousands have been condemned to exile: these are figures that bluntly bespeak this terror.

Once the prisons were filled, you set up concentration camps in major garrisons throughout the country, to which no judge, no lawyer, no journalist, no international observer is allowed access. The military secrecy you claim to be necessary for the conduct of investigations has

(continued on page 116)

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Dennis H. Wrong

Stumbling Along with Carter

Or, the Fragmentation of American Liberalism

The word fans out over the media from Washington and suddenly an impression, crystallized in a few phrases, is perceived as an established condition. It cannot be traced back to particular events or a single source, and sometimes it seems to reflect a collective solipsism creating its own nonreferential truth. One can understand the disposition of political paranoiacs of both the far left and far right to believe that somewhere there is a center coordinating the opinions relayed by TV broadcasters, newspaper pundits, and even the more reflective commentators in weekly and monthly journals for the purpose of promoting this season's "line" presumed to serve unacknowledged interests.

The Carter administration fell victim to this process in the Fall of 1977 to the point where a negative evaluation of its eight months in office became almost universal and was shortly reflected in a sharp decline in Carter's ratings in public-opinion polls. It seems to have begun with the protracted Bert Lance affair, overblown in this writer's opinion but certainly mishandled by the Administration. Examples of tactlessness toward Congress and the predictable contrast between performance in office and "campaign oratory" were widely invoked to confirm the overall negative judgment. Old Washington hands who have seen presidents come and go recalled Carter's limited prepresidential experience and commented on the relative youth and even greater inexperience of his Georgian "mafia." Yet other recent presidents have had even less executive experience than Carter—though none have seen as little service in Washington—and presidents always surround themselves with a home guard from their native states.

The cliché is that Carter "overpromised" the electorate. Apart from the inevitable hyperbole of the campaign, particulary one conducted by a candidate who was unknown at the beginning of the primaries and ran against an incumbent Republican president, this can mean no more than that he aspires to be an activist president and has as yet failed to get the congressional support he needs. Representatives of the labor movement to whom I spoke on a recent visit to Washington contended that there had not been a president since Roosevelt after his first reelection who had put forward so many well-considered liberal legislative proposals dealing with so wide a range of domestic problems.

The Administration's dealings with Congress, however, are another matter. No one I have spoken to denies that there have been grave mistakes: the same ones are brought up again and again. Powerful congressional figures, such as Senator Muskie and House Speaker O'Neill, were offended quite early by failure to consult them. The failure of Vice-President Mondale even to inform Senators Abourezk and Metzenbaum of his action to end their filibuster in support of the Administration's position against natural-gas deregulation has created immense bad feeling and given the impression that Carter prefers to go along with Marjority Leader Byrd at whatever cost to his programs. The much publicized failure to inform pro-Israel legislators and the Jewish organizations of the invitation to the Soviet Union to participate

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in Middle Eastern negotiations at Geneva and, most of all, of the statement acknowledging the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" has increased the tendency of Israel's most ardent supporters to draw closer to the hard-line Cold War position of the AFL-CIO and Senators Jackson and Moynihan (let alone right-wing Republicans—I speak here only of Democratic elements that are actually or potentially part of the loose Carter "coalition").

But blunders in congressional relations hardly explain the current negativism toward the Carter administration. Tensions between Congress and the executive branch are a familiar structural problem of American government. They are more or less taken for granted when Republicans occupy the White House and Democrats control Congress. Democratic presidents are more activist, more influenced by constituencies seeking new legislation to improve their situation. When the Democrats also control Congress by large margins, expectations are raised. Carter resembles Kennedy as a new face who won a close election after eight years of Republican control of the presidency, but he also resembles Johnson after the 1964 election in the size of his party's congressional majorities. And, of course, he suffers from this latter comparison; Johnson was a former congressional politician with a reputation for wizardry in maneuvering bills through Congress, and as president he succeeded in obtaining passage of more liberal legislation, much of it overdue, than any president since the New Deal—until Vietnam did him in. But conditions in the country and the Democratic party were quite different in 1964-66 from what they are today. Despite the similarity in numbers, they are also different in Congress, which, with Carter becoming the target of so much criticism, has virtually managed to escape censure.

WATERGATE, of course, reduced the prestige of the "Imperial Presidency" and elevated that of Congress, especially the House of Representatives. And voter reaction elected many new Democratic faces in 1974 and 1976. But new faces do not necessarily mean new ideas or a strengthened determination to break the deadlocks of the past on such issues as electoral reform, government reorganization, energy policy, changes in the tax laws, and national health insurance. Sometimes freshman legislators may be prone to excessive readiness to submit to firm but cautious direction from a congressional leadership that usually is less innovative than the presidential wing of the party, as in the years of the Johnson-Rayburn leadership. This, however, is scarcely the situation today. An every-man-for-himself outlook, predominantly oriented toward narrow constituent service, appears to prevail. A labor representative vehemently expressed to me his low opinion of many of the new Democratic congressmen, seeing them as opportunist and careerist, oversensitive to opinion polls, and far more concerned with improving their standing in the eyes of their constituents than with supporting a broad legislative program. Their priorities are reflected in the larger numbers of staff members specializing in constituent services rather than in legislative assistance. When urged to support liberal legislation, many new congressmen are inclined to be noncommittal and to shrug off the complaints of liberal-labor lobbyists with the argument that the only alternative to themselves is the election of "Birchers" next time. These criticisms were directed specifically at the newly elected congressmen, not at more senior liberals such as John Burton, Abner Mikva, and Donald Fraser.

The Senate presents a different picture, in some ways even less encouraging. Much power has fallen into the hands of such politicians as Senators Byrd and Long—a familiar story, to be sure, but hardly consonant with the new "statesmanlike" spirit of that body, alleged to have been the result of Watergate. The South Korean scandal has alarmed many Democratic legislators and put them on the defensive, with its full extent yet to be revealed. Carter is generally given high marks in foreign policy by all but the most intractable cold warriors, but voter opposition to the Panama Canal treaties has—incredibly—frightened congressmen and even some senators. Several of the latter, such as Frank Church of Idaho, who profess concern over the opposition to them were courageous early opponents of the Vietnam War despite the overwhelming unpopularity of their stand in their conservative states. This mood is hard to understand in view of the thoroughly bogus nature of the Canal issue; ratification of the treaties is supported by such conservative paladins as ex-President Ford, Senator Goldwater, William F. Buckley, and even John Wayne. The treaties would have passed with only a ripple of attention had not Ronald Reagan chosen to make an issue of them in his primary campaign against Ford.

Reagan's use of the issue emboldened right-wing publicists to undertake a blitz campaign that has been well financed; and over 2 million mailings of material denouncing the treaties have gone out in

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several months. New York City banks that have made loans to Panama have been attacked as standing to profit from the "surrender" of the Canal, thus lending a familiar "populist," anti-Rockefeller flavor to the campaign as its organizers have gleefully boasted. They feel they have at last stumbled upon a really popular conservative issue comparable to the anti-Vietnam and ecology protests of the left, but they do not themselves appear to have any genuine concern with the merits of their case—it is just organized demagoguery using the full apparatus of modern public-relations techniques. Presumably, people who had never heard of Vietnam until the U.S. was fully and fatally involved there—and who would be hard put to distinguish between Iran and Iraq—know all about the Panama Canal as a proud American achievement from high-school history textbooks. The campaign against the treaties need muster only 34 votes in the Senate to defeat ratification. If successful, it will of course embitter relations with other Latin-American countries as well as with Panama, but the aim of the campaign is obviously to inspire right-wing groups and congressmen to embark upon other obstructionist and demagogic actions as happened in the last years of the Truman administration.

Even those who are most sympathetic to initiatives of the Carter administration, and most critical of Congress for the failure to implement them, recognize that Carter is a "fiscal moderate" and that any new social programs must conform to strict fiscal limits, that is, be confined to relatively conservative proportions. The departure of Lance is not likely to change this, for Charles Schultze, the President's chief economic adviser, shares this view. The liberal-labor left, it has to be sadly noted, has failed as fully as everyone else to come up with realistic suggestions for holding down inflation while maintaining near-full employment. The left, of course, gives higher priority to reducing unemployment in the inflation-unemployment tradeoff, but some labor people are critical of the Humphrey-Hawkins bill, now apparently shelved, which they regard as vague and poorly written, and they deplore the present tendency of spokesmen for the black community and some left-liberal groups to rally around it as a symbol of their dissatisfaction with the Carter administration's failure to take action against continuing high unemployment. They see this as an unimaginative and even ritualistic response.

The unions are pleased with the new minimum-wage law and the reform of NLRB certification procedures. Such sensible and overdue proposals for electoral reform as permanent registration and the abolition of the Electoral College have been almost forgotten, although they still languish in committee. I am unable to see any defensible arguments against these measures, which simply implement what has long existed in other Western democracies with almost universally higher rates of electoral participation than in the United States. Yet, tortuous arguments have been advanced against them, even in some liberal journals. Carter's overadvertised energy program included questionable features that were unacceptable to congressional experts, but it is now likely to be mangled beyond recognition, especially after the Administration's rebuff of its allies in the Senate on natural-gas deregulation. Welfare reform has yet to move to center-stage in Congress, and tax reform is scheduled later on the legislative agenda. Suggested changes in tax laws include the altogether meritorious proposal to tax capital gains at regular income-tax rates. Yet, the present mood of disenchantment with the Administration and disunity in Congress make it increasingly likely that the welfare and tax programs will also be cannibalized. We may even have to wait another decade or more to get just and rational tax reforms that were believed even on Wall Street to be imminent as recently as 1972.

The notion that Carter is destined to be a one-term president has been bruited about all over the place, even by Tom Wicker of the *New York Times* whom one would expect to be a bit more skeptical. Barring a serious economic downturn, it is highly implausible—even, or perhaps especially, if the Canal treaties fail of passage and a few Birchers do succeed in winning Democratic seats in the midterm elections next year. It is argued that Carter is more vulnerable than most presidents because he is a party "outsider" with his main, if not only, electoral base in the South, which is especially sensitive to charges of "giving away" the Panama Canal and includes oil-and-gas-producing states opposed to parts of his energy program. I heard it maintained in Washington that Senator Moynihan would be a potent challenger in 1980 because he is the heir to Senator Jackson's labor support and is a much more formidable political personality than Jackson. This suggestion, however, cut very little ice with other people to whom I talked. Moreover, Moynihan seems to have devoted his major efforts in the Senate to obtaining more federal funds for New York (at which he has been surprisingly successful), which suggests anything but courtship

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of a national constituency. A more probable eventuality is that Governor Brown of California will challenge Carter; if Carter's legislative program remains in the doldrums and his Administration's "image" does not improve, Brown might do him sufficient damage in a primary campaign to make him vulnerable to defeat by a strong Republican challenger—depending as always on the state of the economy. But in California the gloss seems to be wearing off Brown's eccentricities, and Republican unity is not going to be helped by a renascent negativistic right.

Carter may be an outsider, but—if I may mix metaphors—it is increasingly hard to locate the mainstream to which he does not belong. Organized labor is far from being a single house and its biggest unit, the AFL-CIO, is itself divided on the number of major questions. The various groups that help form the liberal majority in the Democratic party are all at present more and more inclined to go their own way, concentrating on their special issues: blacks, women, Jews, big-city politicians, and environmentalists who have directed their main efforts of late to opposing nuclear energy. Academic liberals are divided on affirmative action. There are also divisions on foreign policy: the Middle East, Northern Ireland, détente, and human rights. The fragmentation of the liberal constituency is essentially what gives so-called neoconservatism its apparent strength and range, for its adherents at least speak with one voice on a series of issues. Their voice is largely negative, but it is always easier to polemicize against an ideological position at its reductive worst than to deal directly with the problems of the real world.

IN THE HOST of postelection analyses last year, I recall one arguing that the common view that the election represented a reconstitution of the old New Deal coalition was false, an illusion produced by Carter's Southern origins combined with revulsion against Watergate. This now looks quite prescient, although conservative hopes of a new Republican or right-wing majority centered in the Sunbelt have also proven unfounded. The ubiquity of the media with their intense personalization of national candidates seems to be turning our electoral politics into something resembling primary campaigns in the old one-party South as described by V. O. Key in his famous 1949 study, *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. Presidential candidates put together their own ad hoc coalitions, which function as "parties" that cannot be expected to survive longer than a single election.

The American political party beyond the state level has always been an ambiguous and far from coherent entity, but national leadership, as in the Roosevelt-Truman years, has at times given it real force. Carter, perhaps through no fault of his own, has certainly not yet been able to provide that. Such national leadership from the Carter administration would not guarantee, by any means, the passage of much-needed liberal legislation, but its absence guarantees that such legislation will be blocked, evaded, and emasculated. □

Harrell Rodgers

Dangers in Carter's Approach to Welfare Reform

A fundamental reform of the welfare system would:

(A) Create conditions that allow as many persons as possible to earn their own living in the job market;

(B) Seriously reduce the number of welfare programs;

(C) Relieve the states of all or most welfare costs;

(D) Make welfare aid automatic, administratively simple, comprehensive, and adequate for decent living standards without intrusion into the personal lives of the poor;

(E) Be designed to prevent and break the cycle of poverty rather than just administer to the poor.

President Carter's recently announced proposal to reform the welfare system is based on the strategy of dividing the poor into those who can work and those who cannot. Those designated as

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capable of work will be expected to accept a public- or private-sector job the government will supplement if wages fall below established levels that vary by family size. All workers who earn less than $15,600 per year will receive some tax relief. Those unable to work will be eligible for a Negative Income Tax (NIT) program, which will provide a guaranteed income based on family size.

As far as it goes, Carter's basic approach is sound, and consistent with reform proposals and empirical validation of the last 15 years.[1] The NIT (or guaranteed-income) plan should be part of any viable welfare reform. NIT would: consolidate welfare programs, provide uniform benefits, federalize welfare, cover all the poor; it would be simple to administer, its costs would be reasonable (most estimates are in the $25- to $35-billion range), it would not intrude unnecessarily on the privacy of the poor, and it could provide some tax relief to low-income workers. Since those unable to find a job would qualify for assistance (which would include many persons not presently covered by welfare programs), the government might feel some obligation to keep the economy healthier than normal in order to keep down the welfare rolls. Since all the poor would be covered by the bill, the number of citizens eligible for Medicaid would increase substantially. This would probably increase congressional support for National Health Insurance.

Despite its merits, the problems in Carter's approach are substantial. There are numerous deficiencies, but four deserve emphasis.

- First, the benefits to nonworkers are much too low. An urban family of four with no outside income would receive only $4,200, an aged, blind, or disabled person $2,500, and an aged, blind, or disabled couple only $3,750. Since the benefits cannot be supplemented with Food Stamps or SSI, both of which will be abolished, poverty will be institutionalized for those who cannot work. Since Carter's proposal only calls for a total of 1.4 million public-service jobs and is vague about how the job market would be expanded, millions of able-bodied persons would continue to be left out of the job market. Thus, in the absence of full employment, Carter's guaranteed income would simply perpetuate many persons in a spiral of poverty. Maintenance at a very low guaranteed income would become a substitute for serious efforts to expand and improve the economy.
- Second, the jobs to be created under the bill will be quite inadequate. The jobs will pay only the minimum wage, with cash supplements to families (up to $2,300 for a family of four). These low-paying jobs may cause employers (particularly state and local governments) to replace higher-paid workers with welfare recipients, thus further disrupting the job market. Since most of the jobs will have to be supplemented, it would make more sense to simply pay a decent wage. Welfare recipients would have more incentive to work, other jobs would not be jeopardized, and welfare workers would have the dignity of earning their own living.
- Third, there is too little emphasis on child care. Rather than expand federal and state child-care efforts, the proposal allows deductions to low-income workers so that they can pay for child care. This requires the parent to incur considerable expense to start work, is too nondirected to stimulate the child-care market, and fails to set any standards for child care. Since good child care and preschool education can provide poor children with the educational stimulation and training they so often lack,[2] can provide the poor child with at least one nutritious meal per day and with health care, the optimal value of child care should be obtained by federal expenditures.
- Fourth, the fundamental flaw in Carter's proposal is that it does not include or attempt to build upon any mechanisms for permanently correcting some of the deficiencies of American capitalism, namely unemployment and subemployment. Carter's proposal operates on the assumption that employment problems in America are a temporary anomaly that need attention only from time to time. In truth, the American economy has never served anything like all the public. Since 1929, unemployment has been below 3 percent only twice. Between 1950 and 1975 official unemployment averaged about 5 percent, with an average of 8.5 percent in 1975, and 7.7 percent in 1976.[3] Millions of other Americans (including half of all

[1]The studies conducted by the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin, in Madison, are explained in U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, *Rural Income Maintenance Experiment*, (Washington, D.C., November 1976).

[2]See Bernard Brown, "Long-Term Gains from Early Intervention: An Overview of Current Research," Presented at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Denver, February 23, 1977).

[3]U.S. Bureau of Census, *Employment and Earnings* (Washington, D.C., January 1977), p. 24.

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heads of poor families) have always worked at jobs paying inadequate, even poverty, wages. The Census Bureau reports that in 1975 12.9 million persons worked full-time year-round and still earned less than $7,000.[4] *During the 1970s some 35 to 40 million Americans have been consistently either out of work or unable to earn a decent living in the job market.*[5]

A BILL such as Humphrey-Hawkins, even with all its flaws, would be a first step toward facing up to some of the serious deficiencies of American capitalism and fashioning a response to them. Humphrey-Hawkins would make full-employment an obligation, or at least a goal, of administrations. It would require in-depth analysis of the nation's economy and coordinated fiscal planning to achieve balanced economic growth (without excessive inflation) and full employment. Specific programs are proposed to reduce unemployment resulting from cyclical, structural, regional, and youth factors, as well as unemployment caused by discrimination. The bill recognizes that unemployment results from a wide range of systemic problems, and it requires not only efforts to overcome these problems, but continual monitoring to determine if reforms are working and if new problems must be dealt with to create or retain a tight labor market. This would expand the range of factors a president would have to consider in investigating economic problems. Carter's economic approach, for instance, does not consider the impact of oligopoly on the economy, the impact of poor schools, inadequate transportation systems, and many other factors requiring correction by Humphrey-Hawkins.

Most important, the bill would hold a club over the head of the Congress and the executive. If all else failed and unemployment were not brought down to 3 percent, enough public-service jobs would have to be created to reach that goal.

Even if Carter could temporarily improve the economy with tax incentives and public-sector jobs, his poverty reforms would be built on a foundation of sand. If future presidents do not feel obligated to take steps to limit unemployment, or if they decide, as President Ford did, that 8 percent unemployment is as good a means as any to fight inflation, the whole system will flounder, with the blame inevitably placed on the jobless poor. Thus, with Carter's approach, even the end of poverty would be a temporary and illusionary condition, because the flaw of capitalism will not have been addressed. □

[4]U.S. Bureau of Census, "Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1975 and 1974 Revisions (Advance Report), Series P-60, No. 103 (Washington, D.C., September 1976), p. 27.

[5]See Thomas Vietorisz, Robert Mier, and Bennett Harrison, "Full Employment at Living Wages," in Stanley Moses, ed., "Planning for Full Employment," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (New York, March 1975), p. 104.

Nicolaus Mills

Brown-Lung Cotton-Mill Blues

Setting on my front porch swing
I'm like a man forgotten
Head all filled up with angry thoughts
And lungs filled up with cotton*

Fourteen years ago, the Textile Workers Union began their campaign to organize J. P. Stevens, the country's second largest textile manufacturer. Yet today none of the 44,000 workers in Stevens's 85 plants is under union contract. Through "massive violations of its employees' rights" (the words are those of the National Labor Relations Board) and "surface bargaining" in mills where its workers have voted for a union (in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, 3,500 Stevens workers are still without a contract after three years of negotiations), the company has managed to beat back all efforts at unionization.

The problem is one that union leaders throughout the country have recognized as severe.

*"Gonna Go to Work on Monday One More Time," by Si Kahn; from the *Brown Lung Cotton Mill Blues* album, June Appal Records.

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In 1976 the Textile Workers Union and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union merged in order to begin an all-out assault on Stevens's Southern plants, and since then there has been an escalation of ACTWU activity. A national boycott—similar to one the Amalgamated conducted against Farah pants—is now under way, and in addition ACTWU has taken a leading role in the drive for passage of H. R. 8410, a bill designed to strengthen union organizing rights under the National Labor Relations Act.

Over the last year it is not, however, ACTWU, whose boycott of Stevens has had minimal economic impact, but the shakily financed Carolina Brown Lung Association that has made the most gains in the struggle to bring the Southern textile industry under control. Since its formation in April 1975, the six-chapter, 500-member CBLA has made the eradication of brown lung a crusade, and in so doing has forced both the textile industry and the federal government to take notice of health hazards they had preferred to ignore.

Brown lung—or, as it is technically called, byssinosis—is to textile workers what black lung is to coal miners: an occupational disease that if allowed to go unchecked can and will kill. As raw cotton is processed, it gives off a fine dust, which workers inhale and then, depending on length and degree of exposure, react to. A worker with low-grade brown lung will in all likelihood show the same symptoms as anyone with a bad cold: chest tightness, coughing, shortness of breath, and phlegm are standard brown-lung signs. The serious trouble begins when low-grade brown lung moves on to a more advanced stage. Minor discomfort ceases being minor, and Monday morning chest tightness and coughing (caused by reexposure to cotton dust after a weekend of rest) become more pronounced.

At this point the brown lung victim's only hope is to leave the mills or get transferred to a less dusty job. If he cannot (and, in the past, companies like Stevens have made job-change requests difficult or a cause for firing), it is only a matter of time until Monday-morning problems became a daily occurrence and every work day turns into an ordeal. At this juncture, it is not just the brown-lung sufferer's ability to make a living for his family that is in jeopardy. It is his very survival. Brown lung is progressive, and in its most advanced stages it takes the form of chronic bronchitis or, when the alveoli of the lungs rather than the airways are impaired, emphysema.

Like the child who goes through school and never gets chicken pox even though the rest of his class does, there are textile workers who can spend a lifetime in the mills and never show signs of brown lung. But for anyone who works in the dusty areas of a cotton mill long enough (and according to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration over 247,000 textile workers are exposed to cotton dust), the chances are good that brown lung in same form will be a fact of life. In places like the carding room, where exposure to the leafy bract of the cotton is especially severe, medical surveys have shown brown-lung rates as high as 41 percent. The best estimate is that in the United States today there are 35,000 active and retired workers with *disabling* brown lung and as many as 10,000 workers with some form of brown lung.

That there should be so many brown-lung victims and so little precise information about them is perhaps the saddest irony of all. For brown lung is not a new occupational disease. In 1705 Bernardino Ramazzini, an Italian physican living in London, noted the problems of making cloth with remarkable precision, observing in his *Treatise on the Disease of Tradesman* that

> those who hackle in the flax and hemp to prepare it for being spun and wove afford frequent instances of the unwholesomeness of their trade; for there flies out of this matter a foul mischievous powder that entering the lungs by the mouth and throat causes continual coughs and gradually makes way for asthma.

Nor was Ramazzini alone in these observations. From the early 19th century on, there is a steady stream of reports from England, which imported American cotton, on the dangers of cotton dust. In 1818 its effects on Lancashire workers are noted; in 1831 it is described by J. P. Kay as "spinner's disease"; in 1860 it is discussed in an official report to Parliament; and in 1892 the word "mill fever" is used to describe widespread outbreaks of brown lung.

IN THE U.S., the textile industry has been enormously successful in using its money and influence to inhibit knowledge of brown lung. Whereas in Britain brown lung was made a compensable disease in 1941 and was systematically researched as early as 1936, in America barrier after barrier was set up to make sure as little information as possible got out about brown lung. Despite a 1913 report by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, which observed that "constant confinement in a dusty atmosphere" makes cotton

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manufacture "a dangerous trade" and despite a similar report in 1940 in *Textile World*, an industry publication, it was not until 1964 that the U.S. Public Health Service gave Dr. Arend Bouhuys, now with the Yale School of Medicine, a grant to discover why brown lung, which had been so heavily reported in England, had not been similarly reported in America. Even then Dr. Bouhuys was almost unable to complete his project. Industry opposition kept him out of private mills. It was not until 1967, after he got access to a federal penitentiary mill in Atlanta, that he finished his study, and it was not until 1968, when his findings were published in *The New England Journal of Medicine*, that the U.S. Public Health Service officially recognized brown lung as a disease.

Dr. Bouhuys was not alone in being subjected to such pressure. Similar opposition surrounded the work of Dr. Peter Schrag when in 1966 he tried to do a medical survey of textile workers in North Carolina. The only mill he could gain admittance to insisted that he keep his findings secret, and when he went ahead and published his results (which showed a 12 to 29 percent brown-lung rate among the workers studied), he was dismissed from his job with the North Carolina Board of Heath. For the textile world of the late '60s, admitting to being a source of brown lung was worse than admitting to being a source of venereal disease. To the industry brown lung was a Communist and black plot—all rolled into one. As the industry's *Textile Reporter* observed in a 1969 issue, brown lung is a "thing thought up by venal doctors who attended last years ILO [International Labor Organization] meetings in Africa where inferior races are bound to be afflicted by new diseases more superior people defeated years ago."

The textile industry's unwillingness to admit the existence of—let alone take responsibility for—brown lung did not, however, end with the medical information breakthroughs of the 1960s. The textile industry was among the chief supporters of President Nixon's 1972 campaign, and in Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health George Guenther, a former textile official, they had their own man on the inside. In Guenther's eyes, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration was the industry's, not the worker's, agency. It was the "great potential of OSHA as a sales point for fund-raising and general support by employers" the Guenther discussed when he visited the White House in 1972, and when he returned to the Department of Labor, the OSHA he presided over was one in which he could guarantee "no highly controversial standards (i.e., cotton dust, etc.) will be proposed."*

Guenther was true to his word, and in 1975, the year Carolina Brown Lung was formed, very little had changed in how the federal government saw brown lung. The achievement of CBLA is that in two years it has begun to reverse this attitude. At the heart of CBLA's organizing is a two-fold strategy of first making state-compensation systems work for those who have been disabled by brown lung and then using these gains to pressure such companies as J. P. Stevens to introduce the kind of equipment (now available) that would clean up their plants.

IN NORTH CAROLINA, the results of CBLA's work have been highly encouraging. Between 1971, the year that brown lung was clearly made a compensable occupational disease in North Carolina, and 1975, the year CBLA was formed, only 33 people had ever filed for brown-lung compensation. But since that time the numbers have risen eight-fold. This summer the number of filings reached 240—with 49 cases settled out of court, 22 denied, and the rest pending. Equally important, the potential quality of the settlements has also changed. Whereas under the old North Carolina workman's compensation law there was a $20,000 or 400-week limit on claims, under current North Carolina law no such bounds exist. A brown-lung victim is now entitled to receive two-thirds of his final year's salary plus all his medical expenses for life.

In a state like North Carolina, where it has been so difficult to receive compensation for brown lung, getting workers with breathing problems to file for awards has not been easy. It was not until CBLA began organizing and holding free screening clinics that significant numbers of workers began coming their way, and at the start, even the clinics were a touch-and-go matter. To make them effective, ordinary volunteers were not enough. It was necessary to get doctors whose primary political loyalties were not to the textile industry (a difficult problem in small company towns), and then it was necessary to find lawyers who would handle the brown-lung cases that were ready for appeal (and in the process would risk delayed or no payment).

CBLA's work in North Carolina has paid off not only in the number of brown-lung filings in the last

*120 *Congressional Record*, S 12582 and S 12581 (July 16, 1974).

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two years but also in the procedures now used for filings. As the textile companies have shown an increasing reluctance to accept decisions made by the North Carolina Industrial Commission and slowed their hearings at every stage, the Commission has moved to streamline its own practices. A new application form now allows a worker who thinks he has brown lung to file a direct appeal to the Commission rather than get an examination from a private doctor first; then the Commission arranges for the worker to see—at company expense—a state-certified brown-lung expert. The result is that a procedure that in the past dragged on for years has been reduced to a matter of months.

No one in CBLA doubts that a company like J. P. Stevens, which as a result of its illegal labor practices has paid out more than $1.3 million in fines and back pay since the Textile Workers began their organizing drive, will do what it can to avoid future compensation claims. But there is a limit to the stalling Stevens can do in the courts, and as the compensation load grows (the seven CBLA members who have won brown-lung cases received a total of $73,000), mill owners like Stevens will be under pressure not only from the government but from the insurance companies handling their compensation payments.

CBLA's accomplishments at the local level have also made it possible for the Association to make its case in Washington from a position of strength rather than weakness. This is especially true with regard to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. While OSHA, which was formed in 1970, could during the Nixon-Ford years go about its business with only industry pressure to worry about, CBLA has made sure that is no longer the case. The current OSHA health standards for cotton dust are now being revised, and at hearings held last April, CBLA was outspoken not only in its criticism of current OSHA standards (which allow one milligram of cotton dust per cubic meter of air and are constantly violated). It also criticized OSHA's planned changes, which would drop the cotton-dust standard to 0.2 milligrams (the textile industry wants a standard of 0.5 milligrams) and allow the industry to monitor its plants and take seven years to come into full compliance with the new law.

As is the case with CBLA's state organizing, final results are not in, and much hangs in the balance. The mills are already in severe violation of cotton-dust standards (in Stevens's Roanoke Rapids plants, workers were found to be exposed to between 12 and 30 times the legal amount of cotton dust), and to place monitoring responsibility in the industry's hands rather than the union's, opens up the chances for a series of abuses. The same dangers also apply to the question of what cotton-dust standard will finally be instituted. In cotton preparation and yarn areas, untreated cotton has been shown to produce a 7 percent brown-lung rate at 0.1 milligrams of cotton dust per cubic centimeter (the figure CBLA wants), a 13 percent rate at 0.2 milligrams, and when the dust goes up to the 0.5 milligrams the industry wants, the overall brown-lung rates will jump to a whopping 25 percent.

IT IS CLEAR, however, that OSHA is not about to return to its old ways. Its new director Eula Bingham made that evident when she told a delegation of brown-lung victims, "The past sins of this agency at least were not committed by me. . . . I cannot be held accountable for fours years of undone reports." Even the textile industry seems aware that OSHA is no longer the pushover federal agency it once was. Whereas in the past the industry sought to dismiss reports of brown lung as exaggerated, its current strategy is to insist that cleaning up the mills is too expensive. But unless the industry can hide its past record on brown lung or convince the public that in cotton manufacturing as in Vietnam certain body counts are acceptable, its cost argument is in trouble.

In this regard perhaps nothing is more revealing than the proposal by South Carolina's Senator Ernest Hollings of a Brown Lung Bill, patterned after the Black Lung Bill, that would provide a nationwide compensation system for brown lung victims and make the textile mills rather than the federal government do the paying in the long run. For a Senator from a textile state to make such a proposal is in itself an act of courage, but more than that, it is an indication of the political climate Carolina Brown Lung has been instrumental in creating. It will not be possible to say of Hollings's Brown Lung Bill, as it was of California Representative Philip Burton's, that it comes from a legislator with no first-hand knowledge of or vulnerability to the industry he proposes to regulate. □

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Thomas B. Edsall

Congress Turns Rightward

Reform, once seen as the vehicle to free the House of Representatives from the constraints of conservative leadership, is now serving increasingly to weaken the power of a liberal leadership at a time when pressures on the younger members come from the right. Working in tandem with basic shifts in the substance and style of district politics and with the growing perception that the country may face an economy of scarcity, the reform movement in the House has in part returned to one of the roots of reform in American history: a restrictive view in which corruption and a government of largesse become, if not one and the same, closely intertwined.

In the first session of the 95th Congress, there is abundant evidence of a shift to the right. Election-day voter registration, perhaps the most effective measure to increase the political leverage of the poor, is dead. Creation of a consumer-protection agency, acceptable even to the conservatism of Jimmy Carter, faces probable defeat or dilution in the House despite the presence of 289 Democrats. Common situs legislation expanding the right of organized labor to picket construction sites—a proposal passed in 1975 by a vote of 229 to 189—was defeated last year, March 23, by a margin of 217 to 205. Other votes include passage of antibusing amendments, a blanket prohibition of the use of federal funds for abortions, the denial of benefits to Vietnam War-era veterans whose discharges were upgraded under a presidential directive, and defeat of key minimum-wage amendments.

These votes are cast at a time when only token remnants of the once-powerful conservative Southern Democrats remain in power. Of the current roster of 22 committee chairmen, 15 had favorability ratings of 80 percent or more from the AFL-CIO in 1976. Carl Albert, one of the weakest speakers in history, has been replaced by Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, Jr., perhaps the quintessential Northern Democrat, and a politician who thrives on the manipulation of votes to build majorities.

This essentially liberal leadership is faced, however, with a growing body of younger members who are not only reform-minded but also conservative. To intensify the conflict, reform has clipped the power of the speaker and the committee chairmen to line up votes among the younger members and, despite portrayals of O'Neill's tenure as a return to the tradition of a strong speaker, his political muscle is highly fragile. "You know, there is nothing the leadership can offer me, really nothing," Richard A. Gephardt, Democrat of St. Louis and one of the stars of the freshmen class, noted with some pleasure during an interview.

Gephardt, to a large extent, personifies the difficulties facing O'Neill and the other, older Democratic leaders whose roots are in the Roosevelt coalition. Gephardt, who represents the white half of St. Louis and adjoining white suburbs to the South, was elected to the St. Louis City Council as a young turk and now, as a member of Congress, he does not owe his election to any city organization.

This lack of a debt to any locally based political organization, which has become the rule among members elected since 1968, is one of the basic steps toward autonomy from the

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House leadership. One of the traditional mechanisms used by the leadership to reward or penalize new members was the granting or denial of pork-barrel projects: courthouses, post offices, roads. These projects allowed members to proclaim their personal power to the voters—but, more important, the projects provided jobs and contracts to the clubhouse politicians back in the district whose decision whether or not to endorse a new member for reelection often determined the outcome of the contest. Now, Gephardt pointed out, not only is there no traditional organization demanding that it be paid off, but "pork-barrel deals would hurt me in my district."

The local organizations, which could once make or break a junior member, have been replaced by institutionalized personal organizations available to any member once elected. In addition to the small district cadre that any candidate needs to get elected, Congress, in the name of reform, has granted each member a personal staff of 18, a computer service that is the envy of any direct-mail specialist, and the creation, by every agency of the executive branch, of a "congressional liaison" section, whose function is to grant a prompt response to every request from a member on behalf of district constituents.

These perquisites have been developed and are based on the argument that they provide the services essential for sound judgment on issues before the House. In terms of House politics, however, the critical fact is that these benefits are handed out on an entirely neutral basis.

For the members with a rudimentary sensitivity to their district, these perquisites guarantee reelection and have served to break critical dependency on the leadership for elective victory. New members can service their district and, through well-established public-relations techniques, project an image that is almost totally independent of committee assignment, passage of sponsored bills, or the award of public-works projects. Most important, the leadership cannot penalize any recalcitrant member by taking from him this machinery for reelection.

Although the House has progressively weakened the powers of the committee chairs and seemingly added to the procedural leverage of the speaker—giving him control over the Rules Committee, for example—the major development has been the rise of the Democratic caucus on which, ultimately, almost all the speaker's powers depend. This group, which now has a majority of members who have served three or fewer terms, gives final sanction to committee and floor rules, elects the leadership, and decides whether committee chairpersons will keep their jobs. The democratization of House Democrats has served to reinforce the independence of the membership. To a certain extent, power is the authority to make discretionary decisions, benefiting some and hurting others. The presence of the caucus and its demonstrated willingness to vote out of office four committee chairmen—Patman, Sikes, Hebert, Poage—acts as a major brake on the exercise of discretionary power.

O'Neill's talent as speaker has been to define the terms on which his own power is judged. He does not place the prestige of his office behind a bill until it is ready for floor action and the votes are counted. In this way, he has taken credit for the passage of a new ethics code, the federal pay increase, and the energy bill—while avoiding any liability for the failure of common situs, election-day registration, and consumer protection. The measure for which he is given the most credit—the ethics code—was in fact critical to the establishment of his credibility as a leader; without it, he faced debilitating defections from the junior members. O'Neill, however, does not have the authority to be autocratic within the confines of congressional procedure or the power to either insure or seriously injure a member's chance of reelection.

The Rules Committee has become in large part an arm of the leadership, but it is generally obliged to send bills to the floor with rules permitting up-and-down votes on major issues within the legislation. O'Neill has the discretionary power to appoint special ad hoc

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committees, such as the Energy Committee, but he has had to guarantee adequate representation in its membership of all regional interests. (O'Neill's attempt to formally expand his procedural power by winning approval for the creation of a House "administrator" recommended by the Obey Commission and to be appointed by the speaker was overwhelmingly defeated: 252 to 160.) New members dismiss out of hand what in the days of Sam Rayburn was an accepted truth: that the leadership had absolute control over each member's congressional career. This weakness in the present Speaker's power was quietly reflected in O'Neill's decision to abandon any effort to keep Robert L. F. Sikes in the Appropriations Subcommittee chair. Had O'Neill tried to enter the controversy he would have faced a humiliating defeat at the hands of a collection of freshmen and sophomores.

Beyond the shifting power, reform is also serving to alter basic patterns of congressional behavior. In the past, a newly elected member from a farming district would seek a seat on the Agriculture Committee; from a city district, a seat on Education and Labor; from a district with military bases, a seat on Armed Services, etc. In these berths, members slowly acquired seniority and expertise in fields that would provide increasing benefits for their constituents. The development of procedural reform, as a separate terrain from which elective capital can be harvested, has provided a new, and quicker, avenue to congressional prominence. It is a guaranteed no-lose issue, risking none of the loss of voter support that advocacy of substantive legislation inevitably produces. No constituent group is against it. In addition, lack of congressional experience functions as a credential instead of a liability. Finally, reform coincides with the growth of elective politics based on the media, and it is one of the most accessible vehicles a junior member can use to get coverage in the home papers. The flood of inserts to the *Congressional Record* and of releases to the press gallery during the debate on the ethics code was equalled in the last session only during the debate on a congressional pay raise, and on the day of the demise of the B-I Bomber.

When Gephardt arrived in Congress last year, it was not the leadership who provided him with the most important post in his first term—an assignment that probably will be instrumental in his reelection. Instead, the freshmen caucus made him their reform chairman, a position that will give him the opportunity to try to put an end to the cheap meals, free flowers, lavish athletic facilities, and other side benefits that now go with membership in the House. From a purely political point of view, no freshman could ask for a better assignment, and no speaker could ever give it to a freshman.

With the near-elimination of "machine" districts, the style of campaigns in the past ten years has radically shifted in directions that further weaken the power of the House leadership to bargain for votes. The dominant forces in district politics have become a broad array of issue-oriented interest groups—chambers of commerce, civic-improvement organizations, branches of Common Cause, ethnic social clubs, PTAs, farmers' organizations. What unifies almost all these groups is their insistence that congressional candidates spell out their positions in detail on every conceivable issue. In the 1976 contest in Baltimore's Third Congressional District—where the winner used to be picked by a small handful of clubs and , if he wanted to stay in office, he did as he was told—five candidates issued position papers on everything from juvenile crime to deregulation of natural gas to abortion. The consequence is that each term a growing number of members begin locked into a set of positions: the bartering process characteristic of democratic legislating is ruled out, not only by middle-class constituents suspicious of the process, but also by a set of campaign commitments made well before the reality of the choice in committee or on the floor, and before the potential benefits of compromise are present.

A second major characteristic of current local-interest groups is that they are predominantly middle-class, and the pressure

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they apply is not for the creation of new, substantive programs, but for procedural reform or for the elimination and prevention of government initiatives. Common Cause and the League of Women Voters, whose concerns reflect the values and interests of their predominantly upper-middle-class membership, are often working for the reduction of power of the liberal leadership.

Business groups lobby against federal regulation, bills beneficial to labor, increases in the minimum wage. Neighborhood and civic groups, less interested in federal issues than in local government, echo, however, a recurring plaint against their tax burdens. These groups also share a deep distrust of traditional mechanisms in the congressional legislative process: log-rolling to build up majorities, patronage, and the distribution of pork-barrel benefits, the placement of a premium on personal and party loyalty as factors in making legislative decisions.

The increasing shift in balance of pressure on individual House members from the congressional leadership to organized local groups work, in turn, as a pull to the right. In any district containing an economic mix, the more affluent are far more likely to be organized than the poor, and far better equipped to make their position known to their representatives. Business organizations and their lobbying arms are demonstrating, in the current session, the most sophisticated use of constituent pressures, using lists of business people, conservatives, Republicans, and management personnel to create district opposition to consumer-protection, minimum-wage provisions and common situs.

The conflict between the pressures of district groups—to which the younger members are far more sensitive than those who first won election in a different era—and traditional congressional politics was embodied in the drive to oust Representative Robert L. F. Sikes from the Military Construction Appropriations Subcommittee chair he had used to increase the value of personal investments. A leader of the anti-Sikes forces was Leon Panetta, a freshman Democrat from Monterey, California. Ten years ago, the thought of the representative from Panetta's district challenging the chairman of Military Construction would have been inconceivable: the district includes Fort Ord, the Monterey Language School, and the naval postgraduate training school. There is no coherent party structure in the district, and Panetta won largely through his own work and organization. Panetta himself has minimal ties to the Democratic party: he was a Republican civil-rights appointee under the Nixon administration. In a reflection of the changing nature of district politics, Panetta noted after the Sikes defeat, his position was "not only morally right, it was politically right. If that means not returning favors and (not) getting the pork barrel, it is politically right and what my constituents want."

The Panettas and Gephardts of Congress—prototypes of the new generation of members—have changed the rules of the ball game. They argue, with some legitimacy, that the vehicle for the winning of votes, particularly among the younger members, now must be rational persuasion; logic, and not the offer of a job to a backer or the promise of a campaign contribution must prevail. This argument, however, works only for those with constituencies that coincide with the national middle-class majority and do not need exceptional benefits from government. The only way, for example, major revisions of the Food Stamp program were approved by the House was through a major vote-trading arrangement between farm and urban representatives, a process anathema to the constituencies of Panetta and Gephardt. Leading proponents of the use of vote-trading are representatives of minorities who, in an increasingly "rational" Congress, are going to find prospects of winning, or even maintaining, governmental benefits dimming.

Just as important as the changing forces in district politics is the shift in representation that will take place after the 1980 census, a

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change demographically foreshadowed by the 46 freshmen Democrats. The first-term members—those elected in '76—are representative of the population changes that will be integral to redistricting before the 1982 election. A solid block of them, 20, are from Sunbelt states—the tier of states extending across the Southern third of the country—which has been experiencing the sharpest population increase—and a majority, 29, represent the range of districts where the largest population shifts, up and down, are taking place: once rural areas now subdivided into suburban population centers; the edges of declining cities in the East and Midwest; well-established white bastions outside the cities that have high percentages of blacks.

These 46 freshmen are, as a block, more conservative on social and economic issues than any other class, a voting pattern that increases in importance with the recognition that these 46 are also a reflection of probable trends after redistricting. Analysis of their votes on the litmus issues that have surfaced in the first months of the 95th Congress shows: while Democrats as a whole backed the common situs bill by a margin of better than 2 to 1—191 to 88—the freshmen democrats gave only lukewarm support, 25 to 17; on a minor consumer-protection bill prohibiting debt-collection agencies from harassment of debtors, Democrats were in favor 158 to 105 while the freshmen among them opposed the measure, 15 to 27; an amendment prohibiting federal funding of Legal Aid-backed desegregation suits was opposed by Democratic members 150 to 101, but supported by the freshmen Democrats, 21 to 20. The pattern extends to proposals of shifting money to social programs, antibusing amendments, minimum-wage provisions and, to a lesser extent, to measures prohibiting federal funding of abortions. The difficulties facing the consumer-protection agency bill and the election-day registration bill are in large part attributable to the lack of support among the first-term Democrats.

In writing about the two most recently elected classes in the House, there has been a strong tendency in the press to lump them together with an emphasis on their shared "questioning attitude" and "unwillingness to accept the status quo." This vantage point results in a dangerously inadequate perception of Congress: it glorifies the new members' "independence" without recognizing that changed district politics require independence as a prerequisite to election.

More important, the emphasis on shared challenges to tradition fails to recognize the dramatic ideological differences. The 75 Democrats elected in 1974 were by any standard statistical freaks, containing a disproportionate number of men and women with roots outside regular politics, from the peace and antipoverty movements, who used the lever of Watergate to win elections. What makes these Democrats unique is that they are more liberal—in the traditional sense of a commitment to social-welfare legislation, prolabor bills and income redistributing measures—than either their seniors or juniors. As a sample of long-term trends, however, the 46 Democrats elected last year are far more significant. They won election in a year when the remnants of the left-wing politics of the 1960s no longer had the adhesive of Watergate to hold together a dying coalition; the presidential candidates were not, except perhaps in the South, major factors at the congressional levels; geographically, the 46 were elected from districts that are likely to produce most change in the composition of the House after the 1980 census: the Sunbelt tier and suburbia.

The result of these political circumstances is a freshman class of Democrats that votes more conservatively on domestic social issues than any other class in the House. Their conservative votes reflect what might be described, more accurately, as rational representation of middle-class interests. While not insensitive to the needs of and pressures on minorities and the poor, the critical factor for these representatives in the casting of a vote is the protection of the economic and social gains of those who are not in poverty. This style of representation includes a strong commitment to procedural

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reform of the House, but, while the 75 Democrats of 1974 blended reform with the basic tenets of liberalism, the freshmen have an entirely different ideological undercurrent. To them, an integral, although largely unstated, element of reform is the curbing of major parts of the basic Democratic majority: demands from blacks, unions, and urban interests for increased spending and protective legislation. This joining of the reform drive with domestic conservatism among the youngest Democrats is probably the major factor in the seemingly exceptional strength demonstrated by the dwindling Republican minority during the 95th Congress.

In the short run, the consequences of the reform-conservatism of the freshman Democrats is already apparent in the opposition facing such bills as consumer protection, election-day registration, and common situs. In the long run, particularly after the growth in suburban and sunbelt representation following the 1980 census, the consequences are likely to prove both more subtle and significant. Still in the formative stages is the beginning of a major dispute over the distribution of funds, pitting the South and Southwest against Northeast and Middle West, and suburb against city. This dispute now takes place in the context of the continuing shift away from discretionary grant programs—urban renewal, model cities—to formula grant programs patterned in part on the principle of revenue-sharing. Discretionary programs have given cities the opportunity to take the litany of evidence of distress—percentages of decayed housing, number of unemployed, loss of small businesses—to federal executive branch agencies and there to corner all appropriations for housing or unemployment programs. More affluent suburban governments were often either out of the running or unwilling to compete for funds requiring that recipients provide housing for the poor.

In 1974, however, 11 of the major urban programs were consolidated into a formula program—Community Development—in a pattern followed by a number of lesser public-works and unemployment programs. Formulas guaranteed the distribution of money outside city limits to almost every governmental jurisdiction, no matter how affluent. More important, the creation of these formulas gave Congress the authority to determine precisely how the money for each of these programs will be distributed, down to the smallest county in the state. Debates on alternative formulas in the House are not conducted on the basis of need but of computer printouts showing dollar figures for each state, city, suburb, and county for the duration of an appropriation.

Over the past three years, however, the effect has been to shift all the new funds to jurisdictions, largely in the Southeast and South, that had been receiving no money under the old, discretionary system, and to maintain funds for the older cities in the Northeast and Midwest at essentially stagnant levels, despite inflation. Legislation passed in the current session prevented a sharp cutback in the housing-aid levels to the older cities, but it is highly questionable whether existing formulas can survive the shift in the balance of power in the House after the next census.

Although the prospect of redrawn districts is still three elections away, it is a growing force in the thinking of members of the House, particularly younger members who have the least leverage with the state legislatures that set the new district lines. The problem of redistricting is most acute for white members who represent urban districts that have been core bases of liberal support in the past.

In these areas the proportion of whites has been steadily declining, and the typical response has been to create black core districts while forcing white incumbents to compete for a declining number of seats that are being diluted with larger chunks of suburban wards and precincts. Gephardt, for example, noted in an interview that Missouri

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will probably lose one of its ten seats. The likely prospect is that his district will be pushed further out of St. Louis to the more conservative south, in a move to preserve the majority black district for the current incumbent, William Clay, in the northern half of St. Louis, and to prevent any court challenge based on discrimination.

The practice of creating black districts, characteristic of most northern cities—including St. Louis, Cleveland, New York, Detroit, Baltimore and Chicago—has cut two ways. It has guaranteed a solid block of black representation in the House but at the same time has served to create almost lily-white districts in the same communities, consequently eliminating from these districts what had been a source of pressure to support traditional Democratic programs.

The almost universal practice has been to effectively place all blacks in a city in one or more districts, depending on the numbers, so that the black voting majority ranges from 55 to 80 percent, and then to establish adjoining white districts with black populations of 2 to 20 percent. The consequence, in the politics of the House, is that the problems associated with central cities are reduced to the problems of the black congressional caucus, a group gaining in sophistication and seniority but increasingly isolated from many of their white, urban colleagues.

What appears to be happening, if the freshman Democrats do represent a long-term trend, is that, as congressional Republicans move further to the right and decrease in numbers, the vacuum in the center is being filled by Democrats, and that the majority party is itself moving to the right. On this assumption, the probability is that over the next three years the House will progressively recede from its public image as a force for continued deficit-spending and become at least a partial ally of the Carter adminstration's goal of a balanced budget, despite the grumbling from O'Neill and other House leaders that such a goal does not deserve a first priority from a Democratic administration.

The concept of a balanced budget coincides with the kind of reform impulse characteristic of the new member and of their constituencies, voters who see the placement of ethical restraints on members of Congress as an integral part of a larger constraint on the spending and regulatory practices of government, practices that were until now basic to the Democratic party and to the majorities it won among blacks, unions, and in city wards and precincts. □

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Stanley Plastrik

Socialists vs. Communists in France

> What is happening in the Communist party? What's wrong there? Isn't it because the Socialist party has become the first party of France, of the left, because we have carried off so many victories? As for our partners, they have stayed at the level where they were. Does this mean that the Communists want to deal only with a weak Socialist movement? Does it disturb them that popular hope henceforth moves in our direction, toward our ideas and the future that we project?
>
> — FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, after the rupture of the CP-SP Alliance, *Le Monde*, September 27, 1977

A cartoon in the Paris rightist daily *Figaro* shows a gleeful (President of the Republic) Valéry Giscard d'Estaing watching a television screen on which François Mitterrand (Socialist party), Georges Marchais (Communist party) and Robert Fabré (Left-Radicals) attack one another. Turning to his Prime Minister Raymond Barre, Giscard says, "They're right, you know. We don't let them appear often enough on television!"

The great majority of the French now hold the Communists primarily responsible for the breakup of the alliance established five years ago; but this has not changed the wide-spread mood of anger, frustration, and disgust on the part of many with the left in general. The French left has managed to deal itself a heavy, damaging blow.

What began as a classic French struggle between "left" and "right," with the leftist alliance strongly favored, has become over the past few months a far more complex struggle, thanks to the split within the left. The right, unified for the moment by the miseries of the left—to the point of producing a common election manifesto—is clearly in for trouble over the determined drive for power mounted by Jacques Chirac, mayor of Paris and leader of the neo-Gaullists, an outright reactionary who is after the moderate liberal Giscard's head. Opinion polls now show a steady drop in the leftist majority, so impressive in the summer, with the outcome uncertain.

Now each of the left parties is pursuing its own electoral campaign, running its candidates in all the districts of the country and aiming to poll as many first-round seats as possible in March. (Victory on the first round requires 51 percent of the votes.) The first round usually is far from decisive, with only about 20 percent of the seats being filled; the decisive election takes place on the following Sunday, *le deuxième tour*. No candidate, no matter how low his vote percentage, is automatically eliminated after the first round. All may run again if they choose to do so in the following week's runoff election. But here is where "deals" take place, with weaker candidates withdrawing in favor of the stronger, so that most districts end up with

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merely two candidates—one representing the "right," the other the "left." The now-broken Alliance (whose program included a proposal to drop the strange electoral system just described and to replace it with some form of proportional representation) provided for withdrawal of all but the strongest left candidate—Socialist, Communist, or Radical—who then, bolstered by the votes of the left Alliance, would face the candidate of the right. But what will happen now? It is hard to foresee what may occur in the three months that remain before the election.

The Socialists, following the "high road" set for them by Mitterrand, have indicated their intention to withdraw those of their candidates who lag behind the Communists on the first round. The strategy is to act as if the rupture had not occurred.

But will the local SP bodies go along with this policy in all cases? Doubtful. More important, will those who are not party members, the floating electorate whose votes are often decisive in close campaigns, go to the polls to vote Communist on the second round? Seriously doubtful. As for the Communists, they have hinted more than once, so deep are their differences with the Socialists now, that they will not withdraw in their favor—either they will maintain their candidacy, thus splitting the left vote and assuring a rightist victory, or they will support the liberal-centrist Giscardiens!

At the moment we know only that the CP leadership plans to meet in January to take stock of the situation, to evaluate its violent campaign against the Socialists and the affects this has had on the CP's consolidation and membership recruitment. If the anti-Socialist "hard-line" has been successful, it will be pursued and the possibility of repairing the alliance will be dim; if the return of the CP "to the ghetto" has intensified its isolation, then the "hard-line" may be reconsidered or, at the very least, the internal struggle known to be going on within the CP may take on new forms. From the Socialist viewpoint, the Alliance can easily be reformed; a telephone call, so to say, will do the trick.

What effect this might have on the March voting is impossible to foretell. This election simply does not lend itself to predictions. Further, despite problems on the left, the Gaullists on the right continue to compete against their partners, the supporters of Giscard d'Estaing and his Republican party. The Louis Harris Institute of France now gives Chirac's neo-Gaullists only 20 percent of the vote, with Giscard's party drawing 22 percent. And—to everyone's great surprise—the combined Socialists and Communists still have the support (52 percent) of the majority of French voters—down from the high point of 54 percent, but still a clear majority! Still, 20 percent of those polled remain undecided at this point: a decisive factor. This is why, once more, the Socialist leader François Mitterrand continues to reject any thought of abandoning the left-wing Alliance, and threatens to expel from his party anyone advocating cooperation with the centrists (Giscardiens, etc.) to form a socialist-center government after the elections. More than the prospect of governing France with a hostile, uncooperative Communist party, he fears a destruction of the Socialist party such as occurred under the Fourth Republic when the SP took part in coalition governments with the right.

How did France arrive at this point? We know that what has been called the postwar era, during which the country, roughly since 1947, lived under conservative-Gaullist rule, is drawing to an end. In 1972 the two parties of the left, one sunk in its "ghetto" and unable to gain more than 15 percent of the electorate, the other in a state of inner collapse and disintegration, joined forces. The *Union de la Gauche* was formed, with its carefully hammered-out *Programme Commun*, to be applied when the left would take power. The alliance proved to be successful beyond expectations. The SP came back to life. In 1974 its leader, Mitterrand, came within a hairs-breath of winning the presidency. And now its membership has reached one-quarter of a million, with a major influx of new workers, middle-class professionals, technicians, gov-

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ernment employees into the party. The CP, though much less successful, nevertheless also can claim gains from the Alliance—with a strengthened hold over local municipalities and working-class suburbs, expansion of its trade-union activities, the party militants coming out of their shell. Most important, the tendency of Eurocommunism was born. Even though the party has done with the chilling unanimity characteristic of this once most Stalinist of Europe's Stalinist parties, the ancient slogan "dictatorship of the proletariat" was dropped. Implicit in this action was the CP's abandonment of the insurrectionary road to power and at least a partial acceptance of the rules of parliamentary democracy.

Meanwhile, the economic picture in France darkened. There was the growing inflation, unemployment topping the million mark, and thus the closing of the door to immigrant workers from Southern Europe; the French economy was failing to respond to fiscal stimuli, and there was growing inequity in the social sphere. Thus the victory of the left in the approaching parliamentary elections seemed certain. But early in 1977 some new signs made their appearance. The tone of the Communist press hardened slightly; a few by-elections and municipal elections found the CP not doing what it was expected to do, i.e., withdrawing in favor of its stronger partner. The real crunch, however, came in the summer when the tripartite commission met to discuss updating *(actualisation)* of the Common Program. What was expected to be a simple editorial procedure, taking into account events of the past five years, would end dramatically in September at a final meeting that adjourned *sine die* after Marchais scornfully rejected new Socialist proposals on nationalization as unworthy of consideration. The reality was, however, that the Communist paper *l'Humanité*, scheduled to appear the following day, had already been printed and was being distributed with a banner headline already announcing the rupture, denouncing the Socialists and with a centerfold printed in six million copies to be posted throughout France, attacking the Socialist party! The violence of the split had already been anticipated in August when a Communist-CGT workers' delegation from a plant involved in building the Concorde plane invaded and momentarily seized control of a TV news broadcasting studio, in an action defended by the party to the consternation of the Socialists and the general public.

Why? Why, above all now, on the eve of electoral victory? One immediate explanation was the hypothesis that Marchais was yielding to Russian pressure. The Soviet Union's hostility to Mitterrand is scarcely a secret; he is suspected of an anti-Soviet bias, of sympathy for the Russian dissidents and the East European opposition. He is a friend of the Bonn Social Democratic government, of Schmidt and Willy Brandt (one of the *l'Humanité* headlines read: "The Hand of Bonn?"). Nor is it a secret that the Russians prefer the moderate, somewhat neutralist and cool-to-the-Americans regime represented by

Too Late

. . . Ivan arrives at the concentration camp and is asked by another inmate why he was arrested. "I was too late," Ivan says. Asked what he means, Ivan explains:

"Vasily and I were talking last night. He said the beef was getting scarce again, and I said yes, and that there would be another long wait for a new apartment. He said his new suit fell apart the first time he wore it, and I said it was because the party can't do anything right. So it went, until the bar closed and we went home. But at 3 A.M. I woke up and realized that Vasily could send me to a concentration camp if he denounced me for what I'd said.

"I also realized I could send Vasily to a concentration camp, but I realized that he realized it, too. Therefore, to prevent me from denouncing him to protect myself from his denunciation, he would have to denounce me first.

"So I got up and went to the police station to denounce him first. But I was too late."

— From "Silent Fall," Malcolm W. Browne, *New York Times*, October 23, 1977

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Giscard to a Socialist Foreign Ministry in a Mitterrand government. Little wonder then, that even *le Monde* (France's leading paper, which had urged conciliationism with the French Communists for some time) published an angry editorial against the Communists entitled "The Hand of Moscow."

However, matters are far from simple. Annie Kriegel, a former Communist leader who now writes for *Figaro*, rejected this simplistic hypothesis in the September 26, 1977 issue:

> Has the French CP, which has gone so far and so brusquely, Eurocommunized itself in the past two years, has it suddenly made a turnabout under the pressure of Moscow?. . . Is this a real, a good question? Indeed, no! The fact that the PCF belongs to the international Communist movement . . does not imply that Brezhnev at present has the power or the will to impose his views upon Marchais. In fact, the PCF's reconquest of a degree of autonomy is not the product of a recent conversion to Eurocommunism. It is for more than 20 years the product of the need that exists within every highly complex multinational organism to assure the relative cohesion of the whole without going too far in checking the initiative and vitality of the elements that form it.
>
> It is therefore useless to look for the channels by which an order of Brezhnev could have reached Marchais, an order such as: "Break up the Union of the Left. Immediate execution. Rupture." On other occasions things have happened in this way between Moscow and Paris. But not today.

The simple fact is that today, since the rupture, Moscow remains just as jittery and apprehensive about the French party as before. (One of the complaints appearing in *Pravda* about the Parti Communiste Français was that its leadership contains "too many Jews"!) Nor is it any less nervous over the threat of Eurocommunism. And with good reason: national communism will not vanish from the political scene.

If the Soviet bureaucracy's opposition to the French party's alliance was there from the beginning (1972), Marchais, the party leader, nevertheless went ahead on his own. But why has Marchais now for all practical purposes deliberately ended the alliance, much to the obvious satisfaction of the Russians? Here we can only speculate. (We do know, however,

A Letter from Italy: ". . . taking everything in charge."

". . . it is almost not a communism in the sense that it is not at all a matter of a system of social and political thought stemming from Soviet Marxism, but a practical policy that, with its undulating diversity of means, its finesse, its intelligence, its realism, is totally dominated by the Party's aggressive imperialism. The PCI (Italian Communist party) is taking in hand the entire society with all its conflicts; it accepts all the contradictions and nuances; above all, it gives special attention to institutions of all kinds in which it buries and encrusts itself in such a way that it is not content to control them but makes them function to its profit. It is becoming very clear that it is creating in this way a system of power unique in the world, alongside of which the crude bureaucratic policy of the Soviet type is the mere brutal sloppiness of primitives.

"The PCI has become the dominant party and it penetrates, manipulates, determines all the other forces. Hence, a very large number of men who call themselves (and who believe they are) Christian Democrats, Socialists, etc., or state officials, industrialists, merchants, etc., live and act under the tenure of the PCI, have become its clientele, and obligated to it, can no longer enter into serious conflict with it without placing in jeopardy their livelihood, standing, and influence. With this the relations between Moscow and the PCI have become reversed, in the same way and for the same reasons as the relations between the PCI and the Christian Democrats. The PCI no longer appears to the Soviet bureaucracy as a threat but, in an immediate sense, as an ally, difficult to understand, impossible for the moment to reintegrate into Soviet political and intellectual categories, but an inevitable ally who, in the long run, offers a possible path for the evolution of the bureaucratic system.

"Eurocommunism is really an evolution of Stalinism, conserving the preeminent, hegemonic role of the party. Such at least is the case for Italy."

P. P.

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that the party's rank and file is bewildered and unhappy, that a vague and confused struggle goes on at every level of the party.) Whatever evolution the French CP has undergone, greater openness of discussion is not part of it. The hard crust of dogma and impenetrability that has always surrounded this once most Stalinist of Stalinist parties remains. Marchais boasts that 30,000 party cell leaders (the famous "cadres"), at meetings in October, unanimously endorsed the new party line.

Then why the rupture? The answer lies in the CP's national situation and its leaders' estimation of the party's perspective as it reaches out for political power. A small Stalinist gang exists within the party, tightly controlled, but the new Marchais leadership (75 percent of the French CP membership has joined the party since the end of World War II) is carving out an alternative road to power that rejects insurrection, subversion, armed struggle. This was the meaning of last year's fanfare surrounding the party's dropping of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Strategically, the Communists seek a gradual accretion of power—political and parliamentary power, union power, and power over the nationalized industries; power over independent institutions of French society, and power over the state. Whether the CP can attain these goals is another matter. Undermining the Socialist party and its growing influence is a major element in this long-range strategy. Five years of a Unity pact served its limited purpose; but the Socialists were the principal gainers—so it was time to break, and change course. If need be, the Alliance can be picked up again.

In any case, should an Alliance government be formed in March, we shall see the CP both in it and out of it simultaneously. It will accept a minority role, including minor ministerial posts. But from the outside—holding the Socialist majority responsible, of course—it will criticize, play the demagogue, apply pressure through its CGT unions. In general, the CP will pursue its own path. Either way, an exasperated Mitterrand will have his hands full.*

But a revitalized Socialist party has many things operating in its favor. The French Communist party is not the machine it once was. Its membership is inexperienced, its Stalinist faction is disruptive, its influence over the left intellectuals of France has become nil, its Leninist-centralized machinery creaks when called upon to act. Most important, the French workers, including those most directly influenced by the Communists (party members and CGT unionists), no longer propose to ape the Soviet Union, once the "workers' paradise"; in fact, they care very little about Russia. This is agreed upon by all observers who have contact with the party. Except for some old-time Stalinized workers only too happy once again to be on the outs with the Socialists, the general membership is sceptical about the leadership, and the party's word is not accepted as unquestioned as it once was.

The working class of France is unsure of itself and its role; this is not the world of Popular Front France of 1936, and working-class experience over the past 40 years has been embittering and disillusioning. No party in France, no leader, and no union can claim any longer its blind devotion; it judges by actions that relate to its condition of life, its influence in the shop and in political institutions, its right to its own say. This turn has been to the decided advantage of the Socialists, whose regenerated party has drawn largely upon *new* workers in the provinces.

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*The differences between the two left parties are not only over how many larger industrial combines with their affiliates are to be taken over, but include such matters as how these are to be nationalized, the issue of compensation, how they are to be run after nationalization (workers' control, etc.); alos, national defense, with the Communists opting for a "neutral" France and the Socialists favoring limited cooperation in NATO, pending a general disarmament; taxation, minimum wage level and wage differentials, education, and a host of other problems. Important as these disagreements are, it is the strategy of governance—one's vision of the France of the future—that really counts.

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The large French middle class is even less enchanted with the Soviets and is quite familiar with Solzhenitsyn and the facts about Gulag and the Russian dissident movement. Its temper is moderate, somewhat left-of-center; France is ready for change, but *vas y molo* (take it easy . . .). This can be turned to Socialist advantage, particularly electorally where the party aims at a 40 percent vote. Many middle-class French who would not vote Communist on the second round would vote Socialist; if there's no socialist candidate they would prefer a moderate-centrist (a Giscardien), to a Communist candidate. This might be decisive in the election and can easily force a showdown in the few days between the two electoral rounds, now announced for March 12 and 19.

The Socialist trump card is François Mitterrand. Georges Marchais once referred

"Better to Have Your Enemy in Front of You than Alongside!"

We were among ourselves Wednesday evening at the Communist meeting near the Porte de Pantin; the atmosphere was like that of the festival for l'*Humanité*. Post, Telephone, and Telegraph militants were selling sandwiches at the Metro exit; others were handing out CP membership forms. And, just as he had done at the l'*Humanité* festival, M. Gaston Plissonier, a member of the Party secretariat, announced how many had signed up during the meeting: more than 400. Why join the French Communist party? The only way to fight perseveringly for union and change, said M. Marchais. In response, the audience chanted, "Union! Action! With the Communists!—this being the replacement for "Union! Action! Common Program!"

"Is it really over?" a young man asks. He is holding a membership form. "I'm on the fence. I don't know who's right. I've come to get the facts."

"Get the facts? Don't you read the papers? Haven't you got the picture yet? You want the fat capitalists to go on running the show?"

Clearly, the young man wants no such thing. "Maybe it's enough to control, without nationalizing everything," he says. "And it'll cost less that way."

"No, it won't," the CP militant replies, "because the idea is to indemnify only the small stockholders."

They continue to talk as they walk toward the building, which is filling up rapidly. People are arriving in groups; they know each other, and call gaily back and forth. In the hall, a song by Yves Montand is coming over the loudspeakers. "There, you see? They're not holding any grudges. And after what he said about us!"

An older activist finds the Socialists exactly as he'd always known them to be. "For years they've leaned on us to betray the workers. Do you remember the Popular Front, and Mollet's policy afterward?"

"But the Communists voted him full powers."

The older man is annoyed. "That's a misleading argument. Yes, full powers were voted, but so that he'd make peace in Algeria, not build up the war."

The young secretary intervenes. "The old Socialos haven't changed. And the proof? Mitterrand is going to Bonn to see Schmidt."

. . . The name of the Federal German Chancellor will be booed when Marchais, in his speech, includes it among the Socialist leaders who "follow the same policy as Giscard and Barre." Mention of Mitterrand will elicit nothing but silence, with maybe a whistle here or there.

"So, we go on with the same people for another 15 or 20 years?" the hesitant, come-to-get-the-facts fellow asks.

"Look," someone answers, "other people are as disappointed as you are. It's 15 years we've been fighting for unity."

"Aren't the Socialists better than the men who are in power now?"

"You know something," the militant old-timer says, "I'd rather have my enemy in front of me than alongside me."

Some 50 members of the Central Committee walk up onto the big platform, and are greeted by a long ovation. All eyes are on Marchais. "Did you see JoJo? He looks awful. Things are going badly, for sure."

—Patrick Jarreau, *Le Monde, Sept. 27, 1977*

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to Mitterrand as "a Man of Destiny," a view the latter shares. He thinks of himself as a de Gaulle of the "left," with a broader appeal to the French than any contemporary political figure. He is destined to preside over a France undergoing major transformation; his instrument to arrive at this position is the Socialist party—a party that might succeed in Alliance with the Communists. Mitterrand maintains tight control over his own party, encouraging democratic and open discussion but not tolerating organized factions. The party today is a mixture of old Socialists (veteran followers of the Guy Mollet tradition), political intellectuals (Régis Debray, Giles Martinet), but principally of new and vital members coming from several sources: technicians and professionals, skilled workers and experts employed in government and industry, a large number of workers and middle class from outside Paris (small cities in the provinces, recently drawn into industrial life); men and women—not too many young people—drawing away from France's liberal Catholicism toward the left and with a high measure of confidence in Mitterrand. He himself has come late to his Socialist beliefs; his culture, manner, and learning are classically French, his political tradition is centrist (ex-Radical Socialist, of centrist Resistance and post-Resistance groups), infused with personal courage and driving ambition. A popular figure with a strong mass appeal (probably somewhat reduced now because of the insistent verbal abuse leveled at him by the Communists); a superb debator and speaker, a man with literary flair and cultivation who expresses himself with that eloquence typical of the French intellectual.

His shift toward socialism expresses the sincere conviction that French society cannot democratize itself or move toward greater equality under its present leadership, that a fundamental change is required but through orderly and democratic means. Mitterrand is no vacillating Leon Blum of the Popular Front period, no Fierlinger of a 1947 Czechoslovakia; he will not yield to Communist pressures. But his determination to put into effect the 1972 Common Program, provided the Socialists come out of the elections as the top party, has tended to make his SP colleagues too dependent upon him, perhaps to the neglect of building this loosely organized party into a more disciplined, better organized movement with a wider leadership. Even if the Communists appear, for the moment, to have abandoned the idea of taking part in government, this mass party with its tight, collective leadership, its energy that makes its presence felt in every corner of France, remains a formidable machine. And this machine now clearly sees as its Enemy No. 1 the Socialist party.

Three months before the elections the French electorate is confused, divided, and disgusted. The major political "activity" is that of the Communists in their obsessive campaign to cut the Socialists down to size. But a majority of the French cry out for change. There is certainly no revolutionary atmosphere in the country; the moderate leftist Mitterrand-Socialist viewpoint is probably closest to what most people want. The French remain essentially a nation of moderates, given to occasional outbursts (the last being the student revolt of 1968), wedded to the notion of the "good life" and counter to the Communist perspective of austerity and turmoil. As 30 million French prepare to go to the polls, Mitterrand and his party are following the advice of the French sociologist Alain Touraine: "The Socialist party must act in such a way as to be recognized as the principal political force by which more vitality, justice, and freedom can develop in this country."

Now one must await the result. □

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Eurocommunism — Reality, Myth, Hope, or Delusion?

The recent developments in the West European Communist parties have evoked a major discussion within socialist ranks. We too, in and near Dissent, *have joined in this discussion—naturally, with a variety of opinions and emphases. In the discussion below, we start with the view of two* Dissent *editors; continue with the views of the noted Polish philosopher in exile, Leszek Kolakowski (reprinted with permission from* Encounter *magazine); and end with two comments on Kolakowski's article (to which, of course, he has been invited to reply if he wishes to).* — EDS.

Irving Howe

Something New under the Sun

Whatever else it may be, Eurocommunism—or the range of political phenomena we conveniently bunch under that label—represents something new. To say, something new, is not necessarily to say something good; it is just to say, something new. There can be disagreement as to when it began, or the extent of the newness, or the likelihood of still further, deeper changes. But the one view not to be taken seriously is that of the neoconservatives and right-wing social democrats (in the U.S., almost indistinguishable) that Eurocommunism represents a tactical maneuver, perhaps even secretly blessed by Moscow, or that since there is in the world some eternal essence called Communism, that essence must survive eternally.

I agree with those who urge a healthy skepticism toward the Communist parties of Western Europe, or who point to the many ways (ideology, organizational structure, habits of thought, etc.) in which even the more heterodox Communists retain some of the traits of Stalinism. Nor is there any reason to deny that the entry of Communists into West European governments would pose serious problems. Nevertheless: something new has occurred, becoming sharper and clearer in the last few years. And, I think, we are witnessing the merest beginnings of this phenomenon. It has, like almost everything else in the world, its dangers; still, we socialists and liberals ought to find encouragement in its appearance. The Austrian Prime Minister Bruno Kreisky, a right-wing social democrat, puts it dryly but well: "Social democrats have no reason to consider it a defeat when the two largest Communist parties in democratic Europe formally reject political formulae that belong to the most immutable principles of so-called Marxism-Leninism."

A process of great significance is taking place: the gradual, perhaps inexorable break-up of the Communist monolith. It began with Tito, continued with Mao, and has now spread to many of the Communist parties that

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long proclaimed undeviating loyalty to Moscow. Some of these divergent tendencies, like Maoism, are repugnant to socialists; others offer a qualified hope that they will slowly transform themselves in a democratic spirit. But there can be no doubt that, from socialist and democratic premises, the process of division within the Communist world is a desirable one. In our modest way, we must help it along.

Not only the structural monolith of Communism, but also its ideological system ("Marxism-Leninism") is crumbling. Who, in the world of West European Communism, still believes in "the dictatorship of the proletariat"? Well, Cunhal, the fanatical leader of the Portuguese party, does; no doubt some functionaries and rank-and-filers of the French party do; but the old unity of belief has been shattered. Once that is shattered, further heresies and deviations are inevitable. This is a fact of historical importance. In our modest way, we must help it along.

That some of the West European CPs seek new political approaches testifies to the *relative stability* of democracy. True, things are bad in Italy, but even there the CP leadership realizes that the "revolutionary perspective," whether traditional Leninist or Stalinist adulteration, is obsolete. Ideology and slogans catch up, slowly, painfully with reality. The Communist parties of France and Italy have not been revolutionary, in any sense, for some years; it is a question whether mass parties, increasingly integrated into the social life of their countries, *can* be revolutionary. Formally abandoning "the dictatorship of the proletariat" as a perspective and coming out for pluralist, multiparty democracy, these parties tacitly and in some instances openly recognize that their old versions of Leninism simply do not work.

Regarding the significance of this I would quote with agreement from Horst Ehmke, a member of the Executive of the German Social Democratic party, not notorious for leftism:

> All three Communist parties—the Italian, the Spanish, and even the French—accept that ideological, political, and social pluralism should be maintained even during the process of building up socialism, and have declared that they would be prepared at any time to bow to the decision of the electorate. Much of this is a question of tactics. But nevertheless it is of some importance in the long-term that even Communists now admit the inherent value of the basic rights and political freedoms of bourgeois democracy. . . . Whether this will lead to a genuine and final change of heart on the part of the Western European Communists is impossible to predict. But the process alone represents a turning point in the history of the Communist parties which is well worth our careful consideration.

Still another cause for the rise of Eurocommunism, hard to measure but foolish to underestimate, is the influence the East European dissidents have had upon at least some Western Communists. Far more than formal statements of the West European parties in defense of dissidents' rights is at stake. What matters most is the gradual penetration of the ideas, the passionate outcries of the East European dissidents into the minds of some—how many? who knows?—Communist intellectuals and activists, the bulk of whom, by the way, joined their parties after the Khrushchev revelations and were not directly touched by the worst excesses of Stalinism. It is startling, especially as a symptom, that an Italian CP magazine should ask for regular writings from Roy Medvedev, the Russian dissident historian who in his own country is denied publication.

II

There are other, more local reasons for the appearance of Eurocommunism.

In France: pressures of the student uprisings of 1968 that provided ideological competition to the CP; the inherent limits, frustrations faced by a party large enough to gather 20 percent of the vote yet cut off from political rule and unable, probably unwilling, to play a revolutionary role yet also severely limited in its capacity to play a reformist one; the loss of support among intellectuals, not dramatic but a steady erosion; the recent

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growth of the Socialist party, competing successfully for the adherence of the "new" or technical working class; the widespread circulation and acceptance of Solzhenitsyn's reports on Gulag Archipelago, so that (according to expert French observers) many people who vote for the French CP do so out of a desire for social change but certainly do not want to see anything like a duplication of East Europe; but most of all: the fact that the French working class, even though large portions of it continue to vote for the CP, has come to be absorbed into the "system," enjoying a better material life and, while still committed to social change, showing few if any signs of revolutionary insurgency.

In Italy: the massive institutionalization of the CP in the country's political and social life, so that it begins to have a stake in preventing a socioeconomic catastrophe; genuine, half-veiled intellectual developments among crucial segments of the party, with some members of its Central Committee publicly advancing the view (recently expressed by the Spanish CP leader Carrillo) that the Soviet Union is not a socialist society, but a bureaucratic or state capitalist dictatorship; but most of all: the realization that any attempt to achieve "structural reforms" will have to rest on "more than 51 percent" of the population. (The Italian CP has studied the Chilean experience rather carefully and some of its spokesmen have indicated an awareness of the way overly hasty measures, unnecessarily antagonizing "middle" segments of the population, contributed to the downfall of the leftist Allende government.)

Many of the Communist parties in Western Europe, both large and small, are undergoing changes. These comprise more than tactical maneuvers, though in part, of course, they are that. These comprise less than ideological transformations, though in part, also, they are that. Since we confront here a process, rather than an accomplished fact, there are likely to be ebbs and flows, forward and backward steps, allowing hope to those excessively optimistic and reinforcement to those excessively pessimistic.

The Communist parties of Italy and Spain, that of France somewhat less so, are not Leninist or Stalinist parties, though they retain considerable elements of the latter. Neither are they social democratic parties, though the Italian CP comes increasingly to resemble one. It is most useful to think of them as new kinds of parties for which we don't yet have an adequate name; hence, the catch-all, "Eurocommunism."

Within these parties there are clotted remains of Stalinism; workers sincerely committed to some version of radicalism but in their style of life utterly unprepared for revolutionary action; middle-level party officials ambitious for office and power but quite alien to revolutionary perspectives (can you imagine the Communist mayor of Bologna rushing off to rifle practice if the CP were to make a political shift leftward?); new intellectuals ranging from careerist parrots to people seriously engaged in political thought. Diverse tendencies, conflicting interests, incipient disagreements—all these are just *beginning* to manifest themselves, and we may expect political zig-zags, confusion, factional struggles and perhaps splits. It will be a long, tortuous process, but at the end looms the possibility—that, but no more—of a disintegration of the Communist movement, an end to the stranglehold it has held on the workers of certain European countries, and perhaps, thereby, a renewal of a militant and democratic socialism.

III

Blessed is the country without a Communist movement, or at least with a weak one. But we are talking here about those countries where the Communist party is very strong, though experiencing various degrees of crisis, and the question is whether the recent turn or drift toward Eurocommunism offers new possibilities for the socialists.

I think it does, but with a good many obvious risks. The first opportunity is that of electoral blocs that would enable the left to move beyond the permanent frustration of being locked into minority status or of accepting posts in coalition regimes that by

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their very nature cannot satisfy socialist expectations. The second opportunity, beckoning along the road of "competitive collaboration," is that of helping to accelerate and deepen the tendencies within the Communist movement that seem to be pointing toward a democratic socialist perspective. By "competitive collaboration" I mean a policy of agreeing to limited and cautious electoral blocs, as in France, while continuing to express a fundamental criticism of all brands of totalitarianism, especially that of Moscow.

That this policy can work we see from recent events in France, where the Communists, fearful of organizational losses to the Socialist party, have decided to rupture the electoral alliance. Temporarily this may even help the CP: we don't know. But in the long run, provided the Socialists maintain a principled radical politics, the CP will probably lose, either because it retreats to the sterility of isolation, able to pursue successfully neither a revolutionary nor a reformist course, or because it shows itself to be faltering in its efforts to escape that sterility.

My interest here is not to discuss the specific situation in France, which Stanley Plastrik does on another page; nor to examine the strategic and tactical problems that Eurocommunism poses for socialists and democrats in Europe. What I want to stress is that, just as it is fatuous to speak of the Communist parties of Italy, France, and Spain as having become democratic, so it is foolish to deny that significant changes have occurred. These changes point to a major historical crisis for the Communist movement, and by the same token, to major political opportunities for European socialism. One hopes that the leadership of European socialism will be both principled and bold enough to seize the day. □

Bogdan Denitch

Some Dilemmas — and Hopes

Our perceptions of Communist politics in Western Europe are critically linked to periods in the past. Is it our memories of the CPs in their pre-Stalinist forms—sectarian, aggressive, ultra-left parties; or of the CPs in the Popular Front period—Stalinized, endlessly opportunistic, and ruthlessly centralized; or yet the CPs of the Resistance period—when the clandestinity and hardness of the parties was an asset in resisting the Nazi Occupation? All these CPs are historically valid, and so are a number of others: the small Scandinavian parties, which are, with the exception of that in Finland, sects of true believers irrelevant to the political processes of their countries; there also are the stable city machines of the Italian Red Belt and the rural radicals and oppositionists of Southern Italy, the efficient trade-union bureaucrats of the CGT in France, and the reborn Spanish party that is composed mostly of members who were born after Stalin's death. All these are "real" Communist parties.

Most of the CPs now assert their independence from Moscow with various degrees of harshness, repeatedly stressing their commitment to pluralist parliamentary democracy as the framework for socialism. It is not true, however, and this seems to me self-evident, that there is such a thing as "Eurocommunism," with a common ideology, let alone a common strategy. It follows that it is absurd to talk about a common response to the European Communist parties by other

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political forces, specifically by democratic socialists.

First, whatever else may be true about the European Communist parties, it is clear that Moscow's domination of their internal life has ended. This is not to say that there are no parties, and no groups of members in parties, that remain pro-Soviet; nor is it to say that all the parties are equally critical of the Soviet Union and its East European dependencies. It is also true that regardless of the range of criticism of Soviet practices, few Communist theoreticians have attempted a systematic reanalysis of what Soviet society is or is not. Carrillo of Spain is ahead of the pack when he states that the Soviet Union is not a socialist society, but he is clearly not alone. It is also evident that pro-Soviet sentiment, when it does exist, is now the voluntary political expression of views obnoxious to us rather than the response of a coordinated, integrated international apparat. In short, the phenomenon of "Eurocommunism" represents, at the very least, the organizational and ideological disintegration of the international Communist movement.

This disintegration may lead to no more than national Communist parties that can be individually as unlovely as the international movement they have replaced. But, in power terms, the end of Soviet hegemony over the nonruling parties of Western Europe is an important phenomenon in its own right.

Second, the breakdown of the Soviet hegemony has brought to the fore the always latent and sometimes basic differences among the various Western Communist parties. These reflect not merely their respective organizational strengths but often deep-going theoretical differences uneasily covered up in the past and now reemerging with increasing salience. The Italian party, for example, has always tended to be Gramscian rather than Leninist, and while skilled party theoreticians wrote reams to prove that one could be both, the emphasis in Italy was on Gramsci. This alone sharply differentiates the Italian party from all other European Communist parties. It doesn't matter for the moment whether one thinks highly of Gramsci as a theorist or not; the very fact that the Italian CP had its own indigenous "founding father" has major consequences.

Third, a party's size is another relevant factor. It is difficult to imagine a genuine mass party, such as the Italian CP, being an effective instrument for a conspiratorial secret program. Not only is the membership of the Italian CP hardly a "counter-community" of dedicated professional revolutionists; half of this membership doesn't read the Communist press and two-thirds rarely attends meetings. The likelihood that these members, plus the assorted Communist mayors and city councilmen of most Italian cities, could suddenly be transformed into ruthless barricade fighters when new orders come from party headquarters is clearly a right-wing fantasy assuming that magic powers are inherently associated with "democratic centralism," whatever that may mean. Too many of the commentators on the Western parties have read one or another version of Philip Selznick's *Organizational Weapon* and, from that point on, stopped bothering to think about any facts that might clash with this image of a CP.

A party's size, I repeat, is relevant, and this can mean that the massiveness of the CP membership limits space for maneuver by the political center, which can sometimes be a bad thing. In France, for example, it was probably rank-and-file resistance of secondary Communist trade-union leaders and provincial officeholders that pushed Marchais into the present confrontation with the Socialists and threatened the possibility of a left-wing majority in the March 1978 elections. The rank and file had simply not moved as far as had much of the party leadership, and a reassertion of familiar politics was necessary to reassure the CP militants that the party would not tail-end after the Socialists in a coalition. The general point, however, is that a mass party cannot, without risking suicide, abruptly change its mainline strategy in midcourse.

The historic examples of such changes in the CPs may be explainable by the one variable that seems to have changed: unquestioned loyalty to the Soviet Union, to the

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extent of risking one's own party on behalf of an overall policy, which now is missing. The case of the 1939 Hitler-Stalin pact illustrates this point: it was an unalloyed disaster for the Western CPs. They carried out the line with considerable reluctance and later threw themselves into the antifascist war, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, with extra enthusiasm to make up for lost time, members, and prestige.

The other major historic break, the Popular Front, did not have equally drastic consequences because it represented an intelligent, long overdue shift in line justifiable in its own terms and not requiring loyalty to the Soviet Union to legitimate it. In any case, the parties that undertook those drastic shifts were smaller, less rooted in the political and social fabric of their society, and more utopian regarding the prospects of a ready road to power than are the large Western CPs today.

Clearly, therefore, while welcoming the independence of the CPs from the Soviet Union, Socialists need to relate to the CP strategically only in those countries where the Communists represent a significant section of the working-class electorate and where left-wing majorities are out of reach without them. The process I have described differs from country to country. In some cases the Western CPs are rivals and opponents, quite independent of their relationship to the Soviet Union; in other cases they are potential coalition partners, at best junior partners; and in still other cases segments of the CP, or the bulk of the party, has moved sufficiently so that it is possible to conceive of it as a full partner. In Portugal the CP is a foe. In France it is a rival but within a framework that may well include a coalition with or without a common program. In Spain and Italy the CPs, in my view, represent parties without which any development toward socialism is inconceivable. In Spain there may well be reason to propose organizational unity between the CP and the Socialists, while in Italy I find the CP far more serious about mass democratic working-class politics than is the Italian SP. There are, therefore, a number of divergent strategies that make sense in specific situations. For example, it is difficult to see why a new Social Democratic government in Sweden would not continue to accept the support of the handful of CP legislators, as it did in the past. The West German CP, on the other hand, remains an irrelevant group of Soviet pensioners.

One more general point: whatever its form, a break from Soviet hegemony is clearly a development that is unwelcome and dangerous to the Kremlin, both in the long and short run. In this respect, the Soviet leaders show more insight into the potential and immediate impact of this development than do many Western observers. The Soviets make clear that they do not welcome any government of the left in which the CP would be a minor partner—which, after all, in the foreseeable future is the most optimistic possibility for the Western parties.

There are a number of reasons for Soviet hostility, and it is sufficient to cite three. First, the Russians are profoundly conservative and allergic to risk-taking, especially risks that might affect the present balance of relations with the West, including the United States. Second, the new developments reduce the prestige and power of the Soviet leadership both internationally and domestically, since the legitimation of that bureaucracy lay partly in the "leading role" of the Russian party. Third, the West European CPs increasingly stress the importance of the strand of opposition within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that is most dangerous to the Russian bureaucracy—the Marxist and socialist opposition.

While the Western press focuses on human-rights cases that often are apolitical in the sense that they have no system-wide consequences, the Yugoslavs, for example, permit free migration without any notable weakening of party hegemony. In recent years the record of the Western CPs in defending human rights in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. has become clearer, and their tone is harsher. In some cases, as in that of Roy Medvedev, the Italian party has gone beyond mere support of "rights"—it supports and publicizes his views. Some democratic socialist and labor parties

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on the other hand have at times had a murky record in some human rights questions. The British Labour party's record in this respect vis à vis Northern Ireland and the Labor record in Israel on Arabs are examples. All this means that mass democratic parties are often inconsistent and that human rights are not the sole criterion by which the democratic credentials of a party can be judged.

The Western CPs link with the currents that represent probably the majorities or at least the pluralities throughout Eastern Europe. Even Radio Free Europe, in its surveys of what hypothetical free elections would look like in Eastern Europe, has come up with the result that in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania, were an election to occur, a Socialist party would in each case emerge as the largest by far. Without pursuing this point too far, it means that linkages with Western working-class parties—Socialist and Communist—are important in maintaining the morale of the opposition in the Communist world that is most massive and dangerous to the ruling bureaucracy.

A few other points:

In the Spanish party the overwhelming majority of the membership is young and has joined a party that was independent of direct Russian domination throughout their political lifetime. If anything, their political memory is that of continual embarrassments caused by Russian and East European repression, combined with growing hostility toward the cynical de facto relations the Soviet bloc had developed with the Franco regime in its final years. Thus, for example, the Communist miners of Asturias remember all too well that during their strikes throughout the 1960s, the Communist regime of Poland delivered coal to Spain. The Spanish CP leaders, with the exception of La Pasionara, remember with pain their years of exile in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and retain a bitterness about the experience that is as emotional as that of any democratic socialist.

The French party has such a rapid turnover of membership that its overwhelming majority has been politically socialized at a time when the Soviets were already desanctified and at best could be thought of as a lesser evil, and that primarily in foreign policy. The polemics of the French party theorists with their Soviet opposite numbers are as harsh as anything written by West European Socialists. This does not mean that the French CP has become internally a democratic party or that segments of it do not have an unrealistic and cataclysmic view of the transition to socialism, but those features are today *sui generis*. One could go on, but the central point should be clear: the parties now are in ferment, and it is unlikely that the present balance—ideologically and politically—will be maintained. The very nature of the Soviet system and of the regimes in Eastern Europe will continue to provide endless provocations.

The CPs, in order to maintain their present posture, will have to continue their criticism of the Soviet reality until the point of a final break. That may be in the relatively distant future, but so long as a remnant of a link remains, even as ephemeral as the name Communist, the CPs will be forced to comment on Soviet developments and comment in such a way as to retain the credibility of their present membership and base.

Therein lies a continued prospect of internal ferment—a prospect with many possibilities for change, and it is in the interest of democratic socialists to help speed it up. This means continued pressure, continued requests for greater clarity and precision, but also that a dialogue is essential. Everywhere except in Italy, I believe, such a dialogue will strengthen the Socialists and speed the process through which the West European CPs will either be reduced to sects or emerge as working-class parties operating within a democratic and socialist framework. In Italy, however, that dialogue has to be thought of in European rather than national terms since the Socialists there are so critically weak and the CP has shown such enormous flexibility and resourcefulness. Much nonsense, by the way, has been written about the danger the Western CPs face from leftist youth. While this is a problem not only for the CPs but for

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democratic politics in general, I believe it to be much exaggerated. The terrain "to the left" of the CPs is in general arrid and not inhabitable by substantial movements and remains the domain of political and counterculture sects.

Does all this mean that the CPs are or will become models of democratic probity in their internal and external behavior? No; but I would say that the norms of internal democracy that prevail in the Italian CP are not notably different from those in a number of Socialist parties. The Italian CP permits no organized factions, only "currents"—neither does Mitterrand's Socialist party. The CP in Italy occasionally expels dissidents, very few one might add. So does the German Social Democratic party. My point is that mass working-class institutions can be bureaucratic and unreasonable in their internal life without that being evidence of Leninist "democratic centralism." Likewise, it is entirely possible that an independent CP in Western Europe will in its own right be sectarian, ultimatist, and parochial vis-à-vis European unity.

Finally, while the large CPs of Western Europe have come out with reasonable clarity for the defense of their respective countries and Western Europe, and for at least conditional adherence to NATO, it is not at all inconceivable that large sections or entire parties will become neutralist and anti-NATO. There are also such currents in all the large Socialist parties.

Only if one takes an almost theologically sectarian view that one must be either on the side of the forces of darkness or of light can one refuse to face the fact that the disintegration of Soviet hegemony over Communist parties, some of which have substantial roots in the West European working class, is a major gain for democracy and the prospect of democratic socialism in Europe. □

Leszek Kolakowski

The Eurocommunist Schism

To try to answer the question whether there are "varieties of communism"—Euro-Communism, Asian Communism—I make three assumptions:

FIRST: *Despotism is not a "degeneration" of Communism.* So far, we haven't seen any Communism in power except in Leninist-Stalinist, totalitarian versions. There is no exception to the rule that wherever Communism has come to power, no matter in which way (internal forces or foreign domination), not only were civil liberties and democratic institutions done away with, but a totalitarian form of social organization was imposed. (Not everywhere, it is fair to add, was it imposed with the same efficacity.)

Not every variety of despotism is totalitarian. The latter consists in the constant tendency to destroy all the existing social ties and all spontaneous crystallizations of social life, and to replace them with state-imposed organizations. In the perfect totalitarian society no form of human activity—economic, intellectual, political—is allowed unless planned or permitted by the state, and human individuals are considered the nationalized property of the state. One of the salient features of this social form is the abrogation of Law—not necessarily in the

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sense of rules or procedures in public matters but in the sense of a device that mediates between individual and the state, and thus limits the state's power in dealing with individual human beings.

The principle of totalitarianism can achieve perfection only where "the means of production" are entirely state-owned, otherwise some forms of economic activity remain in the hands of individuals, and some segments of the society keep a certain measure of independence. Although the absolutely perfect totalitarian system (including the state control of all types of human private relationships) has nowhere been quite achieved, the Communist form of ruling has always had the strong and persistent tendency to reach this perfection and to nationalize all aspects of life. The so-called de-Stalinization, forced upon Communist states by various economic and political necessities, has not suspended the totalitarian principle. In Communist countries at the moment we are not dealing with "liberalized" or "democratized" variants of Communism but essentially with an ailing Stalinism.

SECOND: *Communism functions according to its own principles.* The sources in history and ideology are various. Whatever may be right in various interpretations emphasizing the importance of specifically Russian traditions in shaping the "Asiato-Communism" (*i.e.* the Soviet type, the only known form of Communist power), its original Leninist ideology was perfectly adapted to its needs. It implied—openly, not implicitly—a dictatorship governed not by Law but by sheer violence only. It implied the abrogation of a balanced division of governmental powers and the end of democratically controlled institutions. It implied that the "abolition of private property" equals the "abolition of classes," and with the end of "classes" the abolition of conflicts of interest and the establishment of the unity of society. This entirely conformed to the Marxist doctrine, which assumed that in "the final analysis" all the important social conflicts were rooted in class division, and that such class division would cease to exist once state or "public" ownership of the means of production is effected.

It thus assumed that since "negative" freedom (*i.e.*, freedom defined by the sphere of decisions left to the individuals by the social organizations) implied conflicting interests, it would lose all meaning in the classless and thus (by definition) unified society. It assumed that when the state would take centralized control of all means of production the "government over people" would be replaced by the "administration of things." Since, however, the centralized administration of all the productive processes includes the administration of the human labor force, *i.e.*, all of the people—Marxist Communism, so conceived, could only become a labor camp. And it is far from true that mere historical contingencies were responsible for the actual process leading from doctrine to its Leninist-Stalinist embodiment. That is to say, the doctrine was innocent or became "distorted" as a result of a whim of History which offered only an improper testing ground for the experiment. That Marxist Communism would mean, once applied, the state-ownership of human persons and an extreme despotic form of government, this had been clearly perceived by many anarchist writers of the 19th century, long before History made its allegedly unfortunate choice of terrain to apply the new idea.

THIRD: *The ideology is dead, yet indispensable.* In European Communist countries the Communist ideology is practically dead in the sense that nobody, neither the rulers nor the ruled, takes it seriously any more. It still remains absolutely indispensable to the ruling party, for it remains (in the absence of democratic forms of representation) the only basis for the legitimacy of a one-party tyranny. The end of the Communist faith was the end of the so-called Revisionist movement, which believed for a while that both democratic principles of social life and intellectual and moral standards could be restored within both the Communist idea and its system.

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But Communism is a matter of power, not of intellectual discussion. Demands for human rights, civil liberties, for freedom of speech, of education, freedom of trade unions (*etc.*) are less and less being made in the name of a better Communism. People think in terms of representative democracy, of national values, of religious ideas, of material well-being—not at all in terms of return to "genuine Marxism," let alone "true Leninism." Since both in the Soviet Union and in its East European dependencies the ruling parties, aware of their ideological defeat, try to find some contact with the people by means of nationalist slogans (Great Power-glory in Russia, fear-of-Russia in Soviet protectorates), they themselves reinforce the disintegration of the entire system. Nationalist hostilities are the most powerful factor in the decay of the Soviet sphere of domination. In spite of all efforts the Soviet Union failed to impose strictly its patterns in dominated countries. Each of them has developed some specific forms of economic and social administration. These differences are tolerated, to a certain extent, as long as the One-party despotism is not threatened and Soviet domination remains unquestioned. Curiously enough East Europe's colonized countries might have more room for economic maneuvers because the local Communist authority there has the ultimate fall-back guarantee in the form of Soviet tanks; but the Soviet Union has no such outside guarantee and it risks more in case of a deep crisis.

FOURTH: *Eurocommunism may emerge but so far it has not.* I take it for granted that so-called Eurocommunism is a significant phenomenon in the decomposition of Communism, and certainly not some devilish Moscow plot. I believe, however, that the question of the "sincerity" of Italian Communist leaders is not of great importance in assessing the prospects of this movement. There is little reason to deny that these people mean what they say. Many politicians mean what they say and, at the same time, fail to realize that their ideas, taken as a whole, might be incoherent or self-contradictory. It is plausible to believe that Lenin meant what he wrote in *State and Revolution* a few weeks before October 1917; and if, on the morrow of October, his semianarchist vision was seen to be what it had always been—sheer fantasy—this was not because he had lied but because this vision was utterly impracticable. There will never be a democracy for workers when human and democratic rights are denied to society as a whole.

As to the Eurocommunist leaders, their position is ambiguous as much by their utterances as by their silences. After having made all the well-known declarations about democracy, after having abandoned the slogan of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" (i.e., despotism of the party apparatus), after having proclaimed the principle of the independence of Communist parties and thus denied Soviet rule over the "movement" and, at last, after having rejected Soviet standpoints on a few important issues (in particular, the 1968 invasion of Dubcek's Czechoslovakia), they still remain within "the movement" as defined by the overwhelming preponderance of the Soviet imperialistic state. Thus, granted all their schismatic tendencies, they still seem to answer affirmatively on the following crucial questions.

1. Is there such a thing as an international Communist movement of which the PCI is a segment and the CPSU another?

2. Is the Soviet Union, despite some "errors" and mistaken moves, a "higher" form of social organization when compared to Western democracies, and does it deserve support in any conflict with the West?

3. Are the Leninist principles of Party life valid? If the answer of Italy's Communist leaders is indeed affirmative, there is no reason to expect that Communist rule in Italy (not to speak of France) would not tend toward the Soviet-type despotism, no matter how Sr. Berlinguer explains that representative democracy is a "strategic" and not a "tactical" principle. (This last statement could mean that democratic rules would be valid for a longer, not a shorter, time, under Communist rule; or it could mean that they will last

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until the next "historical stage," which is bound to come when the moment is "ripe.")

For the time being, Eurocommunists are unable—no matter for what reasons: the fear of split in the Party, the belief that the schism will be better effected if made step-by-step, various forms of dependence on the Soviets, ideological considerations—to recognize openly the Soviet state for what it is: not only a class society with an extremely rigid hierarchy of privileges, but a despotic, totalitarian and imperialist system, highly oppressive in all domains of social life, political, economic, national, religious and intellectual. Are the bureaucrats of the Soviet political, military, and police machine (an unprecedented concentration of power in modern history) "class brothers" in the eyes of PCI leaders? And what do they think about the remarks of M. Marchais who offers East European "People's Democracies" as models of a multiparty system? The point is that as long as the schism is not completely consummated in political and ideological terms, it does not depend on Italian Cummunists whether they will be able to keep their independence from the Soviet Union once in power. If some of the leaders prove still to be reluctant to accept this dependence, they will simply be replaced by others, who are more reliable. To be sure, the Italian Communists have no illusions as to what the Soviet system really is. Nor do I doubt that it is not exactly the aspiration of Berlinguer to share the lot of Dubcek. This, alas, will not help them, if they happened to get power in existing international circumstances, in a position slightly heretical and slightly rebellious, yet essentially as members of the same Communist fraternity. (What this fraternal love implied so far among Communists, everybody knows, including the Eurocommunists; but this will not help them either.)

Briefly, then, neither the heresy nor the schism has been consummated. As long as they are not, the question of which version of Communism will prevail in the case of Communists coming to power in Italy is a matter of strength. Otherwise, in the case of a complete and irrevocable split (which is possible, yet by no means certain), one should ask what the word "Communism" would mean as opposed to social democracy (provided that the schismatics remain faithful to their promises). Words themselves are not important. After all, most of the basic words in our political vocabulary have changed meaning so as to become unrecognizable (this includes such words as "socialism," "liberalism," "democracy," "equality," "freedom," "justice," *etc.*) However, since the word has been monopolized by the Soviet system of power, those who want to use it with a significantly different meaning have to make a complete revision of their ideological principles. Otherwise their cautions and gentle critiques will remain artificial and unconvincing. So far, we lack empirical proofs that a democratic Communism is at all possible, and all the existing proofs are to the contrary. Still, we cannot exclude that a new variant of regenerated Social Democracy could ultimately emerge out of the Communist schism.

NEVERTHELESS, IT APPEARS that the schism in its present, very moderate form could exert a certain influence on the disintegration of the Communist bloc.

The attitudes of the ruling elites in Soviet-dominated lands seem to be ambiguous. On the one hand, their power hinges obviously on Soviet backing, and they cannot possibly wish national sovereignty for their countries; for they can survive only as vassals. On the other hand, they prefer less, and not more, Soviet interference in their internal affairs and they can, therefore, sympathize to a certain degree with the tendencies toward autonomy among the Western Communist parties. Yet they can nourish this sympathy only in the depths of their hearts, and it means little in practical terms. As to the people who are outside the power system and do not take part in the squabbles of political cliques, I believe that they naturally sympathize with these tendencies, not because they share a specific Communist creed but because they welcome everything that undermines the all-embracing Soviet hegemony. Except for a small percen-

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tage of the population with vested interests in the present regime, all strata of the society prefer a less rigid rather than a more rigid Communism; and Dubcek-type leaders, if and when they appear in exceptional circumstances, may count on a very large popular support, which however does not imply that their supporters are Communists of yet another brand, but simply that they want more freedom. (The mass support given to the military coup in Portugal in 1974 did not mean that most Portuguese shared specific political ideas of General Spinola, only that they wanted to get rid of the old system. . . .)

WHAT GOOD AND SUFFICIENT reasons are there for those who do accept the values of a democratic socialist ideal to lend credence to the professions of the Eurocommunists? The Eurocommunist position remains roughly this: "We are for representative democracy and for freedom, yet we believe that the Soviet system is the highest form of society achieved so far by mankind, even though not entirely perfect and not quite free from mistakes. . . ." Let "Eurocommunists" first prove that they really distrust and detest despotism and would resist despotism and imperialism where despotism and imperialism are strongest. □

Lewis Coser

The Jester Turned Prosecutor

I yield to no one in my admiration for Leszek Kolakowski's past contributions to Marxist "revisionism" and his moving attempt to build a theory of libertarian socialism on the ruins of Soviet orthodoxy. His painstaking dissection of the lies and mendacities of Stalinist and post-Stalinist practice and ideology performed a major therapeutic service in the Eastern bloc and among Western radical intellectuals. But his recent paper on "The Euro-Communist Schism" (*Encounter*, August 1977), written at Oxford, where he now teaches as an exile from his native Poland, seems to me quite mistaken.

What I find objectionable, indeed grating, is not only the content of the essay but the mode of argumentation. Kolakowski, who in his revisionist period wrote in praise of jesters and gadflies to the powers to be, here reverts to a schoolmasterly, even inquisitorial style that he must have acquired in the orthodox days of his youth.

He addresses three questions to the leaders of the Italian Communist party:

(1) "Is there such a thing as an international Communist movement of which the PCI is a segment and the CPSU another?"

(2) "Is the Soviet Union, despite some 'errors' and mistaken moves, a 'higher' form of social organization when compared to Western democracies, and does it deserve support in any conflict with the West?"

(3) "Are the Leninist principles of Party life valid?"

"If the answer of Italy's Communist leaders is indeed affirmative," he then argues, "there is no reason to expect that Communist rule in Italy . . . would not tend toward the Soviet-type despotism."

This is a type of argumentation, I submit, that does not benefit libertarian socialists. "Are you, or have you ever been, a tool of capitalism, a Communist spy, an agent of imperialism," so the various inquisitors, be

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they Stalinist, fascist, McCarthyist, or whatever, phrase their questions. To expect yes or no answers from anybody to such questions seems to me a mark of demagoguery, not of a quest for truth.

Italian Communist-party militants—at least many of them—are at present involved in a painful, complicated, and often tortuous attempt to shed some of their former ideological baggage, and to find their bearings in the *terra incognita* of Western democratic politics without the aid of their previous ideological compass. They cling, to be sure, to shreds and pieces of their previous beliefs; they do not intend to disown all of their past, even though they are now attempting slowly to evolve a vision of socialism with a human face. They are caught in the winds of many doctrines, attempting to sail precariously in an uncharted political sea. They have, of this I am convinced, made a commitment to a democratic road to socialism, yet the authoritarian modes of their earlier political orientation have by no means been shed.

While Kolakowski should hail this awakening from doctrinaire and dogmatic slumbers among Italian Communists as the encouraging phenomenon that it in fact is, he instead seems to wish to end their quest by posing a stark, "Leninist" alternative: "Are you for us or against us?" This just won't do. When men and women face a deep crisis in their personal or their political life, one argues with them, one attempts to counsel, but one surely shouldn't bully. Many leaders and rank-and-file members of the Italian CP are now susceptible to the voice of democratic socialists, to their lessons and examples. By waving the big inquisitorial stick, one can only antagonize them. Instead of using the rhetoric of persuasion, Kolakowski speaks in the voice of the prosecutor. Only at show trials and revival meetings are people moved to disavow the totality of their past in one full sweep.

Let me now move to the substance of Kolakowski's brief. He seems to me to argue in a manner that betrays a lack of sociological imagination. Political parties of whatever stripe can never be understood solely in terms of the ideological message they happen to convey. They are complicated social organisms whose character is at least as much shaped by their composition, their structure, the relations to the environment in which they function. Anyone who would have assessed the pre-World War I German Social Democratic party in terms of its official ideology (a mistake, incidentally, that Lenin made) would have misjudged it completely. Even though it still paraded its simon-pure revolutionary Marxism on ceremonial occasions, it was in fact already largely integrated into Wilhelminian society, through its unions, its auxiliary organizations, its parliamentary apparatus, and its electoral machinery. Though it had officially rejected Bernstein's reformist heresy, it in fact lived according to its tenets. As one of Bernstein's "orthodox" adversaries once told him, "These are things one doesn't speak about, one just does them."

THE STRUCTURE of the Italian Communist party, as it has come to develop in the last few decades, resembles a Social Democratic party much more than it does a Leninist vanguard party. It is a huge mass protest party, rooted in both urban and rural areas of Italy. It runs the country's major cities, and many of its provinces; it relies on an extended network of unions, cooperatives, credit unions, and the like. It has deep roots in most Italian localities. But, above all, it is a huge electoral apparatus, a highly organized machinery geared to bring in the votes. Most of those who vote for it, and many of the party members, have only the most rudimentary knowledge of its political doctrine. They are for the most part men and women who are appalled by the corruption, the anarchy, the waste and disorder of contemporary Italian society, who wish for change, and vaguely believe in the possibility of a more humanitarian and equalitarian society free from corruption and inefficient waste.

Such a party could not, even if it wished to do so, institute, as Kolakowski puts it, "Soviet-type despotism." It has for quite a while become part of the fabric of Italian society so that to expect it to return to a

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Leninist vanguard politics is pure fantasy. Kolakowski avers that one cannot believe what their leaders say. Very well, then, just look at what they do. Men and women who are so enmeshed in the routines of piecemeal reform on the local, the regional, the national level are not likely to revert from one day to the next to the politics of revolution.

Italy has been for many years a stagnant and stalemated society. Its ruling Christian Democratic elite has been incapable of projecting the country into the full world of modernity. For better or worse, the large numbers of Communist militants and rank and file constitute a huge reserve army of men and women inspired by reformist zeal and an ardent desire to help rejuvenate the Italian political arena. To rebuff them, and to throw them back into the political wilderness, would be a historical disaster.

Kolakowski, having freed himself of the shackles of Stalinist and post-Stalinist doctrine, still seems to suffer from an unwarranted belief in its efficacy. Thus he trembles at the thought that the Italian CP will subvert democracy once it enters into some of the seats of power. When Satan is allowed to infiltrate the ranks of the godly, Kolakowski appears to believe, he will inevitably corrupt and destroy them. It does not occur to him that when former worshippers of the devil join the ranks of the children of light, this is a major victory for the latter. When former Stalinists, albeit with many *caveats* and doubts, come out for parliamentary roads to socialism, there should be rejoicing rather than gnashing of teeth among Western democratic socialists. This may turn out, in effect, to be one of the most significant turning points in the tortuous history of Western democracy.

One last point: Kolakowski, like all of us, has much sympathy with the various dissenting and revisionist voices in the Eastern bloc. These men and women in their turn look with a great deal of hope to the Italian Communists and their co-thinkers in other European countries; they see them as their allies in the struggle against Soviet oppression. They are, at the same time, full of respect and admiration for Kolakowski, whom they have rightly considered the most articulate voice of libertarian revisionism. But when Kolakowski's article reached Poland, so a Polish friend just arrived from that country told me, it elicited consternation and a measure of despair. Does Kolakowski not realize that the present inquisitorial stance toward the Italian revisionists, which he has helped to make articulate, can only stunt the seeds of dissidence that have begun to sprout beneath the Soviet snow? □

Henry Pachter

What Do We Ask of Eurocommunism?

A political question cannot be answered by a philosophical definition. Leszek Kolakowski has decided, to his own satisfaction, that Communists are Communists are Communists, an insight that he derives from reading their texts. For him, the criteria for their conversion to democracy would be that they repudiate certain texts and make certain declarations on the nature of the Soviet Union. (He notes, however, that "Berlinguer has no illusions as to what the Soviet system actually is.") In his catholic language, he asks

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them "to consummate both the heresy and the schism." As though Catholic princes had not fought the Pope with as much ardor as Protestants! As though the "schism" between Peking and Moscow were not the most "consummated" fact of international politics today! As though the world had not been watching, for the last 30 years with increasing fascination, the "schism in the schism" inside Yugoslavia, with still undecided results. And let me add, in a reference *ad hominem* to the author of an excellent book on positivism, as though scientists had not decided, some 50 years ago, that what matters is not *what* a substance is but *how* it works.

Eurocommunism, as it is constituted today, is not as new as it appears to people born during the Cold War. During the 1920s, Stalin ordered European Communists to offer "united-front" alliances to Social Democrats, and again in 1936 he supported "popular-front" governments in France and Spain. For this, French Communists had to praise the blessings of democracy, march under the tricolor, and even dismantle their clandestine apparatus in the French army. Stalin went out of his way to introduce a "Constitution" in the Soviet Union, and delegations sent there assured us that even the prisoners in the Gulags voted 100 percent for Stalin. When it became necessary for the Anglo-Saxon imperialists to conclude a working alliance with the Soviet Union to defeat Hitler, one could read in the *New York Times* that democracy was ruling in the Soviet Union, that the Moscow Trials had been conducted fairly and according to the rules of due process, and that only the Trotskyites were spoilsports. But we should also remember that for the time of that alliance American Communists saw to it that no strike endangered the war effort. As a birthday present for FDR, the CP, U.S.A., and the Comintern were dissolved, and democracy was promised to Poland.

Let us not repeat these acrobatics of political consciousness but state coolly and cynically: Eurocommunism is not a new development but an invention of non-Communists who, for reasons we shall discuss, wish to conclude electoral alliances with their local Communists. Whether these Communists still believe that the Soviet system is preferable to parliamentary democracy is beside the point. To suggest that these Communists have turned into social democrats who will play the game of democracy is outright hypocrisy (at times they appear to be on the right of the Social Democrats: both Berlinguer and Carrillo tolerate right-wing governments). The only relevant question is: Are the Communists more dangerous outside the government than inside? The so-called Eurocommunists suggest that they would be less of a nuisance inside. They have not said that they are no longer Communists. Those who desire an alliance cannot and should not justify it by telling us that the Communists have changed. They must justify it by telling us why they themselves have changed.

The Communists are essentially an opposition party. They are thriving in that position and have little reason to give it up. Even if they were to join a government, they would still have to project the image of an opposition party; they will not behave like British cabinet ministers who defend their government to the last breath even as they disagree with it, but rather like U.S. senators who will attack it even though they agree with its policies. It cannot be asked in fairness that the Communists commit suicide; in fact it cannot be the purpose of the coalition to transform the Communists into social democrats, for what is proposed is precisely to have the opposition inside the government. One hopes to defuse somehow the class war that the Communists could otherwise unleash, but one does not think that either class war or the Communist support of it can be abolished. One would like to see the Communist party split over the issue of government participation, but not so badly that it loses all control over the masses, and a more radical Communist party (Maoist, anarchist, or Trotskyist) would renew the threat of an uncontrolled, intransigent party of the disgruntled and unintegrated masses. I do not propose to name the master politician who could bring off this feat of prestidigita-

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tion; I merely say that one should honestly say what one is trying to do.

Put that way, there is little inducement for the Communists to take the bait. I don't believe that Sr. Berlinguer or M. Marchais are vain enough to seek the title of Mr. Minister. Either of them has more power now than if he were the member of a government. Joining a government would make sense for them only if they were to feel that they could accomplish something for the masses, not just to pull the capitalist chestnuts out of the fire. Leaders who have been brought up in the tradition of Marxism-Leninism look for guidance to the place they will receive in future history books: Have they advanced the cause? They are committed to structural change, and they must justify their participation in a government by the achievements of that government. Hence they ask for an assurance that it will bring "structural reforms." Is that asking too much?

The question for non-Communists, then, is whether they, too, want those structural reforms. If they don't want them, the participation of Communists will mean trouble; if they do want them, the coalition will have to do what the Communists have not hesitated to spell out: they must be prepared to defend the reforms, even if it means to suspend certain rights. Nationalization of the banks means that capitalists will try to smuggle their money out of the country. How do you deal with that? If he were alive you might ask Allende. If you want socialized medicine you cannot allow doctors to go on strike. But you have to be prepared for more. The measures that a Socialist-Communist government will introduce are not policies that could be changed back after a year's try, but permanent changes in the structure of the economy that need time to demonstrate their benefits. To change them back every time a new government comes to power would be disastrous. A government determined to introduce such changes, therefore, must know that it has the vast majority (not just 51 percent) behind it and that its mandate is long enough to make the reforms stick. In fact, it will have to introduce reforms of such a nature (for instance, mergers that cannot be unscrambled; workers' participation in management of a sort that cannot be undone) that will make a return to the previous status quo impossible.

In such a government, it can very well be the role of the Socialists to see that civil rights are not violated wantonly, that new laws have due-process clauses, etc., but they cannot in fairness ask the Communists to support patch-up measures that will save capitalism for a while and then to allow themselves to be booted out with diminished prestige. That was the fate of the Italian Social Democrats and of the French SFIO before de Gaulle saved it from suicide. The Communists have no reason to ignore that lesson, and therefore their role in a coalition government will be to prevent the Front Populaire experience from repeating itself.

In other words, for Socialists a coalition with Communists would make sense only if the Communists continue to behave like Communists. Socialists must also keep in mind that—whether or not the Communists continue to mouth Leninist theory—the two parties remain rivals, and the Communists would not enter into a coalition if they felt that on balance it would benefit the Socialists. In fact, since the first draft of this comment was written, M. Marchais seems to have come to the conclusion that he would not be the beneficiary of such a coalition, and therefore he busted it. Sr. Berlinguer, in turn, does not even seek a coalition with the Socialists; his stated aim is to crush the Social Democrats by supporting a Christian Democratic government for which he will not take responsibility. It is obvious that Italian Communists cannot take governmental responsibilities without risking a severe split in their ranks. They are already facing competition with an increasingly dynamic movement of urban guerillas on their left. The talk that they will become social democrats is premature.

Kolakowski's approach to the question, however, seems misleading to me. The question is obviously not whether party

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schools still teach the orthodox Leninist theory of the state, nor whether they think that socialism rules in the Soviet Union, in China, Cuba, or for that matter in Uganda. Let us remember that Lenin concluded alliances with Kemal Pasha and that Chiang Kai-shek was trained in Moscow. The PLO is neither socialist nor communist and yet the Italian Communists are committed to support its aims and policies; either for reasons of tradition or because they like to align themselves with the wave of the future, they have chosen to be staunch allies of the radical Arab governments. They have been totally opportunistic in their choice of Mediterranean allies, but one may find in this policy one consistency: they are aligned with Soviet foreign-policy interests in global affairs. (There seems to be one exception: Berlinguer's promise to respect the NATO alliance; but he also wants to "reform" NATO in two respects that are of great importance to the Soviet Union—reducing its Mediterranean commitment and reducing the American participation.)

Besides the practical behavior patterns of European Communist parties, the ideology has become pale. It no longer is a source of strength and unity but has become a source of weakness and of disunity. It does not make sense to assert and reassert that Communists are "really" still Stalinists at heart; it makes even less sense if Stalinism is defined as a rigid, truculently orthodox faith. It was a very flexible, though for that reason not less ruthless tactic that at all times bent the ideology to its practical purposes and sacrificed the interests of national Communist parties to the day-to-day interests of the Soviet Union. Far from being dogmatic, it also sacrificed Communist theory to day-to-day interests, often not even those of the Soviet Union but to those of the ruling faction. We see presently the emergence of national Communist leaders who occasionally talk back to the Kremlin and pursue policies that are better adapted to the tactical situation in different countries. Some of these leaders have evolved so far toward reality that they actually seem to be operating in the framework of practical politics and can sustain an intelligent dialogue with representatives of other parties. One is thankful for small favors. They emerge from absurdity and we give them credit for pursuing aims identical with ours. The one does not necessarily exclude the other, but neither does one follow from the other.

Instead of imputing to the so-called Eurocommunists motives and ideologies that they do not have and that would be at cross-purposes with their true interests, let us soberly deal with them as with any other party: allowing them to evolve, but withholding recognition until they have delivered; making tactical and temporary use of cooperation if and when a useful purpose is achieved but keeping a safe distance, always remaining aware of the limitations of such alliances and of the function that Communist parties must fulfill in the political arena. Communists have a right to be taken seriously. □

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Karl P. Sauvant

The Poor Countries and the Rich — a Few Steps Forward

Three years ago, at its Sixth Special Session, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus two resolutions entitled "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" and "Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order."[1] Through these resolutions, the developing countries (DCs) have succeeded in giving development a priority status on the international agenda. Subsequently, a series of international conferences were held on this topic, which will remain high on the agenda for some time to come. The UN's General Assembly will take it up again when preparing a "third development decade," and various high-level international study groups are in the process of analyzing North-South problems with the purpose of recommending actions regarding development.

The DCs, it is clear, now have achieved one of their major goals—to broaden the purposes of the international economic system so as to include the development of the Third World. They also succeeded in initiating a debate aimed at translating this new purpose into concrete actions. The DCs contend that these actions require a reorganization of the mechanisms and structures of the international economic system, which now is primarily geared to the interests of the developed market economies. The aim, of course, would be to make this system more responsive to the DCs' interests, needs, and special conditions. A New International Economic Order (NIEO) is required that would serve all its members more equitably.

My objective here is threefold. It is, first, to familiarize the reader with the major proposals advanced to achieve a restructuring of the world economy. I shall therefore outline the major elements of the NIEO program in the key areas of North-South relations: trade and commodities, financial matters, science and technology, industrialization and transnational enterprises. Second, I shall examine whether the NIEO program can, in fact, be expected to create a *new* order or whether it is, rather, an attempt to make the status quo more tolerable for the Third World. Third and finally, I shall explore international affirmative action and individual and collective self-reliance as possible approaches toward structural changes.

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[1]See United Nations General Assembly resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI).

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Glossary

BUFFER STOCK: Stocks created for selected commodities, intended to smooth supply-and-demand fluctuations. The managers of the stocks buy the commodities in question when the price falls below the lower intervention margin and sell out of the stocks when the price surpasses an upper intervention margin.

DCs: Developing countries

DMEs: Developed market economies

GROUP OF 77: The economic interest-group organization of the developing countries within the framework of UNCTAD.

GSP: The General System of Preferences was negotiated under UNCTAD's auspices and provides developing countries for certain products and under certain conditions with preferential access to the markets of participating industrialized countries.

IMF: International Monetary Fund

INDEXATION: Process whereby the value of the developing countries' commodity exports is linked to a change in the value of their imports of manufactured goods.

NONALIGNED MOVEMENT: Group of some 80 countries, nearly all of them from the Third World, trying to exercise some influence that is independent of East and West. Created in 1961.

PRODUCERS'ASSOCIATIONS: Groupings of raw-material producers; OPEC is its prototype.

REAL PRICES: (Nominal) prices adjusted for inflation.

SDR: International reserve assets ("paper gold"), created by the IMF.

SIXTH SPECIAL SESSION: First special session of the UN General Assembly held (April-May 1974) exclusively on development questions. The key result of that session was the concept of the New International Economic Order.

TNEs: Transnational enterprises.

UNCTAD: UN Conference on Trade and Development, established 1964. It has its permanent secretariat in Geneva and is currently headed by Gamani Corea, a citizen of Sri Lanka. UNCTAD's main role is to promote international trade with a view to accelerating economic development.

The NIEO Program

THE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES of most Third World countries are largely based on trade with the developed countries. Trade is seen as "the motor of development," needed to generate the foreign-exchange earnings required to finance the import of capital goods and to stimulate industrialization.

So far, this motor has not worked properly. In the last two decades, the DCs' share in world trade has substantially declined. This deterioration was brought about largely by the structure of the DCs' exports—mostly primary products—and especially by the long-term worsening of their terms of trade and insufficient access to the markets of the industrialized countries. Earnings from this trade are, moreover, plagued by violent fluctuations. In the NIEO program, therefore, trade and primary-product questions receive detailed attention.

The program's centerpiece is an integrated approach to commodities intended to arrest the deterioration of the DCs' terms of trade (indeed, to improve them) and to contribute to a more orderly management of commodity supplies. The key measures proposed to achieve these objectives involve the establishment of international buffer stocks for a number of commodities and the creation of a common fund for the financing of these stocks. The main function of these buffer stocks is to absorb market fluctuations, to balance the supply and demand, by stabilizing the prices of the products covered between negotiated lower- and upper-price margins. Obviously, in a world in which 5 to 10 percent inflation is the rule, these price margins must be periodically adjusted in order to protect the real prices originally negotiated. The adjustment mechanism preferred by the DCs is indexation; thus the initially negotiated price could, for instance, be linked to a basket of prices of goods imported by DCs.

While commodity agreements deal with the basic supply of raw materials, as well as with the receipts for them, the NIEO program also promotes their increased processing by the DCs that produce them and the expansion

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and diversification of these countries' exports. To achieve this objective, the DCs must gain greater access to the markets of the industrialized nations. Consequently, the removal, or at least restriction, of tariff and nontariff barriers is an issue of great concern. Special attention is paid to an improvement of the nonreciprocal, nondiscriminatory Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and to the elimination of restrictive business practices that affect the DCs' trade adversely.

AS SUGGESTED, a major function of trade is to generate the foreign-exchange earnings necessary to finance the import of capital goods that are required for industrialization. Partly because of the conditions outlined above, exports alone are not able to do this; other mechanisms are needed. One of these is official development assistance—i.e., official bilateral and multilateral foreign aid, a minimum of which should be free grants. Such assistance, however, has failed to increase in real terms since the middle of the 1960s; in fact, it has dropped sharply as in terms of the percentage of the industrialized countries' GNP: from 0.52 percent in 1961-1962 to 0.33 percent in 1974. And this has occurred in a period when the standard of living in the developed countries reached unprecedented heights. Thus, the international economic system has failed to assure the DCs an equal share in increasing prosperity. Improvement of the foreign-aid performance is therefore a key plank in the NIEO program, and the developed countries are reminded that their foreign aid should reach, at the latest by 1980, the target of 0.7 percent of their GNP, a target they had accepted earlier (however, without a time limit). Moreover, since one important reason for the decline of foreign aid has been its voluntary character, the DCs desire that an element of automaticity be introduced into concessional flows, in order to make them predictable, assured, and continuous.

The decrease of foreign aid forced the Third World to turn to private-capital markets and their less favorable conditions. Thus the DCs' external indebtedness (over 80 non-OPEC) has risen dramatically from $9 billion in 1956 to over $170 billion in 1976 (of which about $70 billion are owed to commercial banks). Total annual debt-service payments (of about $12 billion in 1974) more than cancel the total annual flow of foreign aid and, for many countries, consume around 15 percent of their annual export earnings. The debt issue has therefore become a priority problem for the DCs, and a number of measures have been suggested to alleviate it. Foremost among them is an international conference of major donor, creditor, and debtor countries to arrange a renegotiation of debts and design multilateral measures to bring relief to debt repayments.

The need for financial resources that are required for development also constitutes one of the reasons for a set of Third World proposals related to the international monetary system. Here the basic issues are the creation and distribution of international liquidity. Like any monetary system, the international monetary system is biased against the poor: they have the greatest difficulties, and face the greatest restrictions, in obtaining credit from the institutions of the system; and since most international reserves result from the international acceptance of a few national reserve currencies—thus giving privileged credit to a few countries (and especially the U.S.)—the DCs play virtually no role in the creation of international liquidity, nor do they benefit directly from it. Thus, for instance, international reserves grew by $102 billion between 1970 and 1974; out of this total, the DCs received only $3.7 billion.

In order to improve their credit line with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—the main credit institution of the international monetary system—the DCs have proposed to increase the IMF quota (which governs the availability of IMF finance); to enlarge the first (automatic) credit tranche and derestrict drawings under the other tranches; to liberalize and enlarge the various existing balance of payments mechanisms; and to liberalize

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drawings under the buffer-stock financing facility.

Beyond these improvements, the DCs would also like to change the actual creation of international liquidity. Hence a key plank in the NIEO program is a proposal to reduce the role of gold and national reserve currencies and, instead, to strengthen the role of special drawing rights (SDRs) as the central reserve asset of the international monetary system.

Since SDRs are created by the IMF and distributed to the member countries on the basis of their quotas, a greater role for SDRs means a greater share for the Third World in new international liquidity—even if the DCs do not control the decisions concerning the issuance of these reserve assets. SDRs are also attractive for another reason: they introduce an element of automaticity into the supply of finance. They would be particularly attractive if their distribution were not undertaken on the basis of IMF quotas but rather in relation to the DCs' special financial needs. The "link" of the distribution of SDRs to development assistance is, in fact, an important part of the NIEO program. Since these changes are unlikely to be achieved under the IMF's present voting system, the DCs are pressing for a greater voice in the Fund and in the management of the international monetary system in general—a system, after all, that constitutes the framework for their trade transactions and development efforts.

In no other area is the asymmetry of relations between North and South so pronounced as in science and technology. Virtually all R and D is conducted in developed countries and, as a consequence, nationals or institutions of these countries hold virtually all the world's patents. Recognizing that a transfer of technology is the only way through which DCs can obtain the technology required for their development, the NIEO program focuses on the regulation of the transfer process and its conditions. It is specifically urged that a legally binding code of conduct be adopted for the transfer of technology, to deal with such matters as relations among suppliers, restrictive business practices, access to technology, and pricing. Changes are also envisaged for the international patent system, and efforts are encouraged to formulate policies that aim at improvement of DCs' scientific and technological infrastructure.

THE PURPOSE OF RESTRUCTURING the international mechanisms in trade and finance, science and technology *is to serve industrialization*—the basic objective of most DCs. At present, the manufacturing output of the entire Third World is about as high as that of West Germany—approximately $108 billion. The DCs' goal is to increase this output more than tenfold before the end of this century—an objective that will require substantial mobilization of resources and major adaptations of the world's industrial structures.

The structural adaptations envisaged by the NIEO program amount essentially to a clearer international division of labor: the DMEs are asked to encourage the redeployment of their less competitive industries (i.e., usually labor-intensive, low-technology industries) to developing countries. A "system of consultations" is urged to facilitate this process. In market economies, the primary agents of any redeployment of industries are, of course, private business firms, especially transnational enterprises (TNEs). TNEs are expected to play an important role in the industrialization process (especially under conditions of decreasing foreign aid) by mobilizing financial and technological resources and by providing the markets for the Third World's expanding economies. TNEs are explicitly encouraged to participate in Third World investment projects. At the same time, since the conditions under which foreign direct investment is made available is a critical matter for DCs, the elaboration of an effective code of conduct for TNEs is an important aspect of the NIEO program.

The NIEO Program: A Liberal Holding Operation

THIS SO FAR, in broad brush strokes, are the main aspects of the NIEO program. Let me

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now turn to the program as a possible way of changing the structures of the international economic system. Could a complete implementation of the NIEO program actually alter the structures of the system and the distribution of benefits between North and South? What would happen if all the concrete measures of the NIEO program were implemented—including the entire integrated program for commodities, unrestricted access to the markets of the DMEs, higher financial flows, better access to IMF finance, the link between SDR distribution and development finance, a greater voice in the management of the IMF, a binding code for technology transfer and TNEs, and the redeployment of industries—what, indeed, would happen if all these measures were implemented?

The answer is, I submit, that the structures of the international economic system would not be changed appreciably. On the contrary, they might even be further solidified. For the underlying philosophy of the NIEO program is essentially reformist; it is aimed at improving the existing mechanisms, not at changing the existing structures. Its main objective is to put the DCs—within the framework of the present system—in a better position to pursue their goals, especially to engage in trade and to participate in a "rational" international division of labor. The emphasis is on "put in position."[2]

The program basically represents—not surprisingly, one may add, in view of the training that many Third World leaders and experts have received in the academic centers of the DMEs—a liberal economic approach to the solution of the developing countries' problems. The special situation of these countries (in a variation of the infant-industry argument), of course, is taken into account by providing for a number of exceptions to the free play of international market forces—e.g., commodity agreements and preferential and nonreciprocal treatment for developing countries in a number of areas.

But exceptions are by no means unfamiliar to liberal practices, as is demonstrated, for instance, by the negotiation of "voluntary" trade restriction agreements, the long-term purchasing agreements between the U.S. on the one hand and Japan and the Soviet Union on the other, the management of the agricultural market, and the organization of the raw material market through transnational enterprises. Thus, it is almost surprising that countries subscribing to liberal economic norms, and especially proponents of the existing structures, should have great difficulties in agreeing with the NIEO program. In fact, a number of the key elements of the NIEO program have clear stabilizing effects on the existing international economic system and, in the long run, their implementation may possibly even give the kiss of death to the pursuit of vigorous restructuring.

The integrated commodity program would not, for example, change a situation in which the South is a supplier of raw materials to the North. Rather, the main effect would be to make this situation more tolerable, especially by preventing a further deterioration of the Third World's purchasing power and by reducing fluctuations in export earnings. In addition, and as far as the world economy as a whole is concerned, the integrated commodity program would allow a more rational management of the international supply of raw materials and thus remedy one of the most conspicuous areas of neglect in the present international economic system. In doing this, it would facilitate the management of both the business cycles of the economies of the industrialized countries and the development process of Third World countries.

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[2]To quote Mahbub ul Haq, one of the intellectual parents of the NIEO: "The basic objective of the emerging trade union of the poor nations is to negotiate a new deal with the rich nations through the instrument of collective bargaining. The essence of this new deal lies in the objective of the developing countries to obtain greater equality of opportunity and to secure the right to sit as equals around the bargaining tables of the world." See his "Negotiating a New Bargain with the Rich Countries," in *The Developing World Speaks Out*, Guy F. Erb and Valerina Kallab, eds. (Washington: Overseas Development Council, 1975), p. 158.

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At the present time, the prices of most raw materials are characterized by heavy fluctuations. Given the dependence of many DCs on raw material exports as their primary source of foreign exchange earnings, these price fluctuations translate themselves immediately into earnings fluctuations and thus into fluctuation of the availability of funds for the import (from DMEs) of capital goods for development purposes. These short-term earnings fluctuations frequently follow the DMEs' business cycles. During a period of economic boom, the demand for primary commodities usually rises, and so do their prices; in a period of recession, demand for and prices of raw materials usually fall. Commodity-price movements are therefore largely procyclical in nature. During a boom they add to inflation—directly (through higher commodity prices) as well as indirectly (through increased purchases by developing countries in industrialized ones). During a recession, the reduction of export earnings affects the import ability of the Third World, i.e., demand in DMEs is further reduced. Therefore, severe fluctuations in commodity prices (fluctuations that could be largely stabilized through buffer stocks) complicate the management of the world economy—regardless of whether the aim is development or stabilization of the business cycle, and regardless of whether raw materials originate in developed or developing countries.

There is also a danger that the relief gained from commodity agreements may tempt DCs to relax their efforts to change the product mix of their exports in order to ease their dependence on primary-product exports. Under these conditions, even the move into processing may be neglected. If governments succumb to these temptations, commodity agreements would tend to perpetuate existing structures with their inherent inequities. Indexation could further support this tendency by assuring the maintenance of short- and long-term purchasing power and by further removing pressures for diversification. Indexation is also an example of the holding-operation character of the NIEO program: fearing a further deterioration of their purchasing power, the DCs are willing to ratify the past deterioration of their terms of trade and to institutionalize the existing gap.

In the area of finance and the international monetary system, the implementation of the NIEO program would lead to easier and more plentiful financing as well as to a greater sharing in the management of the IMF. Some progress has been made as regards better access to IMF credit. The danger is, however, that the developing nations might be satisfied with such improvements, while leaving the underlying financial structures unchanged. The distribution of additional funds and the creation of international liquidity have remained solidly under the control of the industrialized states.

Similar considerations apply to science and technology. The current emphasis on transfer of technology and a code of conduct for it places emphasis on the wrong issue. All a code would do is to codify the technological dependency of the Third World. Even worse: if the DMEs actually implement the proposals of the program—that is, encourage, for instance, more Third World-oriented R and D and adaptation of technology in their countries, provide more information about the availability of alternative technologies, ease access to them, and improve the conditions under which they are made available—technological dependence may well become easier to live with for many DCs. The result could be that the establishment of indigenous science-and-technology capacities and infrastructures and the diffusion (rather than transfer) of technology within the Third World would be neglected. In other words, the emphasis on transfer of technology tends to obscure the fact that only indigenous capacities can break the dependent position of the Third World and that, therefore, these should receive primary attention.

Finally, some brief observations along the same lines regarding industrialization. As already mentioned, a key element here is the redeployment of industries to DCs. The NIEO program recommends an international

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division of labor in which DCs would concentrate on (usually) labor-intensive and low-technology industries, while the industrial structures of the developed countries would evolve in the direction of future-oriented, high-technology industries. This creates the real danger that the DCs will remain locked into the present international division of labor, whose division of benefits is highly unfavorable for them. Furthermore, where this redeployment is effected by TNEs (and, as indicated above, they can be expected to play the crucial role), it would be intracompany redeployment, i.e., certain production processes would be moved to the Third World within the framework of a given TNE system. This would leave the foreign affiliate dependent on the parent enterprise for its R and D, transportation facilities, marketing and distribution channels, etc., and its local development, conversely, would be discouraged.

None of the present efforts at controlling TNEs can be expected to change very much in this situation since none of them aim at the internal decision-making mechanisms of TNEs—i.e., at the actual locus of control over decisions relevant to redeployment and, more generally, at the allocation of private resources to DCs. Therefore, the redeployment of industries may not only further solidify the existing international divison of labor but may also, where it is effected through TNEs, further consolidate the dependence of the developing on the developed countries. All that a code of conduct for TNEs is therefore likely to accomplish and—similar to a code for the transfer of technology—it is to take some of the edges off the existing situation, thereby making dependence more tolerable.

I do not mean to suggest that the NIEO program is misdirected or the measures suggested by it should not be taken; far from it. Clearly, the implementation of the program would in many ways smooth the functioning of the present system, create better opportunities for DCs, and lead to improvements in their economic situation. The program is a necessary step toward the immediate alleviation of the DCs' most pressing problems. By the same token, however, this stress on stop-gap measures and immediate relief gives the NIEO program the character of a holding action rather than of a restructuring operation. I mean to suggest that the need for changes in the underlying structures of the system be not forgotten under the pressures of the present situation; for only such changes can bring permanent relief. Elaborate measures have been proposed to deal with the symptoms of the problems—but the strategies aimed at their causes are still vague.

Changing Structures: Other Approaches

BUT CAN SUCH STRATEGIES be formulated within the liberal economic framework that characterizes the NIEO program?

The imbalances between developed and developing countries (as well as the imbalances among the latter themselves) are so great, the structural institutionalization of dependence is so strong—encompassing virtually all areas of interaction between North and South—that a mere provision of equal opportunities may simply not be sufficient to bring about the fundamental changes required to establish a more equitable order.

International Affirmative Action

IF THIS is the case, the achievement of fundamental structural changes would first of all require a change in philosophy.

Opportunities would not only have to be provided, but every effort would have to be made to ensure that they are taken advantage of. Therefore, it might be necessary to bolster the liberal economic approach with a massive international program of affirmative action.[3]

The basis of such an approach would be the recognition that the creation of equal opportunities alone is not sufficient to help the Third World overcome its historically determined disadvantageous position, a position in

[3]The concept of affirmative action was developed in the U.S. when it was recognized that the mere creation of

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which it remains largely for the mere reason that it exists. Going beyond the basic orientation of the NIEO program, the essence of such an approach would therefore be for the developed countries to take affirmative steps to break down the structures created in the past in order to terminate the underprivileged status of the DCs and to build, together with them, a new world economic system.

The concrete mechanisms of an international affirmative action program for development would, of course, have to be elaborated with great care. To give a few examples of the kind of action such an approach could include:

- One should consider the introduction of reverse quotas. Governments of developed countries could agree to ensure that a minimum quota of certain manufactured, semimanufactured, or processed goods produced by developing countries would be sold in their countries.

- Another such method to support the transformation of the DCs from primary-producing suppliers to industrialized countries is to create incentives for the location of processing facilities in the raw-material-producing countries, e.g., by virtually reversing the present tariff structure through a decrease of tariffs on manufactured, semimanufactured, and processed goods exported by DCs while possibly even leveling some tariffs on raw materials imported from them.

- DMEs could also resolve to obtain a certain percentage of their goods and services from the Third World; they could decide to subsidize loans to DCs; or they could require that a certain percentage of bank credits are made available to Third World countries.

In this context, special attention must be paid to TNEs, since the allocative decisions of these enterprises play a very important role in all major areas of economic interaction between developed and developing countries. It is therefore important for the developing countries to gain some influence over the allocative decisions of TNEs. It is the characteristic of current control efforts—including the code of conduct elaborated under the auspices of the United Nations—that they all focus on possible *external* frameworks that could constrain TNEs. As such, they are mainly reactive and corrective in nature and influence the allocation process only indirectly. In order for host countries to directly influence allocative decisions affecting their economies, they would have to participate in the *internal* decision-making of these enterprises. One way of achieving this objective is to establish Host Country Councils at TNE headquarters. Through these Councils, host countries could gain immediate influence on the decision-making process of the main enterprises operating in their territories, thus supplementing policies aimed at setting up external control mechanisms.[4]

Self-Reliance

WE WOULD IGNORE the experience of the past 25 years if we were to expect too much from international development efforts—be they in the form of the NIEO program or of an international affirmative-action program directed at the structures of the international economic system. This is not to say that one should abandon these efforts. It is to say, rather, that Third World countries must also search for alternatives that are independent of the international community as a whole. The developing countries now are moving in this

equal opportunities was not sufficient to give equal status to certain groups (e.g., blacks, women) in the society as a whole. Affirmative-action mechanisms, in this situation, include various quota systems (e.g., regarding employment) and "reverse discrimination"—discrimination to aid members of historically disadvantaged groups—for instance, when giving preference in admission (e.g., to professional schools) to members of an underprivileged group at the expense of established groups.

[4]For a further discussion of this approach, see Karl P. Sauvant, "Controlling Transnational Enterprises: A Review and Some Further Thoughts," in Karl P. Sauvant and Hajo Hasenpflug, eds., *The New International Economic Order: Conflict or Cooperation between North and South?* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977).

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direction as they turn to individual and collective self-reliance.

Toward the end of the 1960s, DCs began to realize that, if they wanted to break out from the reproduction process of international inequality, they would have to reduce their dependency on inputs from abroad and to mobilize increasingly their own resources. This realization requires a change in the basic development model because the traditional model is based on capital inputs—inputs that (in the quantities necessary) can only be obtained from abroad. In this traditional approach, the mass of people was essentially regarded as a liability, viewed mainly as consumers who needed to be fed and clothed, i.e., who absorbed already scarce capital. However, questions begun to be asked whether one could not regard the mass of people as an asset whose creative potential, when released and combined with other local resources and with appropriate technology, could be the basis of autonomous development, aimed at the satisfaction of the minimum needs of the entire population. At the same time, a capacity for autonomous goal-setting, decision-making and decision-implementation would be built up. Thus, a model had to be developed that reduces the role of foreign inputs and places greater emphasis on the use of resources that are in plentiful supply in the Third World.

These thoughts are captured in the concept of self-reliance, a concept enunciated at the 1970 Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries in Lusaka, and increasingly (even if slowly) gaining acceptance in the Third World. Self-reliance is not an attempt to replace foreign capital by labor, but rather to change the balance between the two factors by a margin that would make development more independent from foreign aid and, consequently, more autonomous. Improvements in the terms of international economic transactions remain, of course, desirable and must be pursued, but these transactions themselves are seen from a new perspective: the motor of development is no longer trade and transfers from abroad, but rather *the mobilization of indigenous resources for primarily indigenous needs.*

This deemphasizing of international transactions should not be confused with an effort to achieve autarchy. It represents, rather, a more general application of the infant-industry approach. While ordinarily this approach is only adopted for selected industries, it would, in this context, be extended to the entire economy and to the whole society of Third World countries. The pursuit of this approach may lead to a certain "decoupling" of the Third World from the developed market world. Given the all-encompassing dependence of the developing countries on the developed ones, such a decoupling may in fact be desirable—if not necessary—until the Third World is strong enough to reintegrate itself into a new international economic system.

This change in the approach to development is also important because it represents an act of sociocultural emancipation, a dimension of development (and of self-reliance) that so far has received little attention.

During the colonial period, the countries of the Third World were not only subjected to political and economic but also to sociocultural colonization. The values and behavioral patterns of Third World societies had gradually been transformed to reflect those of the metropolitan countries. After independence, these patterns were maintained (or even reinforced) through a variety of mechanisms. Increasingly important among them have been TNEs (whose investment package consists not only of capital and technology but also of such sociocultural investments as values and behavioral patterns) and advertising agencies (which directly manipulate a society's values, especially its consumption values). In addition, the choice of production for foreign affiliates in DCs (and for local enterprises imitating them) is largely a combination of the production and R and D experiences of parent enterprises on the one hand and the foreign-induced wants of the small elites and middle classes in host countries on the other.

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The problem is that both these factors reflect the relative abundance of developed countries and not the absolute poverty of developing ones; the wants of consumers in developed countries and not the needs of large proportions of the population in developing countries. At least for the time being, therefore, these wants can only be satisfied through continued inputs from abroad. Consequently, economic dependence on countries and institutions that can help to fulfill these foreign-oriented wants continues and is reinforced. Self-reliance, thus, requires sociocultural emancipation. If this emancipation does not take place, if industrialization continues to model itself on the demand-and-supply situation of the developed market economies, the economic development of the Third World will tend to remain a dependent development.[5]

The achievement of self-reliance, and through it of economic development, demands fundamental internal and external changes. Internally, the implementation of the concept of *individual self-reliance* requires that conditions are created for the mobilization of the population. This requires a substantial raising of mass-consciousness through greater participation that, in turn, is not very likely to occur without drastic changes in the class structure of the individual countries. Only through the mobilization and organization of the masses can the reliance on foreign capital be decreased. This focus on the population as a whole is a function not only of the need to mobilize available domestic resources but also an expression of the fundamental aim of this approach, which is to satisfy the basic needs of all classes and not only the wants of the elites and small middle classes. The concept of individual self-reliance, therefore, draws attention to the internal conditions in DCs, the need for change within these countries, and the importance of such change for the development process. Partly, this attention follows from the realization that whatever benefits had been reaped in the traditional model (and probably including those to be secured by the NIEO program), they rarely trickled down to the masses but rather tended to be absorbed by the elites.

The implementation of *collective self-reliance* necessitates less emphasis on relations between developing and developed countries and more emphasis on relations among developing countries. This requires a reorientation in literally all major areas. Trade with other DCs, for instance, accounts for only one-fifth of total trade of the Third World—and this share has been declining.

Increased cooperation among Third World countries demands, first of all, measures aimed at facilitating interactions among them. Among these are various measures to provide preferential treatment to imports from other DCs; the expansion and strengthening of existing clearing arrangements and the creation of a broad multilateral payments scheme (including clearing arrangements as well as arrangements for the settling of balances); the facilitation and encouragement of flows of financial resources (especially from OPEC countries); and the encouragement and further strengthening of regional integration schemes and cooperation projects. The last measure involves direct collaboration efforts among developing nations and their institutions, including in the context of producers' associations.

For many of these schemes, concrete proposals have now been elaborated and some activities are under way to implement them. Thus the Group of 77 decided, during its 1976 Manila ministerial meeting, to establish an intergovernmental working group for the purpose of preparing the details of a comprehensive program for economic cooperation. Similarly, the Non-Aligned Countries decided at their 1972 Georgetown Foreign Ministers' Conference to designate a

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[5]On the importance of sociocultural emancipation and the mechanisms of sociocultural domination, see Karl P. Sauvant, "The Potential of Multinational Enterprises as Vehicles for the Transmission of Business Culture," in Karl P. Sauvant and Farid G. Lavipour, eds., *Controlling Multinational Enterprises: Problems, Strategies, Counterstrategies* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976).

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number of coordinating countries to be responsible for implementing the four main areas of self-reliance covered in the Action Programme; there now has been some progress in fulfilling this mandate.

Conclusions

INTERNATIONAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND SELF-RELIANCE aim both at restructuring the international economic system and at creating a system that serves the needs of all its members. The Third World's efforts to implement individual and collective self-reliance are still in a very embryonic state. Both approaches, if adopted, will take some time to evolve since they require a complete reorientation of existing structures. They are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, through an international affirmative-action program, the international community could greatly facilitate and serve the task of self-reliance by decreasing the time required to implement it and thus creating the conditions for a reintegration of the DCs into a new international economic system. The two approaches also do not exclude a vigorous implementation of the NIEO program in order to alleviate pressing immediate problems. And all three approaches can be expected to benefit from the politization of the development issue, the new assertiveness of the Third World, and the transformation of the nonaligned movement into a highly organized international pressure group for the reorganization of the international economic system. However, in playing the checkers game of immediate improvements, one should not forget that the chess game of structures is played on the same board. Since the two games are played simultaneously (and, in the real world, interact), one has to ensure that the moves in checkers do not divert attention from the moves in chess—or even prejudice the outcome of the chess game. □

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Marshall Berman

"All That Is Solid Melts into Air"

Marx, Modernism, and Modernization

Several years ago I began a study of modernity. I meant to explore both the history of ideas—such ideas as "modern times," "modern society," "the modern predicament," and so on—and the human realities that these ideas were meant to grasp. I found that two large bodies of thought and discussion about modernity have appeared in the last 20 years, organized around two separate and distinct ideas: Modernization and Modernism.

"Modernization" has come to signify a complex of social, economic, and political processes: sustained economic development, industrial expansion, urban growth, bureaucratic regulation and rationality, mass media, mass participation in politics—including at least the pretense of democracy—large-scale social planning, shattering of traditional cultures and forms of life, continuous pressure to raise productivity and make progress. "Modernism" has come to denote a family of artistic and intellectual movements that have been radically experimental, spiritually turbulent and militant, iconoclastic to the point of nihilism, apocalyptic in their hopes and fantasies, savagely destructive to one another—and often to themselves as well—yet capable of recurrent self-renewal. Writers on modernization project us into a world of power plants, steel mills, mass rallies and media events, growth rates, five-year plans. When we read about modernism, we find ourselves in the midst of an endless series of spiritual upheavals and cultural revolutions—the death of God, the theater of cruelty, Dada, jazz, the twelve-tone scale, Existentialism, abstract art, and on and on. I was surprised to find that writers in each group were, with very few exceptions, wholly unaware of the existence of the other.[1] It seemed bizarre that there should be no connection between them: after all, weren't they all thrown into the same modern world? I wanted to make these two worlds connect by discovering the underlying unity of life and experience that sustains them both.

As I explored the literature on modernization, I found, not surprisingly, that the figure of Marx bulks large. Even those writers who claim to refute and surpass him generally recognize his work as a primary source and point of reference for their own. On the other hand, in the literature on modernism, Marx is not recognized in any way at all. Modernist consciousness and culture are often traced back to his generation, the generation that came of age in the 1840s—to Baudelaire, Flaubert, Wagner, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky—but Marx himself does not even rate a small branch on the genealogical tree: if he is even mentioned in this company, it is as a foil, or sometimes as a survival of an earlier and serener age—the Enlightenment, say—whose clear vistas and solid values modernism supposedly destroys. Some writers see Marx-

[1] Among the few exceptions are Henri Lefebvre, *Introduction à la Modernité* (1965); Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Keller, *The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness* (1973).

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ism as a deadweight that stifles the modernist spirit; others (Georg Lukacs is the most prominent) see Marx's outlook as far saner, healthier, and more "real" than those of the modernists; but everybody seems to agree that he and they are worlds apart.[2]

And yet, the closer I got to Marx, the less this dualism made sense. Take an image like this: "All that is solid melts into air. . . . " The cosmic scope and visionary grandeur of this image, its highly compressed dramatic power, its vaguely apocalyptic undertones, the ambiguity of its point of view—the heat that destroys is also superabundant energy, an overflow of life—all these qualities are supposed to be hallmarks of the modernist imagination. They are just the sort of thing we are prepared to find in Rimbaud or Nietzsche, Rilke or Yeats—"Things fall apart, the center does not hold." In fact, my image comes from Marx—not from any esoteric, long hidden Marx, but from the heart of the *Communist Manifesto*. It comes as the climax of Marx's description of "modern bourgeois society."

The affinities between Marx and the modernists are even clearer if we look at the whole of the sentence from which our image is drawn: "All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and men at last are forced to face the real conditions of their lives and their relations with their fellow men."[3] Marx's second clause, which proclaims the destruction of everything holy, is more complex and more interesting than the standard 19th-century materialist assertion that God does not exist. Marx is moving in the dimension of time, working to evoke an ongoing historical drama and trauma. He is saying that the aura of holiness is suddenly missing, and that we can't understand ourselves in the present until we confront what is absent. The final clause, "and men at last are forced to face. . .," not only describes a confrontation with a perplexing reality, but acts it out, forces it on the reader—and, indeed, on the writer too, for "*die Menschen*" are all in it together, at once subjects and objects of the pervasive process that melts everything solid into air.

As I followed this modernist "melting" vision, I found it throughout Marx's works. Everywhere it pulls like an undertow against the more "solid" Marxian visions we know so well. It is especially vivid and striking in the *Communist Manifesto*. Indeed, it opens up a whole new perspective on the *Manifesto*, as the archetype of a century of modernist manifestos and movements to come. This is the perspective I will develop here. I will take the *Manifesto* as my text and explicate several of its images and ideas, to show how it expresses some of modernist culture's deepest insights and, at the same time, dramatizes some of its deepest inner contradictions.

At this point it wouldn't be unreasonable to ask: Aren't there already more than enough interpretations of Marx? do we really need a modernist Marx, a kindred spirit of Eliot and Kafka and Gertrude Stein and Artaud, on top of all the rest? I think we do, not only because he's there, but because he has something distinctive and important to say. Marx, in fact, can tell us as much about modernism as it can tell us about him. Modernist thought, so brilliant in illuminating the dark side of everyone and everything, turns out to have some repressed dark corners of its own, and Marx can shine new light on these. Specifically, he can clarify the relationship between modernist culture and the bourgeois economy and society—the world of "modernization"—from which it has sprung. We will see that they have far more in common than either modernists or bourgeoisie would like to think.

[2]The one really striking exception here is Harold Rosenberg. I owe a great deal to his brilliant essays of 1949, "The Resurrected Romans" (reprinted in *The Tradition of the New*) and "The Pathos of the Proletariat" (in Howe, ed., *The Essential Works of Socialism*); and a later piece, "Marxism: Criticism and/or Action (in *Voices of Dissent*, 1958); the last two essays can also be found in Rosenberg's collection, *Act and Actor: Making the Self* (1970).

[3]Most of my citations from the *Manifesto* are drawn from Samuel Moore's classic translation (London: 1888), authorized and edited by Engels, and universally reprinted. I have sometimes deviated from Moore, generally in the direction of more literalism and concreteness, or for the sake of a diction that is less Victorian and more vivid. These changes are frequently but not always indicated by bracketed citations from the German.

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We will see Marxism, modernism, and the bourgeoisie caught up in a strange dialectical dance, and if we follow their movements we may learn some important things about the modern world we all share.

The Melting Vision and Its Dialectic

THE CENTRAL DRAMA for which the *Manifesto* is famous is the development of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and the struggle between them. But we can also find a plan going on within this play, a struggle inside the author's consciousness over what is really going on, what the larger struggle means. We might describe this conflict as a tension between Marx's "solid" and his "melting" visions of modern life.

The *Manifesto*'s first section, "Bourgeois and Proletarians," sets out to present an account of what is now called the process of modernization and sets the stage for what Marx believes will be its revolutionary climax. Here Marx describes the solid institutional core of modernity. First of all, there is the emergence of a world market. As it spreads, it absorbs and destroys whatever local and regional markets it touches. Production and consumption—and human needs—become increasingly international and cosmopolitan. The scope of human needs and demands is enlarged far beyond the capacities of local industries, which consequently collapse. The scale of communications becomes worldwide, and mass media emerge. Capital is concentrated in a few hands. Independent peasants and artisans cannot compete with big capital and are forced to leave the land. Production is increasingly centralized and rationalized in factories or vast agricultural estates run like factories. The poor and uprooted pour into cities, which grow almost magically—and catastrophically—overnight. In order for all these changes to go on smoothly, administrative, legal, fiscal and political centralization must take place, and they do. National states arise and accumulate vast power, although that power is continually undermined by the international scope of capital. Meanwhile, the industrial workers, terribly exploited, gradually begin to organize. In all this we are on familiar ground.

As we read all this, however, strange things begin to happen. Marx's prose suddenly becomes luminous, incandescent; brilliant images succeed and blend into one another; we are hurtled along with a reckless momentum, a breathless intensity; he is not only describing, but evoking and enacting the desperate pace and frantic rhythm that capitalism imparts to every facet of modern life. He makes us feel that we are part of the action, drawn into the stream, hurtled along, out of control, at once dazzled and menaced by the onward rush. After a few pages of this, we are exhilarated but perplexed; we find that the solid social formations around us have, indeed, melted away. By the time Marx's proletarians finally appear, the world stage on which they were supposed to play their part has disintegrated and metamorphosed into something unrecognizable, surreal, a mobile construction that shifts and changes shape under the players' feet. It is as if the innate dynamism of the melting vision has run away with Marx, and carried him—and the workers, and us—far beyond the range of his intended plot, to a point where his revolutionary script will have to be radically reworked.

The paradoxes at the heart of the *Manifesto* are manifest almost at its very start: specifically, from the moment Marx starts to describe the modern bourgeoisie. "The bourgeoisie," he begins, "has played a most revolutionary role in history," What is startling about Marx's next few pages—and his original readers, in 1848, must have been even more startled than we are today—is that he seems to have come not to bury the bourgeoisie but to praise it. He writes an impassioned, enthusiastic, often lyrical celebration of bourgeois works, ideas, and achievements. Indeed, in these pages he manages to praise the bourgeoisie more powerfully and profoundly than its members have ever known how to praise themselves.

What have the bourgeois done to deserve Marx's praise? For one thing, they have "been the first to show what man's activity can bring

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about." Marx does not mean that they have been the first to celebrate the ideal of *vita activa*, an activistic stance toward the world. This has been a central theme of Western culture since the Renaissance; it has taken on new depths and resonances in Marx's own century, in the age of Romanticism and Revolution, of Napoleon and Byron and Goethe's *Faust*; Marx himself will develop it in new directions, and it will go on evolving into our own era. Marx's point is that what modern poets, artists, and intellectuals have only dreamed of, the modern bourgeoisie has actually done. Thus it has "accomplished wonders that far surpass Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals"; it has "conducted expeditions that put all former migrations of nations and crusades in the shade." Its genius for activity expresses itself, first of all, in great works of physical construction—mills and factories, granaries, bridges, canals—these are the cathedrals of modernity; next, in immense movements of people—to cities, to frontiers, to new lands—which the bourgeoisie has sometimes subsidized, sometimes brutally enforced, sometimes inspired. Marx, in a stirring, evocative paragraph, transmits the rhythm and drama of bourgeois activism:

> The bourgeoisie, in its reign of barely a hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive power than have all previous generations put together. Subjection of nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to agriculture and industry, steam navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even an intimation that such productive power slept in the womb of social labor?

Marx is neither the first nor the last writer to celebrate the triumphs of bourgeois technology and social organization. But his paean is distinctive both in what it emphasizes and in what it leaves out. Although Marx is supposedly a materialist (he has identified himself as such since 1844), he does not seem especially interested in the things, the material structures that the bourgeoisie creates. What matters here is the processes, the powers, the expressions of life and energy: men working, moving, cultivating, communicating, organizing and reorganizing nature and themselves; the new and endlessly renewed modes of activity that the bourgeoisie brings into being. Marx does not dwell much on particular inventions and innovations in their own right (in the tradition that runs from Saint-Simon through McLuhan); what stirs him is the active and generative process through which one thing leads to another, dreams metamorphose into blueprints and fantasies into accounts, the wildest and most extravagant ideas get acted on and acted out ("whole populations conjured out of the ground"), and ignite and nourish new forms of life and action.

THE IRONY of bourgeois activism, as Marx sees it, is that the bourgeoisie is forced to close itself off from its richest possibilities, possibilities that can be realized only by those who break its power. For all the marvelous modes of activity the bourgeoisie has opened up, the only activity that really means anything to its members is making money, accumulating capital, piling up surplus value; all their enterprises are merely means to this end, in themselves of no more than transient and intermediary interest. The active power and processes that mean so much to Marx appear as mere incidental by-products in the minds of their producers. Nevertheless, the bourgeois have established themselves as the first ruling class whose authority is based not on who their ancestors were but on what they themselves actually do. They have produced vivid new images and paradigms of the good life as a life of action. They have proved that it is possible, through organized and concerted action, to really change the world.

Alas, to the bourgeois' embarrassment, they cannot afford to look down the roads they have opened up: the great wide vistas may turn into abysses. They can go on playing their revolutionary role only by denying its full extent and depth. But radical thinkers and workers are free to see where the roads lead,

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and to take them. If the good life is a life of action, why should the range of human activities be limited to those that are profitable? And why should modern men, who have seen what man's activity can bring about, passively accept the structure of their society as it is given? Since organized and concerted action can change the world in so many ways, why not organize and work together and fight to change it still more? It is only a matter of time before this dialectic is thought through and worked out. The "revolutionary activity, practical-critical activity" (as Marx put it in 1845) that overthrows bourgeois rule will be an expression of the active and activistic energies that the bourgeoisie itself has set free. Marx began by praising the bourgeoisie, not by burying it; but if his dialectic works out, it will be the virtues for which he praised the bourgeoisie that will bury it in the end.

THE SECOND great bourgeois achievement has been to liberate the human capacity and drive for development: for permanent change, for perpetual upheavel and renewal in every form of personal and social life. This drive, Marx shows, is embedded in the everyday workings and needs of the bourgeois economy. Everybody within reach of this economy finds himself under pressure of relentless competition, whether from across the street or across the world. Under pressure, every bourgeois, from the pettiest to the most powerful, is forced to innovate, simply in order to keep his business and himself afloat; anyone who does not actively change, on his own, will become a passive victim of changes draconically imposed by his rivals. This means that the bourgeoisie, taken as a whole, "cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the means of production."

But the forces that shape and drive the economy cannot be compartmentalized and cut off from the totality of life. The intense and relentless pressure to revolutionize production is bound to spill over and to transform what Marx calls "conditions of production" (or, alternately, "productive relationships") as well, "and, with them, all social conditions" and relationships.[4]

At this point Marx is ready to soar into one of his great set pieces, propelled by the desperate dynamism that he is striving to grasp:

> Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social relations, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier times. All fixed, fast-frozen relationships with their train of venerable ideas and opinions are swept away, all new-formed ones become obsolete before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and men at last are forced to face the real conditions of their lives and their relations with their fellow men.

Where does all this leave us, the members of modern bourgeois society? It leaves us in strange and paradoxical positions. Our lives are controlled by a ruling class with vested interests, not merely in change, but in crisis and chaos. "Uninterrupted disturbance, everlasting uncertainty and agitation," instead of subverting this society, actually serve to strengthen it. Catastrophes are transformed into lucrative opportunities for redevelopment and renewal; disintegration works as a mobilizing and hence an integrating force. The one specter that really haunts the modern ruling class, and that really endangers the world it has created in its image, is one thing that traditional elites—and, for that matter, traditional masses—have always yearned for: solid stability. In this world stability can only mean entropy, slow death, while our sense of progress and growth is our only way of knowing for sure that we are still alive. To say that our society is falling apart is only to say that it is alive and well.

What kinds of people do these permanent revolutions produce? In order for anyone, whatever their class, to survive in modern bourgeois society, their personality must take

[4]The German word here is *Verhältnisse*, which can be translated as "conditions," "relations," "relationships," "circumstances," "affairs," and so on. At different points in this essay it will be translated in different ways, whichever seems most apt in its context.

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on an open form. Modern men and women must learn to yearn for change: not merely to be open to changes in their personal and social lives, but positively to demand them, actively to seek them out and carry them through. They must learn not to yearn nostalgically for the "fixed, fast-frozen relationships" of the real or fantasized past, but to delight in mobility, to thrive on renewal, to look forward to future developments in their conditions of life and their relations with their fellow men.

Marx absorbs this developmental ideal from the German humanist culture of his youth, from the thought of Goethe and Schiller and their Romantic successors. (This theme and its development, still very much alive in our own day, may be Germany's deepest and most lasting contribution to world culture.) Marx is perfectly clear about his links to these writers, to whom he is constantly alluding (to Goethe most of all), and to their intellectual tradition. But he understands better than any of his predecessors that the humanistic ideal of self-development grows out of the emerging reality of bourgeois economic development. Thus, for all his criticism and loathing of the bourgeois economy, he embraces enthusiastically the modern personality structure that this economy has produced. The trouble with capitalism is that, here as elsewhere, it destroys the human possibilities it creates. It fosters, indeed forces, self-development for everybody, but we can only develop in warped, distorted ways. Those traits, impulses, talents that the market can use are rushed (often prematurely) into development, and squeezed desperately till there is nothing left; everything else within us, everything nonmarketable, gets draconically repressed, or withers away for lack of use, or never has a chance to come to life at all. The outcome of Marx's dialectic is that "the development of modern industry cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products." The inner life and energy of bourgeois development will sweep away the class that first brought it to life. We see this dialectical movement as much in the sphere of personal as in economic development: in a system where all situations and ideas, human values and relationships are volatile, how can capitalist forms of life—private property, wage-labor, exchange-value, the insatiable pursuit of profit—alone hold still?

Where the desires and sensibilities of people in every class have become open-ended and insatiable, attuned to permanent upheavals in every sphere of life, what can possibly keep them fixed and frozen in their bourgeois social roles? The more furiously bourgeois society agitates its members to grow or die, the more likely they will be to outgrow it, the more furiously they will eventually turn on it as a drag on their growth, the more implacably they will fight it in the name of the new life it has forced them to seek. Thus capitalism will be melted by the heat of its own incandescent energies. After the Revolution, "in the course of development," after wealth is redistributed, class privileges are wiped away, education is free and universal, then—so Marx prophesies at the *Manifesto*'s climactic moment—then, at last,

> In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we will have an association in which the free development of each will be the condition for the free development of all.

Then the experience of self-development, released from the demands and distortions of the market, can go on freely and spontaneously; instead of the nightmare that it so often is in bourgeois society, it can be a source of beauty and joy for all.

This vision of communism is unmistakably modern, first of all in its individualism, but even more in its ideal of development as the form of the good life. Here Marx is closer to some of his bourgeois and liberal enemies than he is to traditional exponents of communism, who, since Plato and the Church Fathers, have sanctified self-sacrifice, distrusted or loathed individuality, and yearned for a still point at which all strife, and all striving, reach an end. Once again, we find Marx more responsive to what is going on in

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bourgeois society than are the members and proponents of the bourgeoisie themselves. He sees in the dynamics of capitalist development—both the development of each individual and of society as a whole—a new image of the good life: not a life of definitive perfection, not the embodiment of prescribed static essences, but a process of continual, restless, open-ended, unbounded growth. Thus he hopes to heal the wounds of modernity through a fuller and deeper modernity.

WE CAN SEE, then, why Marx gets so excited and enthusiastic about the bourgeoisie and the world it has made. Now we must confront something even more perplexing: next to the *Communist Manifesto*, the whole body of literature in praise of capitalism, from Adam Ferguson to Milton Friedman, is remarkably lame, pale, empty of life. The celebrants of capitalism tell us surprisingly little of its infinite horizons, its revolutionary energy and audacity, its dynamic creativity, its adventurousness and romance, its capacity to make men not merely more comfortable but more alive.

For all this we must go to its most notorious enemy, to Marx. The members of the bourgeoisie (and their ideologists), never known for humility or modesty, seem strangely determined to hide much of their light under a bushel. The reason, I think, is that there is a dark side to this light that they cannot blot out. They are dimly aware of this, and deeply embarrassed and frightened by it, so that they will ignore or deny their own strength and creativity rather than look their virtues in the face and live with them. What is it that the members of the bourgeoisie are afraid to recognize in themselves? Not their drive to exploit people, to treat them purely as means or (in economic rather than moralistic language) as commodities. Marx's bourgeoisie doesn't lose much sleep over this. After all, its members do it to themselves—it is the way they define themselves—so why shouldn't they do the same to everybody else? The source of the trouble is the bourgeois claim to to be "the Party of Order" in modern civilization. The immense amounts of money and energy put into building, and the self-consciously monumental quality of so much of this building—indeed, throughout Marx's century, every piece of furniture built for a bourgeois interior was itself a monument—testify to the sincerity and seriousness of this claim. And yet, the truth of the matter, as Marx understands, is that everything that bourgeois society builds is built to be torn down. "All that is solid"—from the clothes on our backs to the looms and mills that weave them, to the men who work the machines, the houses and neighborhoods the workers live in, the firms and corporations that support and exploit them, the towns and cities and whole regions and even nations that embrace them all—all are made to be broken tomorrow, smashed or shredded or pulverized or bio-degraded, so they can be recycled or replaced next week, and the whole process can go on again and again, hopefully forever, in ever more profitable forms.

The pathos of all bourgeois monuments is that their material strength and solidity actually count for nothing and carry no weight at all, that they are blown away like frail reeds by the very forces of capitalist development that they celebrate. Even the most beautiful and impressive bourgeois buildings and public works are disposable, capitalized for fast depreciation and planned to be obsolete, closer in their functions and their fate to tents and camps than to the "Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals."[5]

If we look behind the sober scenes the members of our bourgeoisie create and see the way they really work and act, we realize that these solid citizens would tear down the world if it paid. Even as they frighten everyone with fantasies of proletarian rapacity and revenge

[5]Engels, just a few years earlier, in *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (1844), was appalled to find that workers' housing, built by speculators for fast profits, was built to last only 40 years. He little suspected that this would become the archetypal pattern of construction in bourgeois society. Ironically, even the most splendid mansions of the richest capitalists would be

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they themselves, through their inexhaustible dealing and developing, hurtle masses of men, materials and money up and down the earth, and erode or explode the foundations of everybody's lives as they go. Their secret—a secret they have managed to keep even from themselves—is that, behind their staid facades, they are the most violently destructive ruling class in history. All the anarchic, measureless, explosive drives that a later generation of intellectuals will baptize with the name of Nihilism—drives that Nietzsche and his followers will ascribe to such cosmic traumas as "the death of God"—are located by Marx in the seemingly banal everyday working of the market economy. He unveils the modern bourgeois as consummate nihilists in action on a scale far vaster than modern intellectuals can ever dream.

The members of the bourgeoisie have alienated themselves from their own creativity because they cannot bear to look into the moral, social, and psychic abyss that their creativity opens up. Some of Marx's most vivid and striking images are meant to force us all to confront that abyss. Thus, "modern bourgeois society, a society that has conjured up such mighty means of production and exchange, is like the sorcerer who can no longer control the powers of the underworld that he has called up by his spells." This image evokes all the spirits of that dark medieval past our modern bourgeoisie is supposed to have buried. Its members present themselves as matter-of-fact and rational, not magical; as children of the Enlightenment, not of darkness. When Marx depicts the bourgeois as sorcerers—remember, too, their enterprise has "conjured whole populations out of the ground," not to mention "the specter of communism"—he is pointing to depths they deny. Marx's imagery projects, here as ever, a sense of wonder over the modern world: its vital powers are dazzling, overwhelming, beyond anything the bourgeoisie could have imagined, let along calculated or planned. But Marx's images also express what must accompany any genuine sense of wonder: a sense of dread. For this miraculous and magical world is also demonic and terrifying, swinging wildly out of control, menacing and devastating blindly as it moves. The members of the bourgeoisie repress both wonder and dread at what they have made: these possessors don't want to know how deeply they are possessed. They learn only at moments of personal and general ruin—only, that is, when it is too late.

Marx's bourgeois sorcerer in fact descends directly from two literary figures who haunted the imagination of his whole generation: Frankenstein (Mary Shelley, 1819) and Faust (Goethe's *Faust*, completed in 1831). These mythical figures, striving to expand human powers through reason and science, unleash demonic energies that erupt beyond all human control, with horrifying results. Marx's bourgeoisie moves within this tragic orbit. But he places its underworld in a worldly context, he shows its dark powers working in broad daylight, propelling a million factories, exchanges, mills, and banks: his vision brings this abyss close to home.

Thus Marx lays out the polarities that will shape and animate the culture of modernism in the century to come: the theme of permanent revolution, infinite development, perpetual creation and renewal in every sphere of life; and its radical antithesis, the theme of nihilism, insatiable destruction, shattering and swallowing up the heart of darkness, the horror. Marx shows how both these human possibilities are infused into the life of every modern man by the drives and pressures of the bourgeois economy. Later on, modernists will produce a great array of cosmic and apocalyptic visions, visions of the most radiant joy and the bleakest despair. Many of the most creative modernist artists and thinkers will be simultaneously possessed by both, and driven endlessly from pole to

gone in less than 40 years—not only in Manchester but in nearly all cities dominated by capital (New York's Fifth Avenue is a vivid example)—leased or sold off to developers, pulled down by the same insatiable drives that had built them up. Considering the rapidity and brutality of capitalist development, the real surprise is not that so much of our architectural and constructive heritage has been destroyed, but that there is anything still left to preserve.

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pole; their inner dynamism will reproduce and express the inward rhythms by which modern capitalism moves and lives. Marx plunges us into the depths of this life process, so that we feel ourselves charged with a vital energy that magnifies our whole being—and are simultaneously seized by shocks and convulsions that threaten at every instant to destroy us.

Then, by the power of his language and ideas, he tries to entice us to trust his vision, to let ourselves be swept along with him toward a climax that lies just ahead. The sorcerer's apprentices, the members of the revolutionary proletariat, are bound to wrest control of our modern productive forces from the grasp of the Faustian-Frankensteinian bourgeoisie. When this is done, they will transform these volatile, explosive social forces into sources of joy and beauty for all, and bring the tragic history of modernity to a happy end. Whether or not this ending should ever really come to pass, the *Manifesto* is remarkable for its imaginative power, its expression and grasp of the luminous and dreadful possibilities that pervade modern life. Along with everything else it is, it's the first great modernist work of art.

BUT EVEN AS we honor the *Manifesto* as an archetype of modernism, we must remember that archetypal models serve to typify not only truths and strengths but also inner tensions and strains. Thus, both in the *Manifesto* and in its illustrious successors, we will find that against the creator's intentions and probably without his awareness, the vision of revolution and resolution generates its own immanent critique, and new contradictions thrust themselves through the veil that this vision weaves. Even as we let ourselves be carried along by Marx's dialectical flow, we feel ourselves being carried away by uncharted currents of uncertainty and unease. We are caught up in a series of radical tensions between Marx's intentions and his insights, between what he wants and what he sees.

Take, for instance, Marx's vision of the revolutionary community. Its foundations will be laid, ironically, by the bourgeoisie itself: "The progress of industry, whose inadvertent promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the workers through competition with their union [*Vereinigung*] through association." The immense productive units inherent in modern industry will throw large numbers of workers together, will force them to depend on each other and to cooperate in their work—the modern division of labor requires intricate cooperation from moment to moment on a vast scale—and so will teach them to think and act collectively. The workers' communal bonds, generated by capitalist production, will generate militant political organizations, unions that will oppose and finally overthrow the private, atomistic framework of capitalist social relations. So Marx believes. And yet, if his overall vision of modernity is true, why should the forms of community produced by capitalist industry be any more solid than any other capitalist product? Might not these collectivities turn out to be, like everything else here, only temporary, provisional, built to obsolesce? Marx, in 1856, will speak of the workers as "newfangled men, . . . as much an invention of modern times as machinery itself." But if this is so, then their solidarity, too, however impressive at any given moment, may prove to be as transient as the machines they operate or the products they turn out. The workers may sustain each other today, on the assembly line or the picket line, only to find themselves scattered tomorrow among different collectivities with different conditions, different processes and products, different needs and interests. It appears that only the abstract forms of capitalism subsist—capital, wage labor, exploitation, surplus value—while their human contents are in perpetual flux. How can any lasting human bonds grow in such loose and shifting soil?

Even if these workers do build a successful revolutionary *movement*, how, amid the flood tides of modern life, will they ever manage to build a solid communist *society*? What is to prevent the social forces that melt capitalism from melting communism as well?

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If all new relationships become obsolete before they can ossify, how can solidarity, fraternity, mutual aid be kept alive? A socialist government might try to dam the flood by imposing radical restrictions on personal, economic, cultural development. All "socialist" governments in our century have in fact done this, with different degrees of success.

To the extent that such a policy is effective, doesn't it, however, betray the Marxian aim of free development for each and all? Marx looks forward to communism as the consummation of modernity; but how can it entrench itself in the modern world without suppressing those very modern energies it promises to set free? On the other hand, if it gives those energies free rein, mightn't the spontaneous flow of popular energy sweep away the new social formation itself?

Thus, simply by reading the *Manifesto* closely, and taking its vision of modernity seriously, we arrive at serious questions about Marx's answers. We can see that the fulfillment Marx sees as just around the bend may be a long time coming, if it comes at all; and we can see that, even if it does come, it may well be only a fleeting, transitory historical episode, gone in a moment, obsolete before it can ossify, swept away by the same tide of perpetual change and progress that brought it briefly within our reach, leaving us endlessly, helplessly floating on. We can see, too, how communism, in order to hold itself together, might stifle the active, dynamic, and developmental forces that have brought it into being, might betray many of the hopes that have made it worth fighting for, might reproduce the inequities and contradictions of bourgeois society under a new name. Ironically, then, we can see Marx's dialectic of modernity reenacting the fate of the society it describes, generating energies and ideas that melt it down into its own air.

Nakedness: The Unaccommodated Men

NOW THAT we have seen Marx's "melting" vision in action, I want to use it to explicate several of the *Manifesto*'s most powerful images of modern life. In the passage below, Marx is trying to show how capitalism has transformed people's relationships both with each other and with themselves. Although, in Marx's syntax, "the bourgeoisie" is the subject—it is its economic activities that bring the big changes about—modern men and women of every class are objects, for all are changed:

> The bourgeoisie has torn apart the many feudal ties that bound men to their "natural superiors," and left no other bond between man and man than naked interest, than callous cash payment. It has drowned the heavenly ecstasies of pious fanaticism, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egoistical calculation. . . . The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honored and looked up to with reverent awe. . . . The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and turned the family relation into a pure money relation. . . . In place of exploitation veiled by religious and political illusions, it has put open, shameless, direct, bare exploitation.

Marx's basic opposition here is between what is open or naked and what is hidden, veiled, or clothed. This polarity, perennial in Eastern as well as Western thought, symbolizes everywhere a distinction between a "real" world and an illusory one. In most ancient and medieval speculative thought, the whole world of sensuous experience appears illusory—the Hindu "veil of Maya"—and the true world is thought to be accessible only through transcendence of bodies, space, and time. In some traditions, reality is accessible through religious or philosophical meditation; in others, it will be available to us only in a future existence after death—the Pauline "for now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face."

The modern variation, beginning in the age of the Renaissance and Reformation, places both these worlds on earth, in space and time, filled with human beings. Now the false world is seen as a historical past, a world we have lost (or are in the process of losing), while the

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true world is the physical and social world that exists for us here and now (or is in the process of coming into being). At this point a new symbolism emerges: clothes become an emblem of the old, illusory mode of life, nakedness comes to signify the newly discovered and experienced truth, and the act of taking off one's clothes becomes a symbol of spiritual liberation, of becoming real. Modern erotic poetry elaborates this theme with playful irony; modern tragedy penetrates its awesome and fearsome depths. Marx thinks and works in the tragic tradition: for him, the clothes are ripped off, the veils are torn away, the stripping process is violent and brutal; and yet, somehow, the tragic movement of modern history is supposed to culminate in a happy end.

The dialectic of nakedness that culminates in Marx is defined at the very start of the modern age, in Shakespeare's *King Lear*. For Lear, the naked truth is what a man is forced to face when he has lost everything that other men can take away except life itself. We see his voracious family, aided by his blind vanity, tear away its own sentimental veil. Stripped not only of political power, but of even the barest traces of human respect and dignity, he is thrown out of doors in the middle of the night at the height of a torrential and terrifying storm. This, he says, is what human life comes down to in the end: the solitary and poor abandoned in the cold, while the nasty and brutish enjoy all the warmth that power can provide. Such knowledge seems to be too much for us: "man's nature cannot carry/Th'affliction, nor the fear." But Lear is not broken by the storm's icy blasts, neither does he flee them; instead, he exposes himself to the storm's full fury, looks it in the face and affirms himself against it even as it tosses and tears him. As he wanders with his royal fool, they meet a crazy beggar, stark naked, apparently even more wretched than he. "Is man no more than this?" Lear demands. "Thou art the thing itself; unaccommodated man. . . . " Now, at the climactic moment of the play, he tears off his royal robes—"Off, off you lendings"—and joins Poor Tom in naked authenticity. This act, which Lear believes has placed him at the very nadir of existence—"a poor, bare, forked animal"—turns out, ironically, to be his first step toward a full humanity, because, for the first time, he recognizes a connection between himself and another human being. This recognition enables him to grow in sensitivity and insight, and to move beyond the bounds of his self-absorded bitterness and misery. As he stands and shivers, it dawns on him that his kingdom is full of people whose whole lives are consumed by the abandoned, defenseless suffering that he is going through right now. When he was in power he never noticed, but now he stretches his vision to take them in:

> Poor naked wretches, wheresoe'er you are
> That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm,
> How shall your houseless heads, and unfed sides,
> Your loop'd and window'd raggedness defend you
> From such seasons as these? O I have ta'en
> Too little care of this: take physic, Pomp,
> Expose theyself to feel what wretches feel,
> That thou may shake the superflux to them,
> And show the heavens more just.

It is only now that Lear is fit to be what he claims to be, "every inch a king." His tragedy is that the catastrophe that redeems him humanly destroys him politically; the experience that makes him genuinely qualified to be a king makes it impossible for him to be one. His triumph lies in becoming something he never dreamed of being, a human being. Here a hopeful dialectic lights up the tragic bleakness and blight. Alone in the cold and, the wind and the rain, Lear develops the vision and courage to break out of his loneliness, to reach out to his fellowmen for mutual warmth. Shakespeare is telling us that the dreadful naked reality of the "unaccommodated man" is the point from which accommodation must be made, the only ground on which real community can grow.

In the 18th century, the metaphors of nakedness as truth and stripping as self-discovery take on a new political resonance. In Montesquieu's *Persian Letters*, the veils

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that Persian women are forced to wear symbolize all the repressions that traditional social hierarchies inflict on people. By contrast, the absence of veils in the streets of Paris symbolizes a new kind of society where "liberty and equality reign," and where, as a consequence, "everything speaks out, everything is visible, everything is audible. The heart shows itself as clearly as the face." Rousseau, in his *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, denounces "the uniform and deceptive veil of politeness" that covers his age, and says that "the good man is an athlete who loves to wrestle stark naked; he despises all those vile ornaments that cramp the use of his powers. . . . " Thus the naked man will be not only a freer and happier man but a better man. The liberal revolutionary movements that bring the 18th century to a climax act out this faith: if hereditary privileges and social roles are stripped away, so that all men can enjoy an unfettered freedom to use their powers, they will use them for the good of all mankind. We must note here a striking absence of worry as to what the naked human being will do or be. The dialectical complexity and wholeness that we found in Shakespeare have faded away, and narrow polarizations have taken their place. We find this same narrowing of perspective in the counterrevolutionary *Reflections* of Edmund Burke:

> But now all is to be changed. All the pleasing illusions that made power gentle, and obedience liberal, which harmonized the different shades of life, . . . are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire of light and reason. All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off. All the super-added ideas, which the heart owns, and the understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover the defects of our weak and shivering nature, and to raise it to a dignity in our own estimation, are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd and antiquated fashion.

The *philosophes* imagined nakedness as idyllic, opening up new vistas, beauty and virtue and happiness for all; for Burke it is counteridyllic, an unmitigated disaster, a fall into nothingness from which nothing can come. Burke's people lack King Lear's capacity to learn something from their mutual vulnerability in the cold. Their only hope lies in lies: in their capacity to construct mythic draperies heavy enough to stifle their dreadful knowledge of who they are.

For Marx, writing in the aftermath of bourgeois revolutions and reactions, and looking forward to a new wave, the symbols of nakedness and unveiling regain the dialectical depth that Shakespeare gave them 250 years before. The bourgeois revolutions, in tearing away veils of "religious and political illusion," have left naked power and exploitation, cruelty and misery, exposed like open wounds; at the same time, they have uncovered and exposed new options and hopes. Unlike the common people of all ages, who have been endlessly betrayed and broken by their devotion to their "natural superiors," modern men, washed in "the icy water of egotistical calculations," are free from deference to masters who destroy them, animated rather than numbed by the cold. Because they know how to think of, by, and for themselves, they will demand a clear account of what their superiors are doing for them—and doing to them— and they will be ready to resist and rebel where they are getting nothing real in return.

Marx's hope is that once the unaccommodated men of the working class are "forced to face . . . the real conditions of their lives and their relations with their fellow men," they will come together to overcome the cold that cuts through them all. Their union will generate the collective energy that can fuel a new communal life. One of the *Manifesto*'s primary aims is to point the way out of the cold, to nourish and focus the common yearning for communal warmth. Because the workers can come through the affliction and the fear only by making contact with the self's deepest resources, they will be prepared to fight for collective recognition of the self's beauty and value. Their communism, when it comes, will appear as a kind of transparent garment, at once keeping its wearers warm and setting off their naked beauty, so that they can recognize themselves and each other in all their radiance.

Here, as so often with Marx, the vision is

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dazzling but the light flickers if we look hard. It isn't hard to imagine alternate endings to the dialectic of nakedness, endings less beautiful than Marx's but no less plausible. Modern men and women might well prefer the solitary pathos and grandeur of the Rousseauean unconditioned self, or the collective costumed comforts of the Burkean masque, rather than the Marxian attempt to fuse the best of both. Indeed, the sort of individualism that scorns and fears connections with other people as threats to the self's integrity, and the sort of collectivism that seeks to submerge the self in a social role, are probably a lot more appealing than the Marxian synthesis, because they are intellectually and emotionally so much easier.

There is a further problem that might keep Marx's dialectic from even getting under way. Marx believes that the shocks and upheavals and catastrophes of life in bourgeois society enable moderns, by going through them, as Lear does, to discover who they "really are." But if bourgeois society is as volatile as Marx thinks it is, how can people ever settle on any real selves? With all the possibilities and necessities that bombard the self and all the desperate drives that propel it, how can anyone definitively define which ones are essential, and which merely incidental? Where is there a clear point of reference for the self's ultimate identity? The nature of the newly naked moderns may turn out to be just as elusive and mysterious as that of the old, clothed one—maybe even more elusive, because there is no longer any illusion of a real self underneath the masks. Thus, along with community and society, individuality itself may be melting into the modern air.

The Metamorphosis of Values

THE PROBLEM OF NIHILISM emerges again in Marx's next line: "The bourgeoisie has resolved all personal honor and dignity into exchange-value; and in place of all the freedoms that men have fought for, it has put one unprincipled freedom—free trade." The first point is the immense power of the market in modern men's inner lives: they look to the price list for answers to questions not merely economic but metaphysical—questions of what is worthwhile, what is honorable, even what is real. When Marx says that other values are "resolved into" exchange-value, his point is that bourgeois society does not efface old structures of value but subsumes them: old modes of honor and dignity do not die; instead, they get incorporated into the market, take on price tags, gain a new life as commodities. Thus, any imaginable mode of human conduct becomes morally permissible the moment it becomes economically possible—becomes "valuable"; anything goes if it pays. This is what modern nihilism is all about. Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, and their 20th-century successors will ascribe this phenomenon to science, rationalism, the Death of God. Marx would say that its basis is far more concrete and mundane: it is built into the banal everyday workings of the bourgeois economic order—an order that equates our human value with our market price, no more, no less, and that forces us to expend ourselves in pushing our price up as far as we can make it go.

Marx is appalled by the destructive brutalities that bourgeois nihilism brings to life, but he believes that it contains a hidden tendency to transcend itself. The source of this drive is the paradoxically "unprincipled" principle of free trade. Marx believes that the bourgeoisie really believe in this principle—that is, in an incessant, unrestricted flow of commodities in circulation, a continuous metamorphosis of market values. If, as he believes, the members of the bourgeoisie really do want a free market, they will have to enforce the freedom of new products to enter the market. This in turn means that any full-fledged bourgeois society must be a genuinely open society, not only economically but politically and culturally as well, so that people will be free to shop around and seek the best deals, in ideas, associations, laws, and social policies as well as in things. The unprincipled principle of free trade will force the bourgeoisie to grant even communists the

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basic right that all businessmen enjoy, the right to offer and promote and sell their goods to as many customers as they can get. Thus, by virtue of "free competition in the realm of knowledge," even the most subversive works and ideas—like the *Manifesto* itself—must be allowed to appear, on the grounds that they may sell. Marx is confident that, once the ideas of revolution and communism become accessible to the masses, they *will* sell, and a "self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority" will come into its own. Thus he can live with bourgeois nihilism in the long run because he sees it as active and dynamic, a nihilism of plenitude. Propelled by its nihilistic drives and energies, the bourgeoisie will open the political and cultural floodgates through which its revolutionary nemesis will flow.

This dialectic presents several problems. The first concerns the bourgeoisie's commitment to the unprincipled principle of free trade, whether in economics, politics, or culture. In fact, this principle has generally been more honored in the breach than in the observance. The members of the bourgeoisie, especially the most powerful, have always fought to restrict, manipulate, and control their markets; indeed, much of their creative energy has gone into arrangements for doing this—chartered monopolies, trusts, holding companies, cartels and conglomerates, price-fixing, open or hidden subsidies from the state—all accompanied by paeans in praise of the free market. Moreover, even among the few who really do believe in free exchange, there are fewer still who would extend freedom of trade to ideas as well as things. (Humboldt, J. S. Mill, Justices Holmes and Brandeis and Douglas and Black have been still, small voices in bourgeois society, embattled and marginal at best.)

A more typical bourgeois pattern is to praise freedom when in opposition, and to repress it when in power. Here Marx may be in danger—surprisingly, for him—of getting carried away by what ideologues say, and of losing touch with what the men with money and power actually do. This is a problem because, if the members of the bourgeoisie really don't give a damn about freedom, then they will do all they can to keep the societies they control closed against new ideas, and it will be harder than ever for communism to take root. Marx would say that their need for progress and innovation will force them to open up their societies even to ideas and movements they dread. Yet their ingenuity might avoid this through a truly insidious innovation: a consensus of mutually enforced mediocrity, designed to protect each individual bourgeois from the risks of competition, and bourgeois society as a whole from the risks of change.[6]

Another problem in Marx's dialectic of the free market is that it entails a strange collusion between bourgeois society and its most radical opponents. This society is driven by its unprincipled principle of free exchange to open itself to movements for radical change. The enemies of capitalism may enjoy a great deal of freedom to do their work—to meet, speak, write, organize, demonstrate, strike, elect. But their freedom to move transforms their movement into an enterprise, and they find themselves cast in the paradoxical role of merchants and promoters of revolution, which necessarily becomes a commodity like everything else. Marx does not seem to be disturbed by the ambiguities of this social role—maybe because he is sure that it will become obsolete before it can ossify, that the revolutionary enterprise will be put out of business by its fast success. A century later, we can see how the business of promoting revolution is open to the same abuses and temptations, manipulative frauds and wishful self-deceptions, as any other promotional line.

Finally, our skeptical doubts about promoters' promises must lead us to question

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[6] In *Capital*, in the climactic chapter on "The Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation" (Volume I, Chapter 32), Marx says that when a system of social relations acts as a fetter on "the free development of productive forces," that social system has simply got to go: "It must be annihilated; it is annihilated." But what would happen if, somehow, it didn't get annihilated? "To perpetuate it" would be, Marx says, "to decree universal mediocrity." This seems to be one thing—perhaps the only thing—that Marx is utterly incapable of imagining.

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one of the primary promises in Marx's work: the promise that communism, while upholding and actually deepening the freedoms that capitalism has brought us, will free us from the horrors of bourgeois nihilism. If bourgeois society is really the maelstrom Marx thinks it is, how can he expect all its currents to flow only one way, toward peaceful harmony and integration? Even if a triumphant communism should someday flow through the floodgates that free trade opens up, who knows what dreadful impulses might flow in along with it, or in its wake, or are even impacted inside? It is easy to imagine how a communist society committed to the free development of each and all might develop its own distinctive varieties of nihilism. Indeed, a communist nihilism might turn out to be far more explosive and disintegrative than its bourgeois precursor—though also more daring and original—because, while capitalism cuts the infinite possibilities of modern life with the limits of the bottom line, Marx's communism could launch the liberated self into immense, unknown human spaces with no limits at all.

The Loss of a Halo

ALL THE AMBIGUITIES in Marx's thought are crystallized in one of his most luminous images, the last one we will explore here: "The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every activity hitherto honored and looked up to with reverant awe. It has transformed the doctor, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science [*Mann der Wissenschaft*],[7] into its paid wage-laborers." The halo, for Marx, is a primary symbol of religious experience, the experience of something holy. For Marx, as for his contemporary Kierkegaard, experience, rather than belief or dogma or theology, forms the core of religious life. The halo splits life into sacred and profane: it creates an aura of holy dread and radiance around the figure who wears it; the sanctified figure is torn from the matrix of the human condition, split off inexorably from the needs and pressures that animate the men and women who surround it.

Marx believes that capitalism destroys this mode of experience for everybody: "all that is holy is profaned"; nothing is sacred, no one is untouchable, life becomes thoroughly desanctified. In some ways, Marx knows, this is frightful: modern men and women may well stop at nothing, with no dread to hold them back; free from fear and trembling, they are free to trample down everyone in their way, if self-interest drives them to it. But Marx also sees the virtue of a life without holy auras: it brings about a condition of spiritual equality. Thus the modern bourgeoisie holds vast material powers over the workers and everybody else, but it will never achieve the spiritual ascendancy that earlier ruling classes could take for granted. For the first time in history, all confront themselves and each other on a single plane of being.

We must remember that Marx is writing at a historical moment when, especially in England and France (the *Manifesto* really has more to do with them than with the Germany of Marx's time), disenchantment with capitalism is pervasive, overt and intense, and almost ready to flare up in revolutionary forms. In the next 20 years or so, the bourgeoisie will prove remarkably inventive in constructing haloes of its own. Marx will try to strip these away in the first volume of *Capital*, in his brilliant analysis of "The Fetishism of Commodities"—a mystique that

[7]The word *Wissenschaft* may be translated in many ways, narrowly as "science," or more broadly as "knowledge," "learning," "scholarship," or any sustained and serious intellectual pursuit. Whatever word we use, it is crucial to remember that Marx is talking here about the predicament of his own group, and hence about himself.

I have intermittently used the word "intellectuals" as shorthand for the diverse occupational groups Marx brings together here. I realize the word is anachronistic—it stems from the turn of the 20th century—but it has the advantage of bringing together, as Marx seeks to do, people in diverse occupations who, despite their differences, all work with their minds.

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disguises the intersubjective relations between men in a market society as purely physical, "objective," unalterable relations between things. In the climate of 1848, this bourgeois pseudoreligiosity has not yet established itself. Marx's targets here are, both for him and us, a lot closer to home: those professionals and intellectuals—"the doctor, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science"—who think they have the power to live on a higher plane than ordinary humanity, to transcend capitalism in life and work.

Why does Marx place that halo on the heads of modern professionals and intellectuals in the first place? To bring out one of the paradoxes of their historical role: even though they tend to pride themselves on their emancipated and thoroughly secular minds, they turn out to be just about the only moderns who really believe that they are called to their vocations and that their work is holy. It is obvious to any reader of Marx that, in his commitment to his work, he shares this faith. And yet, he is suggesting here, in some sense it is a bad faith, a self-deception. This passage is so arresting because, as we see Marx identifying himself with the critical force and insight of the bourgeoisie, and reaching out to tear the halo from modern intellectuals' heads, we realize that, in some sense, it is his own head that he is laying bare.

The basic fact of life for these intellectuals, as Marx sees them, is that they are "paid wage-laborers" of the bourgeoisie, members of "the modern working class, the proletariat." They may deny this identity—for, after all, who wants to belong to the proletariat—but they are thrown into the working class by the historically defined conditions under which they are forced to work. When Marx describes intellectuals as wage-workers, he is trying to make us see that modern culture is part of modern industry. Art, science, social theory like Marx's own, all are modes of production; the bourgeoisie controls the means of production in culture, as in everything else, and anyone who wants to create must work within the orbit of its power.

As members of the proletariat, modern professionals, intellectuals, and artists

> live only so long as they find work, and . . . find work only so long as their labor increases capital. These workers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.

Thus they can write books, paint pictures, discover physical or historical laws, save lives, only if someone with capital will pay them. But the pressures of bourgeois society are such that no one will pay them unless it pays to pay them—that is, unless their works somehow help to "increase capital." They must "sell themselves piecemeal" to an employer willing to exploit their brains for profit. They must scheme and hustle to present themselves in a maximally profitable light; they must compete against others (often brutally and unscrupulously) for the privilege of being bought, simply in order to go on with their work. Once the work is done they are, like all other workers, separated from the products of their labor. Their goods and services go on sale, and it is "the vicissitudes of competition, the fluctuations of the market" rather than any intrinsic truth or beauty or value—or, for that matter, any lack of truth or beauty or value—that will determine their fate. Marx does not expect that great ideas and works will fall still-born for want of a market: the modern bourgeoisie is remarkably resourceful in wringing profit out of thought. What will happen instead is that creative processes and products will be used and transformed in ways that will dumbfound or horrify their creators. But the creators will be powerless to resist, because they must sell their labor power in order to live.

Intellectuals occupy a peculiar position in the working class, one that generates special privileges, but also special ironies. They are beneficiaries of the bourgeois demand for perpetual innovation, which vastly expands the market for their products and skills, often

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stimulates their creative audacity and imagination, and—if they are shrewd enough and lucky enough to exploit the perennial shortage of brains—enables them to escape the poverty of most workers. On the other hand, because they are personally involved in their work—unlike most wage laborers, who are alienated and indifferent—the fluctuations of the market strike them in a far deeper way. In "selling themselves piecemeal," they are selling not merely their physical energy but their minds, their deepest feelings, their visionary and imaginative powers, perhaps the whole of themselves. Moreover, they are driven not only by a need to live, which they share with all men, but by a desire to communicate, to engage in dialogue with their fellowmen. But the cultural commodity market offers the only media in which dialogue on a public scale can take place: no idea can reach or change moderns unless it can be marketed and sold to them. Hence they turn out to be dependent on the market not for bread alone, but for spiritual sustenance—a sustenance they know the market cannot be counted on to provide.

It is easy to see why modern intellectuals, trapped in these ambiguities, would imagine radical ways out: in their situation, revolutionary ideas would spring from the most direct and intense personal needs. But the social conditions that inspire their radicalism also serve to frustrate it. We saw that even the most subversive ideas must manifest themselves through the media of the market. Insofar as these ideas attract and arouse people, they will expand and enrich the market, and so "increase capital." Now, if Marx's vision of bourgeois society is accurate, there is every reason to think that it will generate a market for radical ideas. This system requires constant revolutionizing, disturbance, agitation; it needs to be perpetually pushed and pressed in order to maintain its elasticity and resilience, to appropriate and assimilate new energies, to drive itself to new heights of activity and growth. This means, however, that men and movements that proclaim their enmity to capitalism may turn out to be just the sort of stimulants capitalism needs. Bourgeois society, through its insatiable drive for destruction and development, and its need to satisfy the insatiable needs it creates, inevitably produces radical ideas and movements that aim to destroy it. But its very capacity for development enables it to negate its own inner negations: to nourish itself and thrive on opposition, to become stronger amid pressure and crisis than it could ever be in peace, to transform enmity into intimacy and attackers into inadvertent allies.

In this climate, then, radical intellectuals encounter radical obstacles: their ideas and movements are in danger of melting into the same modern air that decomposes the bourgeois order they are working to overcome. To surround oneself with a halo in this climate is to try to destroy the danger by denying it. The intellectuals of Marx's time were particularly susceptible to this sort of bad faith. Even as Marx was discovering socialism, in the Paris of the 1840s, Gautier and Flaubert were developing their mystique of "art for art's sake," while the circle around Auguste Comte was constructing its own parallel mystique of "pure science." Both these groups—sometimes in conflict with one another, sometimes interfused—sanctified themselves as *avant-gardes*: they were at once perceptive and trenchant in their criticisms of capitalism, and, at the same time, absurdly complacent in their faith that they had the power to transcend it, that they could live and work freely beyond its norms and demands.

Marx's point, in tearing the haloes from their heads, is that nobody in bourgeois society can be so pure or safe or free. The networks and ambiguities of the market are such that everybody is caught up and entangled in them. Intellectuals must recognize the depths of their own dependence—spiritual as well as economic dependence—on the bourgeois world they despise. It will never be possible to overcome these contradictions unless we confront them directly and openly. That is what stripping away the halo means.

This image, like all the great images in the history of literature and thought, contains depths that its creator could not have foreseen. First of all, Marx's indictment of the

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19th-century artistic and scientific *avant-gardes* cuts just as deeply against the twentieth-century Leninist "vanguards," who possess an identical (and, of course, equally groundless and self-deceptive) faith in their own powers of transcendence. Next, it raises questions about Marx's own romantic image of the working class. If being a "paid wage-laborer" is the antithesis of having a halo, how can Marx speak of the proletariat as a class of "new men," uniquely equipped to transcend the contradictions of modern life? Indeed, we can carry this line of questioning a step farther: if we have followed Marx's unfolding vision of modernity and have confronted all its endemic ironies and ambiguities, how can we expect *anybody* to transcend all this?

Once again we encounter a problem we have met before: the tension between Marx's critical insights and his radical hopes. My emphases in this essay, and maybe my sympathies as well, have leaned toward the skeptical and self-critical undercurrents in Marx's thought; and a sympathetic reader might well be tempted to take only the criticism and self-criticism to heart, and throw out the hopes as utopian and naive. To do this, however, would be to miss what Marx saw as the essential point of critical thinking. Criticism, as he understood and practiced it, was part of an ongoing dialectical process. It was meant to be dynamic, to drive (and inspire) the person criticized to overcome not only his critics but himself, to propel both parties toward a new synthesis. Thus, to unmask phony claims to transcendence. To give up the quest for transcendence is to erect a halo around one's own resignation, and to betray not only Marx but ourselves.

After the Convergence

I HAVE BEEN trying in this essay to define a space in which Marx's thought and the modernist tradition converge. First of all, both are attempts to evoke and to grasp a distinctively modern realm of experience. Both regard modernity with mixed emotions, awe and elation mixed with a sense of horror. Both see modern life as shot through with contradictory impulsions and potentialities, and both try to resolve or dissolve the contradictions. Beyond these formal resemblances, I have tried to read Marx as a modernist writer, to bring out the vividness and richness of his language, the depth and complexity of his imagery—clothes and nakedness, veils, haloes, heat, cold, etc.—and to show how brilliantly he develops the themes by which modernism will later define itself: the glory of modern energy and dynamism, the ravages of modern disintegration and nihilism, the strange intimacy between them; the sense of being caught in a vortex in which all facts and values are whirled, exploded, decomposed, recombined; a basic uncertainty about what is basic, what is valuable, what is meaningful, even what is real; a flaring up of the most radical hopes, in the midst of their radical negations.

At the same time, I have tried to read modernism in a Marxist way, to suggest how its characteristic energies, insights, and anxieties spring from the drives and strains of "modernized" economic life: from its insatiable pressure for growth and progress, its demands on everybody to exploit not only one's fellowmen but also oneself, its absorption of all values as commodities, the volatility and endless metamorphoses of all its market values, its pitiless destruction of everything and everyone it cannot use—so much of all the "premodern" worlds, but so much of itself and its own modern world as well—and its capacity to exploit crisis and chaos as a springboard for still more development, to feed itself on its own self-destruction.

It may seem that I have overplayed this theme of convergence. If I have, it's been to compensate for the fact that it has always been so badly underplayed.[8] Marxists have gener-

[8]There are two kinds of exceptions, which I plan to discuss in detail in the future. First, those who have tried to act out an outright fusion of the two, to make revolutions simultaneously in art and in politics: e.g., the Expressionists, Futurists, Dadaists and Constructivists of 1914-21. Next, those who experience modernism as a

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ally ignored modernism, or done their best to repress it—out of fear, I suspect, that (in Nietzsche's phrase) if they look into the abyss, the abyss will start looking back into them. For them, I've tried to close off an exit, by showing how this abyss opens up within Marxism itself. I should say, too, that Marxism's strength has always lain in its willingness to start from frightful social realities, to confront them, work through them and work them through; it would be sad—and self-destructive—to stop now. We will never ride the wave of the future if we don't learn to steer our way through the maelstrom we all live in now; if we try to act as if it isn't there, we may be the first to be swept away. Meanwhile, modernists have similarly avoided or shunned Marxism, largely out of fear that it will strip them of a halo they hold dear: their conviction of the artist's creative autonomy. To them I would say that although, indeed, a Marxist understanding would take this halo away, it could give them back something better in exchange: a heightened capacity to imagine and express the endlessly rich, complex, and ironic relationships between them and the "modern bourgeois society" they deny or defy. A fusion of Marx and modernism would melt the too-solid body of Marxism—or at least thaw it out—but it would give modernist art and thought a new solidity and invest its creations with an unsuspected resonance and depth: it would reveal modernism as the realism of our time.

The bourgeois' responses to both Marxism and modernism over the last century have fluctuated with the market. At first they recoiled in shock and horror from both, because both forced them to face the world they had created and the people they had become. But as time went by they learned, as usual, to adapt. In times of expansion and prosperity, like the 1920s and the 1960s, they managed to live with, and even enjoy, the most subversive Marxist and modernist ideas—as the bejeweled Berlin audience of 1928 cheered Brecht's *"Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral"*—comfortable in their nihilism, confident that they could exploit any challenge or change and make it pay. In periods of retrenchment and depression, like the 1930s and the 1970s, they donned their Party of Order robes, waxed righteous, accused political, racial, or cultural Outside Agitators, and passed the buck in every direction to deny their own complicity in collapse. Thus modernism in the '70s, like "degenerate art" and "cultural Bolshevism" in the '30s, has played a prominent scapegoat's role. What has been disguised, both then and now, is the fact that these cultural movements, for all their eruptive power, have been no more than bubbles on the surface of a social cauldron that has been teeming and boiling for more than a hundred years. It is modern capitalism, not modern art and culture, that sets and keeps the pot boiling—reluctant as capitalism may be to face the heat today.

There are many people in the modern world—mostly in capitalist countries, but many in "socialist" ones too—who are honestly searching for integration and integrity that they cannot seem to find in the life options that confront them. Such people often become very bitter toward modern culture and feel that if they could only assimilate and internalize another—Oriental, classical, medieval, or primitive—they could bring their lives together. The point of this essay is that so long as the modern economy remains intact—an economy that reduces all values to market values, that runs on compulsory or compulsive acquisition, requires endless, mindless growth, and measures growth in quantity alone—people's lives are going to keep falling apart. Only the most radical economic and social changes could begin to lift modern men and women out of the maelstrom. Until these changes take place—which could be a while—they are going to need a modernist culture to show them what they are doing and who they are.

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maelstrom, Marxism as *ein' feste Burg* of solid rock, and who expend great energy and anguish plunging back and forth between them: e.g., Mayakovski, Brecht, Benjamin, Adorno, Sartre.

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Even after such a revolution, they will still need it to show them what they were, could be, and might yet become.

Meanwhile, those of us who are most critical of modern life need modernism most, to show us where we are and where we can begin to change our circumstances and ourselves. In search of a place to begin, I have gone back to one of the first and greatest of modernists, Karl Marx. I have gone to him not so much for his answers—since his dialectical genius often generated questions that dissolved his own answers—as for his questions. The great gift he can give us today, it seems to me, is not a way out of the contradictions of modern life, but rather a surer and deeper way into these contradictions. He knew that the way beyond the contradictions would have to lead through modernity, not out of it. He knew we must start where we are: psychically naked, stripped of all religious, aesthetic, moral haloes and sentimental veils, thrown back on our individual will and energy, forced to exploit each other and ourselves in order to survive; and yet, in spite of all, thrown together by the same social forces that pull us apart, dimly aware of all we might be together, ready to stretch ourselves to grasp new human possibilities, to develop identities and mutual bonds that can help us hold together as the fierce modern air blows hot and cold through us all.

Note

The literature on both modernization and modernism is immense, though the former has dropped off somewhat in the past decade, while the latter is still in the process of developing. Here is a brief sampling:

On modernization: Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (1958); W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960); S. M. Lipset, *The First New Nation* (1963); Michael Walzer, "The Only Revolution: Notes on the Theory of Modernization" (*Dissent*, Fall 1964); David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (1965); C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (1966); S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (1966); Dankwart Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (1967); Lloyd and Suzanne Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition* (1967); Daniel Lerner, James Colemann and Ronald Dore, articles on modernization in the *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* (1968), vol. 10; Alex Inkeles, *The Modernization of Man* (1975).

On modernism: Harold Rosenberg, *The Tradition of the New* (1959); Jacques Barzun, *Classic Romantic & Modern* (1961, 1975); Lionel Trilling, "The Modern Element in Modern Literature" (1961), reprinted with additional discussion in *Beyond Culture* (1965); Stephen Spender, *The Struggle of the Modern* (1963); *The Modern Tradition*, an anthology edited and Introduced by Richard Ellman and Charles Feidelson (1965); Paul de Man, "What is Modern?" (*New York Review of Books*, August 1965); Caesar Grana, *Modernity and its Discontents* (1964, 1967); Clement Greenberg, "Modernist Painting," in *Art and Culture* (1966); Irving Howe, "The Culture of Modernism" (*Commentary*, January 1967), reprinted as Introduction to Howe's anthology, *Literary Modernism* (1967), Renato Poggioli, *The Theory of the Avant-Garde* (1962; English version, 1968); Louis Kampf, *On Modernism* (1970); Daniel Bell, "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism" (*Public Interest*, Fall 1970; reprinted with further discussion in his book, same title, 1975); various discussions by Hilton Kramer, in *The Age of the Avant-Garde* (1972); Harold Rosenberg, "What's New" (*New Yorker*, February 1973; reprinted with further discussion in his book, *Art on the Edge*, 1976). □

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Paschalis M. Kitromilides

Democratic Greece—Stumbling Toward Modernity

. . . it is a certaine signe of wise Government . . . when it can hold Mens hearts by Hopes . . .

—FRANCIS BACON

I

The collapse of the Greek dictatorship in July 1974 generated an extraordinary sense of hope. After turbulent and discouraging decades everything now seemed possible. The traditional reactionary right, utterly discredited because of its collaboration with the dictatorship, was expected to disappear as a political force, thus removing the major impediment to fundamental changes.

The forces of the antijunta resistance—the liberal conservatives, the liberal and social democratic center, and the spectrum of the left—had one basic demand: "dejuntaization." They expected at a minimum the removal and trial of all those, whether military or civilian, who had risen to power through collaboration with the dictatorship. Beyond that, they sought to dismantle the entire machinery of the parastate,* including a purge of spies and collaborators from the vast state bureaucracy, the armed and security forces, and other public agencies. At the least, the armed forces and the police would have to be brought under effective civilian control, cracking down on conspiratorial groups in their ranks and breaking their ties with clandestine reactionary and fascist elements.

Political life in this period has been intense. Following the collapse of the junta, a government of national unity—based on the predictatorship parliamentary right, and the liberal and social democratic center—was formed to deal with the Cyprus crisis, to reestablish conditions of political freedom, and to prepare the country for elections. Parliamentary elections were held on November 17, 1974, the first time in ten years. In a referendum held three weeks later, two-thirds of the voters cast their ballots for the abolition of the monarchy, and thus the third Greek Republic was founded.

II

With the election and parliamentary government, Greek politics took on a new shape. To some extent this resembled the pre-1967 political spectrum, but with important modifications. The reconstituted party of the traditional right, under the name of "New

This essay is based on a paper presented at a meeting of the Greek Study Group, Center for European Studies, Harvard University. This was written before the Greek elections of November 1977—the postscript afterward.

*One of the most important results of the trials of the junta in the summer of 1975 was that the examination of witnesses (most of whom were prominent right-wing politicans and senior army officers) produced enough evidence to confirm all the allegations and suspicions concerning the existence and workings of the parastate and its ties with the army, the palace, the right-wing establishment, and American secret services. The latest testimony on these issues available in English is *I Should Have Died*, by Philip Dean (New York: Atheneum, 1977).

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Democracy" and led by Constantine Karamanlis, polled 54.5 percent of the vote, one of the largest majorities in Greek history. It was a vote of prudence, an effort to prevent a return to military rule. This, added to Karamanlis' dynamism as a vote-getter, explains the rise in conservative votes from 35 percent in 1964.

Three main currents can be discerned in New Democracy. A substantial group on the right (corresponding perhaps to the 30 percent that voted for the King in the 1974 referendum) are unrepentant conservatives. Judging by the political line of their newspapers, these people seem to have regretted nothing and learned nothing. They appear more than willing to tolerate the existence of the parastate and to keep the junta option alive. They strongly oppose any further "dejuntaization," and some do not hide their royalist preferences.

A second group in "New Democracy" is that of the Neo-Europeans. Mesmerized by the mirage of technocratic solutions to the problems of Greek society, they advocate full membership in the European Economic Community. Their political strategy is modernization without popular participation. In fairness it must be said that this group appears committed to the parliamentary process, but theirs is an old-fashioned parliamentarism in which patronage remains basic to political control.

The third group in the Greek right is composed of people for whom the dictatorship was a kind of shock. They may be called conservative liberals, and their work in the antijunta resistance inspired them with a clear commitment to the democratic process The newspaper *Kathemerini* speaks for them and they represent the best the right can offer.

Karamanlis, as premier in the years 1955-63, was largely responsible for the economic development that established an infrastructure of growth but did nothing to democratize the economy. Today he is a towering figure in Greek politics, imbued with a messianism only too obvious in the personal manner with which he handles the country's problems. Despite his pretensions, he lacks a wider vision; the contrast with General de Gaulle, whom he likes to project as his model, is all too obvious. For Karamanlis, Greece's problems require technical, not structural, solutions. His vision for Greece does not extend beyond that of the Neo-Europeans. Upon his return to Greece, it was commonly suggested that the long years of reflection in exile had changed him from a tough practical politician into a philosphical liberal set upon democratizing Greek society. This mythology is belied not only by his unwillingness to take bold steps toward dejuntaization, but also by his role within his own party. The Prime Minister has not only avoided supporting the liberal elements in his party; he has failed to use his mandate to purge the party—as a prelude to a wider purge of the remnants of the dictatorship in the state machine and the armed forces. Still, he has abided impeccably by the rules of parliamentary politics and has made possible an atmosphere of full freedom unparalleled in Greece in the last 40 years. Furthermore, Prime Minister Karamanlis has restored a sense of rectitude to Greek public life and, within the limits of his politics, has handled Greek foreign policy responsibly.

The Union of the Democratic Center (EDIK), headed by George Mavros, has inherited the support of the pre-1967 Center Union of George Papandreou and the traditions of Venizelist liberalism. It also has inherited the problems of Greek liberalism. Polling 20.4 percent of the vote, it emerged as the second party in parliament and thus forms what in Greece is called the "axiomatic opposition." Its share of the vote showed a dramatic decline from the 52.83 percent registered by the Center Union in 1964 As it is counting among its leaders prominent activists in the resistance, it has also attracted most of the country's professional talent. Uncertain about its ideology, torn between the prominence of its progressively oriented resistance activists and the old party hands, EDIK has weathered, in the last two years, an internal struggle between old-style liberalism and social democracy. The Social Democrats, having lost, opted out and formed a splinter party, the Socialist Initiative, which includes

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the most prominent Greek Social Democrats and has deprived EDIK of some of its most talented leaders. In December 1976, EDIK nonetheless adopted a social democratic program. The more conservative segments of the party's electoral support having gone over to New Democracy, the party had no choice but to appeal to the socially more forward-looking groups of the political center, which otherwise might have been lost to the left. Despite the chronic crisis that is dramatized by this internal struggle, EDIK remains a serious political force.

An alternative to Karamanlis might come from the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), founded and headed by Andreas Papandreou. PASOK grew out of PAK (Panhellenic Liberation Movement), Papandreou's resistance organization that was active during the seven years of military rule. In its parliamentary shape it inherited part of the support enjoyed by Andreas's father, George Papandreou, in certain regions, but it mostly attracted the progressively oriented segments of the urban lower middle class. It also cut into areas of traditional liberal strength in northern Greece. With 13.68 percent of the vote in 1974, PASOK is the first articulate socialist movement advocating radical social change to emerge in Greece outside the Communist party.

PASOK may eventually prove a catalyst for political and social change, but so far it has engaged mostly in a negative politics; it still lacks a consistently thought-out conception of Greece's problems. This is underlined by the party's own uncertainty about its variety of socialism. Although clearly not identifying with the Soviet model, its programmatic positions include elements gleaned from Swedish social democracy, the Yugoslav *autogestion*, "Arab socialism," and the vague radicalism of Third World liberation movements. Still, in advocating profound structural changes, in examining the risks of Greek membership in the EEC, and in his eloquent articulation of an autonomous foreign policy, Papandreou has drawn the outlines of an alternative. How realistic this is will depend on his capacity to cooperate with other forces of the opposition.

Papandreou's conduct in running his own party raises doubts. He has run his movement as a personal party in the traditional Greek manner and has found it difficult to tolerate collective leadership, thereby precluding, in effect, cooperation with other opposition parties. Internally PASOK has been weakened through splits and expulsions. The most significant of the resulting splinter groups is the Socialist Course (Sosialistiki Poreia), a partial continuation of the heroic Democratic Defense that distinguished itself in the anti-junta resistance. The Socialist Course has acted as an ideological pressure group, trying to work in the broader spectrum of the Greek left and aiming to unify the fragmented forces committed to a socialist transformation. Its effectiveness, however, is undermined by an excessively radical rhetoric.

Democracy also has brought the legalization of the Communist party, outlawed since the end of the Civil War. The Communists' effectiveness at the polls has been impeded by a split in their ranks, which occurred in 1968 over disagreements on how to chart a course of action against the dictatorship. As a result, the Greek Communist party of the Interior, KKE (In), emerged out of the ranks of the traditional Communist party of Greece (KKE), in a separation that was ideological as well as organizational. The cadres of the KKE (In) were actively involved in resistance activities in Greece and redefined their positions on the model of the Italian Communist party, from which they received considerable help.

After the collapse of the dictatorship, the two Communist parties managed to work out a precarious alliance. In the 1974 elections they ran under the common banner of the "United Left," polling 9.29 percent of the vote (as against 11.83 percent for a similar group in 1964), cast mostly in the working-class suburbs of Athens, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki. The electoral pact was not faithfully observed during the election, and it broke down immediately thereafter. The Communist

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party of Greece managed to get five deputies elected to parliament and the Communist Party of Greece (Interior) two. The eighth leftist seat went to Elias Iliou, a respected senior statemsan and chairman of the reconstituted Unified Democratic Left (EDA), the party that articulated leftist views in the 1950s and 1960s.

The split is at the root of the major problems of the Greek left. The KKE (In) represents a serious attempt at innovation. It has attracted the support of many of the most serious people in Greece, especially among the intelligentsia, the younger professionals and university youth, and has managed to gain the respect of its ideological rivals in the liberal center and the democratic right, although not of the radical socialists in Papandreou's following who criticize the KKE (In) for being too soft on the government. The KKE (In) remains organizationally weak and besieged by internal disagreements. Its bitter rival, the Communist party of Greece, KKE, presents an opposite picture. It has inherited most of the traditional Communist strength at the grass roots and has taken over the organizational structure of the old party. It has the largest and best disciplined youth movement in Greece (Communist Youth of Greece—KNE). It has retained an extraordinary ideological rigidity, consisting mostly of an unwavering dedication to Moscow, and has consequently remained locked into its traditional political ghetto.

III

The central problem of contemporary Greek society is posed by the urgent pressures for change, best understood as a rising aspiration for political participation. Deeply entrenched structures have traditionally operated as brakes in the democratization of the Greek polity, arresting social change and providing effective conduits for the foreign manipulation of Greek politics. These structures have been geared to the perpetuation of a ruling class that has dominated Greece for most of its history, a ruling class that maintains itself through the army, the state bureaucracy, and the universities.

The Greek university system still functions largely on the 19th-century German model. At its inception the University of Athens had a dual purpose: to propagate Hellenic culture as well as sow nationalist ideals in the East, especially among the Greek-speaking populations of the Ottoman Empire—and to train a class of professionals capable of providing leadership for state-building in an independent Greece. The University succeeded in the first task: the Greek populations of the East were wholeheartedly converted to Greek nationalism; but it failed in the second: the state that was built turned out to be a monster of institutionalized inefficiency and corruption.

The University system contributed decisively to the perpetuation of a ruling elite, in two ways. First, university instruction perpetuated a conservative ideology through *ex cathedra* pronouncements of militantly conservative "truths," especially in such faculties as philosophy, theology, and law. High-school teachers who are trained exclusively in this university system become the transmitters of ideological orthodoxy. Second, through a tightly controlled system of admissions, the universities function as a system of highly selective cooptation blocking upward mobility on the basis of merit. The problem of admission to the university today is reaching crisis proportions. Out of a total of 70,000—80,000 applicants, only about 10,000—15,000 are admitted after a severe examination process. Admission is increasingly accessible only to those who have the means to go through a very expensive preparatory system of instruction.

The quality of university instruction is notoriously poor. Yet, after four or five years in the university, its graduates acquire the formal qualifications required to fill top jobs in Greek society. A Greek university professor has remarked recently in a public discussion at Harvard that at the time of their graduation most Greek students know less than after completing the preparatory courses required for the admission examination. This has had predictable consequences. First, it precludes critical thinking that might challenge prevail-

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ing orthodoxies. Second, it deprives the country of the skills necessary to cope with the technical problems of government, economic modernization, business, modern science, etc. These problems are never tackled; they are simply ignored. Decision-making is often no more than a spasmodic reaction to crises. Key positions in government, business, and the professions are occupied on the basis of inherited privilege or go to those who managed to acquire the necessary competence abroad—and these people usually come from the same closed and deeply entrenched elites. The rare exceptions only underline the problem.

The ossification of the polity is reinforced by the workings of the Greek bureaucracy, a civil service vast, fragmented, and excruciatingly inefficient. Bureaucratic regulations are such a maze of entanglements that any business with public authorities consumes an incredible toll in time and psychic energy. The bureaucracy is staffed by large numbers of underpaid, underqualified, alienated employees. Caught between red tape and the hostile attitude of civil servants, the citizen is reduced to a sense of impotence and hostility toward the state. Public authorities, organizations, and institutions are perceived as stumbling blocks to be evaded or cheated—at all costs to be avoided if you want to achieve anything.

All of this transforms daily business into a frantic search for ways to get around the rules, and reinforces the feeling that nothing can be done without calling upon some personal "connection." This is the basis of patronage politics and a personalized political culture that persists despite long-term economic and demographic changes. There has been no real structural political change in Greece since the emergence of patronage-based political groupings in the 1830s and 1840s.

IV

Pressures for change and aspirations for participation keep mounting. And it is around such issues that the dialectic of disappointment has revolved in the last three years. No political group with parliamentary representation is arguing for complete social upheaval. A democratization of society—that is the crux of the matter. For instance, the programs of the various political groups of the left are essentially aimed at creating the conditions for a transition to liberal social democracy. On this point there is almost complete unanimity among parliamentary political groups, excluding the recalcitrant conservative wing of "New Democracy."

Yet, despite these limited goals, progress has been slow. Disenchantment has been growing. Considering the chaos in which the dictatorship left the country and the very dangerous external pressures (mostly from Turkey) threatening its territorial integrity, the government of Karamanlis can be credited with considerable achievements: the country has recovered its sense of dignity, political life now is entirely free, the economy has been salvaged from seven years of mismanagement. But the government has been very restrained in dismantling the machinery of the parastate and much too soft on the remnants of the junta, so that the agents of reaction have been given time and opportunity to rally their forces, and to conspire against the democratic process.

Worrisome symptoms continued to multiply into 1977. The most serious provocation came in December 1976 with the funeral of a mysteriously murdered police officer who had been one of the chief torturers under the dictatorship. On that occasion, projuntaists, royalists, fascists, old-fashioned reactionaries of all kinds, came together in a demonstration of strength. Many police officers in uniform joined in this tribute to the slain torturer Their presence corroborated the fears of Greek democrats who have repeatedly expressed concern over police behavior during student or other demonstrations.

Uneasiness over these disturbing signs has been compounded by disappointment over the government's response to the problem of change. Two strategies have been employed to contain pressures. First, through moderniza-

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tion from above, an attempt has been made to remedy the worst signs of inefficiency and corruption. Second, there have been attempts to bring potential agents of change under control. In both cases, there has been a consistent effort to depoliticize the movements by defining their jurisdictions very narrowly, and by forbidding political strikes. The obvious consequence is the weakening of students' organizations and trade unions.

Thus the prevailing stalemate remains. Its historical roots can be traced back over the past two centuries. The political development that introduced liberal democracy in Western Europe did not operate successfully in Greece. The failures of liberalism were largely due to the class relations that took shape in Greek society as a result of the country's location on the socioeconomic periphery of the modern world. A few tightly knit social castes, based on wealth derived from comprador economic activities (shipping, banking, and commerce, stretching throughout the Eastern Mediterranean), dominated the society. This dominance was reinforced by intimate ties with the ruling classes of Great Britain and France, whose interests in the Eastern Mediterranean could best be served by a comprador economy in the area. As a consequence, the productive sectors of the Greek economy stayed underdeveloped and Greece remained an extremely inegalitarian society.

Traditionally, the problem of rural poverty has been defused through emigration to North America or Australia and now by the export of Greek *Gastarbeiter* to central and northern Europe. This continues to provide the classic mechanism sustaining the status quo by removing the demographic surpluses that could spark protest movements. But the end product of this hemorrhage has been a dangerous depopulation of the Greek countryside. Concomitantly, there has been an enormous expansion in the major urban areas that have received the peasants who did not go abroad. The rural migrants form an alienated mass of new urbanites, living on parasitic jobs and very small incomes.

These problems are largely the outcome of the economic policies pursued in post-World War II Greece. Emigration and the stagnation of the Greek population, as well as rural depopulation and the urban explosion, could have been controlled had there been a better planned development policy. Instead of emphasizing the productive sectors of the economy, the main stress has been on services and tourism, thus achieving one version of economic modernization but also perpetuating the old parasitic character of the Greek economy. More attention to the social issues arising out of the modernization of agriculture would probably have made it possible for a larger part of the rural population to remain in the countryside and to increase the share of agricultural incomes in step with the national wealth. A program of industrial development might have emancipated the Greek economy and rid it of its parasitic existence. There also might have been a step toward some economic democratization through a few standard measures of income redistribution. Instead, Greece has remained what it was: an inegalitarian society marked by extreme concentration of wealth in the hands of a few social castes, economically dependent on nonproductive sectors (shipping, tourism and services, emigrants' remittances), and economically dominated from abroad.

It is true that the results of long years of distorted development cannot easily be eradicated. At the same time, it is entirely reasonable to argue for a set of policies that will eventually lead to change. Such suggestions have repeatedly been put forward by the left. It is obvious that the Greek economy cannot continue to be geared to the requirements of foreign investment and multinational monopolies. Firm control will have to be exercised over these foreign concessions, and they will have to be heavily taxed. There also will have to be a coherent development plan for industrial production based on available natural and human resources. Public investment could be used to finance development of the country's mineral wealth and the creation of electronic and chemical industries for which there are

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considerable manpower reserves. Such programs could be financed by public funds that might be increased by nationalizing the country's oligarchic credit and banking system, heavier taxation of large incomes, and strict controls on tax evasion.

V

Yet, despite these serious problems and the disappointment that comes with the realization that old elites are still in control, the mood of the country continues to reflect a yearning for better things. There is a remarkable absence of resignation. The explanation can be found, I think, in the sense of liberation that pervades Greek life. After 40 years during which Greek politics alternated between upheaval and oppression, there now is unprecedented freedom. It is obvious in public life, in the press, in the activities of the politicized university youth, in the enormous output of new books, in the proliferation of fringe political organizations. In such an atmosphere, Greek culture is experiencing a new ferment.

The resistance itself cleared the ground for this revival by giving a democratic tone to Greek cultural life. Cultural resistance to the junta began with the collective volumes by dissident writers,* and consequently found in the theater an effective mode of communication with the masses. The stage became a forum of veiled criticism and open defiance. The basic preoccupation of Greek culture today remains the same as it had been for many generations: how to be true to the genuine traditions of a rich and lively heritage and at the same time respond creatively to contemporary needs. The most successful response to this challenge has come in music. The great composers who have dominated Greek music since the 1950s have been joined by a host of younger, creative musicians.

The restoration of democracy indeed has led to an outpouring of new literary production. In the first half of 1976 the publication of the collected works of two poets active since the 1950s, Manolis Anagnostakis and Titos Patrikios, has marked the emergence of a new generation in the rich tradition of modern Greek poetry. Along with Ares Alexandrou, who published his collected poems in 1972, and a few others, they can be seen as the foremost representatives of post-Seferis poetry. If Seferis led "the generation of the 1930s," the three new poets can be characterized as the generation of the 1950s—to a large degree their poetry reflects the mood of that period. The inspiration and mood of their poetry is infused with a sense of disappointment and loss that also pervades Seferis' poetry. In his case this sense sprang from the tragic failure of the Ionian vision, in theirs from the bitter defeat of the aspirations of the 1940s.

There is another cultural achievement that deserves mention. It comes from the world of the cinema and is best revealed in the motion picture *Thiasos* (The Troupe), directed by Th. Angelopoulos. Filmed partly during the dictatorship, this movie is a study of Greek history in the last 40 years, based on a contemporary reenactment of the ancient myth of the House of Atreus. It presents a view of recent history that is quite opposed to the official "line." As a cinematographic achievement, this film can be favorably compared to Italian post-neorealism.

These few remarks on the arts in contemporary Greece are only meant to convey a general impression of the cultural flowering that has accompanied political liberty. Witnessing these achievements and the eager participation of the younger generation in cultural life, one feels that the most creative energy of contemporary Greece is to be found in the arts and, more generally, in its intellectual life. Once the serious problems of domestic change and the crisis in Greece's relations with Turkey are resolved, the flowering of this potential could bring about a neo-Hellenic cultural renaissance.

*Three such volumes have been published in Athens: *Eighteen Texts* (1970) and *New Texts* (1971), vols. I and II. The first one was translated into English and published by Harvard University Press, 1972.

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Postscript

Voting, in the Greek election last November 20th, was heavy and orderly despite bad weather—the turnout 78 percent of the registered vote. New Democracy polled 41.85 percent of the vote (173 seats), a reduction of more than 10 percentage points since 1974. Most of these votes were lost to the National Rally, which received 6.82 percent and 5 seats in areas of traditional conservative and royalist strength. EDIK's share also was substantially reduced, with 11.95 percent of the vote and 15 seats. PASOK emerged as the second largest party with 25.33 percent of the vote and 92 seats, thus becoming the main opposition. The Communist party of Greece—KKE—polled 9.36 percent and 11 seats, thus recapturing the traditional Communist vote in Greece. The Alliance of Progressive and Left Forces pulled 2.72 percent and 2 seats, mostly in Athens; the Neo-Liberals polled 1.08 percent and 2 seats, mostly in Crete.

The victory belonged to PASOK and its leader Andreas Papandreou. Although the parties of the right retained the loyalty of about half of the electorate, the clear message of the popular vote was to reinforce protest and the aspiration for change. PASOK's victory was partly due to the charisma of its leader, but due also to a program that is both comprehensive and realistic. PASOK stressed that, for it, change does not mean a revolutionary overthrow of the social system but pursuit of collective goals, as these mature in the popular consciousness. There now is reason for guarded optimism that a train of democratic change may be set in motion. □

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Germany: Democracy in Trouble

George Eckstein

Coping With Terrorism

The recapture of the hijacked plane at Mogadishu, the death of three leading terrorists in Stammheim prison, and the murder of kidnapped industrialist Schleyer may, for a while, have put an end to the wave of terrorism in West Germany. But the larger questions remain: how could it develop in a country where dissent can be rather freely expressed, and what might be its effects on the society? To explore these questions, even to properly pose them, requires a look at some of the facts.

After a two-year lull, which had followed six years of intermittent terrorist activity, the recent months have seen a succession of spectacular actions:

- in April, the assassination of the Baader-Meinhof trial's Chief Federal Prosecutor Buback and two of his assistants;
- in July, the killing of prominent banker Jürgen Ponto in the course of a failed kidnap attempt that was guided by a girlfriend of his daughter (armed with a bouquet of red roses—a scenario straight out of Jean-Luc Godard);
- in September, the kidnapping of industrialist Schleyer, head of the German equivalent of the NAM, during which his chauffeur and three bodyguards were gunned down while stopping the car for a baby carriage that had been put across a residential street (another touch of Godard).

The terrorism spread beyond the borders: just prior and after the Schleyer kidnapping, and obviously connected with it, there were incidents at car rental agencies in two Dutch cities where two young German women with forged driver's licenses had aroused suspicion, one Dutch policeman was killed and two were wounded, and one male accomplice was caught. Eventually, there was the hijacking of a Lufthansa plane in Spain with the help of Arab confederates, the murder of Schleyer and the deposition of his body on a street in Mulhouse, France. This internationalization of terror is facilitated by the ease with which today's European frontiers can be crossed. Preparations can take place abroad, often with the help of local sympathizers: getaway cars and safe apartments were rented in Holland and France, weapons purchased or stolen in Italy and Switzerland, supportive parallel actions undertaken in Spain and Italy.

Over the years, the purpose of the terrorists has shifted from vaguely political dramatic shock to vengeance, intimidation of court officials, and fundraising and blackmail for the release of jailed members of the interconnected groups. As the degree of violence escalated, whatever political purpose had been pursued by the "first generation" of "urban guerillas" (led by journalist Ulrike Meinhof, a recent suicide in jail), has in the "second generation" virtually evaporated behind the vague rhetoric of the current Red Army Faction (RAF), a linear descendant of the Baader-Meinhof group. Indeed, some of the latter, after serving their sentences, participated in the current RAF actions. Insofar as they still sport a political line, it is oriented toward the Third World: they pattern themselves after Ché and the Tupamaros and have developed close ties with Arab terrorists with whom some of them trained and cooperated (in the Munich Olympics, Entebbe, etc.).

Like their much weaker U.S. counterparts, such as the Weathermen and the Symbionese Liberation Army, these young people (in their late 20s and early 30s) come mainly from upper-middle-class families. These children of businessmen, ministers and other professionals became radicalized in their student years. (Their one highly prized "working-class" member has long since retired and has written an impudent little book about his experiences.) Among them are a number of young lawyers, a fact of some bearing on the present countermeasures. Their total membership was

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always considered to be very small and rather immune to penetration by the police. The official estimate was recently raised to 1,200, a figure that may be somewhat high. This hard core can draw on occasional assistance (for shelter, money, maildrop, moral support) from a larger number of sympathizers, officially estimated at about 6,000. This figure depends on how loosely one defines this larger circle.

This circle of sympathizers would certainly include such people as the member of a radical student group at Goettingen University who publicly confessed to "deep-down joy" over the daring murder of Prosecutor Buback, while considering the act as futile in the face of a still solid system "that cannot be brought down without a full-scale armed uprising." This attitude is not altogether untypical of certain West German radical students and some professors (their coalition with left-wing socialist students achieved a majority in the Goettingen student council). Such facts have to be kept in mind when judging the deplorable "Radicals Decree" (inaccurately called *Berufsverbot* by its opponents).

At the periphery of the circle of sympathizers is, for instance, a man such as Claus Peymann who is director of Stuttgart's Municipal Theater and has made it one of the country's leading stages. Peymann's case is typical of the crosscurrents at work in Germany after Schleyer. He was belatedly attacked by the *Bildzeitung*, a sensational sheet, for having months ago—for humanitarian reasons, as he says—assisted the mother of one of the convicted members of the Baader-Meinhof gang in raising funds for major dental work performed on them and not covered by prison regulations. The local Christian Democrats (CDU) demanded Peymann's dismissal for this not very judicious act; but Stuttgart's Lord Mayor Manfred Rommel, son of the famous general and a man of integrity, successfully vetoed the demand, although he himself is a member of CDU.

ALTOGETHER, the recent terrorist acts have unleashed a wave of hysterical reactions, not unlike that which followed the blackout lootings in New York City. Fed by a sensationalist press and eager reactionaries, this wave also has engulfed people one would have presumed more immune to hysteria—such men as the historian Golo Mann, son of Thomas Mann, who, in the mass-circulation paper *"Die Welt"*, demanded "in this new kind of civil war" countermeasures going beyond the limits of traditional law: "No longer is it sufficient to talk of 'keep a cool head,' 'use all means within the rule of law,' 'intellectual debate with terrorism.' We are at war, we are up against enemies who are ready to kill." And political scientist Kurt Sondheimer proposes special "legislation for fighting terrorism" that might include limitations of freedom for people inclined in this direction—in other words, preventive custody.

Conservative publications and politicians are using the prevailing public sentiment for an assault on the "intellectual breeding grounds" of radicalism at the universities; against such left-wing authors as Heinrich Boell who, in one of his novels, had the heroine shelter a fugitive activist; and against educational reforms that have put "questioning and controversy above the teaching of permanent values." There are familiar sounding demands (albeit perhaps a bit more justified) for reducing legal safeguards for the accused, harsher sentences including the death penalty (the current limit for life imprisonment is 15 years), and for harsher correctional treatment. But interestingly enough, all political parties have spoken out unanimously against the restoration of the death penalty. Even the demagogue Franz Josef Strauss rudely cut off all discussion on this subject at the recent congress of his Bavarian CSU party. The memory of Hitlerian "justice" is still all too vivid.

The more responsible press and the broadcasting stations (all public in Germany) clearly try to counteract the hysteria. The prominent liberal weekly *"Die Zeit,"* for example, has published a thoughtful analysis of "the terrible fugitive Children of Affluence," the "dead-end street of terrorism." And it followed this by opening its pages to three prominent authors accused of belonging among the sympathizers—Heinrich Boell, Herbert Marcuse, Rudi Dutschke (himself once the victim of a right-wing murder attempt). All three sharply condemned terrorism. Boell combined his moral condemnation with an appeal to treat the terrorists judicially like all other lawbreakers,—in terms of the legal structure that is "the blessing and the burden of a government of laws." Dutschke rejects terrorism as contrary to democratic socialism; Marcuse, rather unsatisfactorily, merely as counterproductive, but permissible in "situations where the elimination of protagonists of repression really changes the systems" (note the use of the "value-free" word "elimination").

CHANCELLOR SCHMIDTS GOVERNMENT, already weakened by the country's sluggish economy and

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the conservative trend in recent state elections, apparently has pursued two immediate objectives: one, a show of determination not to let the authority and the business of government be interfered with by terrorism; two, "to go to the limits of what is permitted to and demanded by a state under law." In the dilemma of what is compatible with the rule of law and what is considered necessary to overcome terrorism, opinions differ both within government and opposition parties; in addition, the pressure of an aroused public opinion is to be reckoned with.

The result has been a new compromise piece of legislation, the swiftly passed "Isolation Law." This law permits, in cases of acute threat of life or liberty and under certain judicial safeguards, the complete isolation of imprisoned terrorists, whether convicted, indicted, or only suspected, from all outside contacts—including fellow-inmates, lawyers, families, news media—for a 30-day-period that can be extended under certain restrictions. This means, among other things, that any communication between accused persons and their attorneys has to be channeled via the investigating judge and that an ongoing trial has to be suspended during the period. The law is clearly subject to abuse; but it is the answer to recent experiences that point to collusion between imprisoned terrorists, their friends outside, and their "movement" lawyers with whom they were in constant touch. The law has been sharply criticized by civil libertarians and some jurists, but it was passed with only a handful of deputies voting against it.

Ironically, the application of the Isolation Law to the Stammheim prisoners is now backfiring—it is bound to cast some doubt on the suicide of the three leaders.

Throughout the six weeks of the Schleyer case, there was a common determination shared by the Schmidt government and the opposition to see it through without giving in to blackmail; to play for time in the hope of ferreting out the culprits—but not to shrink from a possible bitter end, in the knowledge that, on the one hand, only a living hostage is of value to the kidnappers; on the other, that a release of previously caught terrorists would render any future prosecution futile and thus only start another round of blackmail.

The present unusual, and limited, consensus, if it holds, may facilitate the difficult task of maintaining governmental authority while adhering to the rule of law, without succumbing to the danger of turning the Federal Republic into the repressive society that the terrorists falsely accuse it of being, or that they would like to see it become. Even if the Schmidt government succeeds in the task, this would not mean the end of conservative pressure for more "discipline." (There now are already those who say: "This could not have happened under Hitler.") But it would not be a small achievement in a country where the libertarian tradition is still brief and fragile and where the memory of the weakness of Weimar in the face of *its* violent enemies stands as a warning example.

At the moment, the Schmidt government has gained in stature at home and abroad through its determined handling of a difficult dilemma. Yet there remains the uneasiness about how such deep disaffection could develop in an economically successful democratic society, a phenomenon that should give pause to other democracies with greater social cleavages.

At any rate, what happened now in Germany should be a sobering experience for those on "the left" whose explicit or implicit authoritarianism has not been altogether innocent in spawning a monstrous deformity. □

Milton Mankoff
and Monica Jacobs

McCarthyism and the Civil Service

For the past five years a variant of America's infamous McCarthyism has been unfolding in a country that recently has gained a measure of respectability on the world stage: West Germany. The linchpin in the repressive apparatus has been *Berufsverbot* or job ban, a policy that has resulted in the dismissal of 4,000 civil-service employees, investigations of up to 800,000 others who were applying for or holding civil-service jobs, and the political intimidation of a significant proportion of the West German population.

Berufsverbot began early in 1972, when the minister presidents of the 11 German states and the federal chancellor, then Willy Brandt, issued the so-called Hamburg decrees, which sought to purge the civil service of persons "antagonistic" to the Constitution. One of the reasons for this action was the behavior of the anarchist sect that became

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known as the "Baader-Meinhof gang," a politically isolated grouplet that combined rhetorical hyperbole and terrorism. The logical connection between the existence of a few urban terrorists and the need to purify the 3.5 million-person civil-service of "anti-constitutional" elements has never been made sufficiently clear. Terrorists, living underground and wanted by the police, are unlikely, after all, to be members of or to seek positions in the civil service. The government also argued, however, that many "graduates" of the university-based new left of the 1960s were gaining entrance into the civil service and consequently were in a position to undermine the security of the German state. The alleged process of subversion would be long-term and more subtle than the tactics of Baader-Meinhof, but a Fifth Column in the civil service would provide fertile ground for the spread of "antidemocratic" ideas, the kind of ideas that ultimately lead to terrorism.*

The language of the Hamburg decrees, in its vagueness and totalitarian concern with all aspects of the prospective or current civil-service employees' existence, has promoted violations of civil liberties and mushrooming paranoia. Point One stated that "only those persons may be appointed as public officials who can at all times guarantee support for the free basic democratic order according to the Constitution, and public officials are obliged to actively defend this basic order both in office and out of office." Other provisions of the new policy were that "an applicant who engages in anticonstitutional activities . . . " or "belongs to an organization pursuing goals antagonistic to the Constitution . . . " or does not demonstrate "by his total behavior" endorsement of the free democratic basic order shall either not be employed by the civil service or be dismissed if already a member. Moreover, "doubt" about an applicant's or civil servant's loyalty shall generally "justify rejection."

Needless to say, the necessity to guarantee "at all times" by one's "total behavior" and "active" defense support of *any* principle places extraordinary burdens on a citizen. The ambiguity of the 1949 German Constitution adds to the difficulty. The Constitution is extremely permissive in what it allows citizens to do and think politically and potentially repressive in its contention that persons who abuse "basic rights" to undermine a loosely conceived "free basic democratic order" are "antagonistic" to the Constitution. They may then forfeit those Basic Rights and, under the *Berufsverbot* policy, their livelihood as well. It does not take a vivid imagination to recognize that German citizens could be subject to forfeiture of Basic Rights and jobs if they used their freedom of speech, assembly, and political beliefs to attack constituted authority.

For example, the Constitution guarantees the right to expropriate private property that is not being utilized in a manner consistent with the public interest. New leftists in the 1960s often argued that the inflammatory press lord Axel Springer should have his newspaper monopoly broken. Their anti-Springer demonstrations seemed to them in harmony with the Constitution. Springer, of course, felt they were abusing freedom of speech and assembly to attack property rights that were also guaranteed by the Constitution. How is one to determine whether political dissidents are acting within or outside the constitutional framework, when they and those they attack can legitimately claim constitutional support—depending upon which Basic Right they invoke to justify their actions? In such matters, of course, the "right of interpretation" belongs to those who hold institutional power regardless of the merits of their debating points. *Berufsverbot* is the expression of a one-sided interpretation of the Constitution in behalf of those who define "freedom" and "democracy" as being embodied in the *present* institutional structure of the Federal Republic. Those who might desire West Germany to move toward democratic socialism as well as left

*Some defenders of *Berufsverbot* have drawn parallels between leftist civil servants in the 1970s and rightist civil servants of the period 1918-33 who undermined the Weimar Republic and helped pave the way for Nazism. *Berufsverbot* critics contend, however, that a policy of excluding leftists from the civil service will not insure the maintenance of democratic institutions in West Germany. If a Weimar analogy is to be used, they argue that *Berufsverbot* is not so much an example of learning from mistakes of the past as repeating them. Once again, a government is bowing to right wing pressure and repressing leftism. The German state is being stabilized at the cost of undermining civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. Today the center is repressing the left, but if Weimar is relevant, the center itself may some day be hoisted by its own petard. Few persons will deny the right of a truly democratic society to protect itself from those who would destroy it. *Berufsverbot*, however, because of its tendency to treat dissenters as destroyers and persons who use constitutional freedoms of belief, speech, and association as subversives, is hardly a reasonable solution to the age-old problem of reconciling freedom and order.

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sectarians face exclusion from the civil service because they are alleged to be "antagonistic" to the Constitution.

HOW THEN is *Berufsverbot* carried out? When persons apply for civil-service positions their names are sent to the Ministry of the Interior where it is determined whether a dossier exists on the applicant. The dossiers themselves are composed of reports supplied by local, state, and national intelligence operatives and by the police. If there is a dossier, the prospective employer can subtly refuse employment without a hearing or set up a hearing to decide the suitability of the applicant for civil-service employment. Applicants are sometimes offered the option of writing a letter that will dispel doubts about their loyalty to the Constitution. If a hearing takes place, civil-service applicants are not entitled to know in advance the nature of the evidence that gives ground to question their loyalty nor is counsel available. The burden of proving political loyalty falls solely upon the applicant. Analogous procedures occur in cases of persons suspected of disloyalty who are already civil servants.

What kinds of intelligence data are likely to raise suspicions in the minds of civil-service employers about the character of job applicants or members of the civil service? Experience indicates that formal affiliation with leftist political organizations, arrest, or known participation in demonstrations, signatures on petitions, association with political undesirables, and attending meetings of suspicious groups are all actions that could lead to *Berufsverbot* or at least to an inquiry. Because there is no national standard for evaluating political loyalty, each hiring agency can develop its own criteria. Not surprisingly, this leads to wide variations in enforcing *Berufsverbot*. Social Democratic employers have been known to be concerned more with applicants' concrete behavior, while Christian Democrats tend to consider a dubious formal political association (e.g., membership in the Communist party) sufficient grounds to invoke *Berufsverbot*. In some cases membership in the Jusos, the youth wing of the Social Democratic party, has led to a denial of employment. Although the Jusos are to the left of the parent party, it is demogogic to believe they are seeking to destroy the Constitution.

The arbitrary nature of the *Berufsverbot* policy in West Germany today can be illustrated by mention of the cases of some of its most publicized victims:

(1) Rudi Röder, a train conductor with the state railway for 12 years, was denied a promotion and dismissed because of his membership in the Communist party. Ironically, his father, also a locomotive conductor, suffered the same fate in 1933.

(2) Gerda Tantau, a mathematics teaching applicant, was denied a job. Originally, she was informed that there were no more job openings. Two months later in court, she forced the authorities to disclose the real reasons for her rejection from the civil service: her husband and brother were considered disloyal radicals. Guilt by association is, of course, a doctrine inimical to any civilized sense of justice, but it turned out that Ms. Tantau's associations were not quite as they appeared. Her husband was not a member of the West Berlin Communist party as had been alleged. Her brother was arrested for supporting terrorist organizations but was released and never charged with a crime. Even when association with disloyal radicals proved to be without foundation, Ms. Tantau still was having difficulty finding employment as a teacher. The government appealed a court ruling in her favor. An ironic aspect of this case was that Ms. Tantau had left East Germany in 1960 after her loyalty to that state was questioned and she was denied admission to a preparatory school.

(3) Charlotte Niess, a lawyer and member of the Social Democratic party, was denied a position as a judge in Bavaria because she belonged to a lawyer's organization in which a small minority of the membership were Communists.

(4) Twenty-nine teachers had to undergo disciplinary hearings after placing a petition in the form of an ad in a newspaper protesting the dismissal of a colleague. Despite the reinstatement of the person whose firing precipitated the ad, the petitioners were investigated because they had engaged in public protest. This was said to be inconsistent with the loyalty to supervisors expected of civil servants. A disciplinary hearing can be a first step in the *Berufsverbot* process.

The bizarre quality of these *Berufsverbot* cases, a consequence of the vagueness of the Hamburg decrees and the sweeping powers given to local authorities to interpret the meaning of anticonstitutional behavior, has had a chilling effect on the exercise of Basic Rights among large numbers of people. University students and graduates are particularly reluctant to express their political convictions, even in the most innocuous

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ways. The anxiety associated with *Berufsverbot* is perhaps best understood if one realizes that German society is characterized by a much greater association between formal training for an occupation and the possibilities of practicing it. In the United States it is common for young people to train for one career and pursue another, and so-called on-the-job training procedures predominate. In Germany, the licensing of aspirants for even the most mundane occupations is far more frequent. If one is barred from practicing one's chosen profession, the possibility of entering another occupational sphere is severely curtailed. *Berufsverbot* is most threatening if all positions in one's occupation require civil-service clearance. Besides the teachers, all social workers, doctors employed by hospitals, postal and railway workers come under the auspices of the civil service. Altogether, 15 percent of the labor force are civil servants. While those pursuing occupations not associated with the civil service are somewhat more secure in exercising their political rights, there is growing evidence that private employers are beginning to invoke their own *Berufsverbot* policies. Amidst a relatively high postwar unemployment rate, it is easy to see why young job-seekers are anxious to have a clean political bill of health.

LIKE MCCARTHYISM, *Berufsverbot* is a policy that is ostensibly aimed at far-left political sects but has its greatest impact in silencing the much larger left-liberal forces in the society. Its development has coincided with and reinforced a rightward trend in West Germany. Today the Social Democratic party, like the Democratic party in the United States during the 1940s and 1950s, has gradually deemphasized its reformist stance. On questions of "internal security" its record increasingly resembles that of the traditionally authoritarian Christian Democrats with whom it competes in pursuit of the "law-and-order" vote. Willy Brandt, under whose leadership *Berufsverbot* was instituted, recently stated that introduction of the policy represented his most regrettable political decision in light of the repressive forces it unleashed. Perhaps it is time now to stop seeing merely the German "economic miracle," which has lost some of its power in recent years, and to begin attending to the darker side of life in the Federal Republic. □

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James I. Loeb

Some of My Best Friends Are Socialists

Below is a communication we have received from James I. Loeb, a prominent liberal and a friend of Dissent, *with responses by two of our editors.*—EDS.

What's in a name? Frequently not very much, not even in the name of a political party.

In the United States, for example, the Republican party does not reject the political system of democracy, at least not in theory even if frequently in practice; and the Democratic party accepts the republican form of government, however it may be interpreted. The adjective "liberal" is generally (but by no means unanimously) well received in the United States but I shall never forget an incident several decades ago when, at a dinner of the Union for Democratic Action (the minute predecessor of the A.D.A.), Jennie Lee, the dynamic Welsh member of the British Labour party, was introduced by a not very sophisticated toastmaster as "one of Great Britain's most distinguished liberals"! Poor Jennie kept her composure with remarkable self-discipline.

Similar political misnomers could be cited endlessly, such as the old French Radicals who were essentially conservative. So far as the word "socialism" is concerned, the most extreme example I can recall is the story told my old Socialist friend (across the hall on New York's old Third Avenue when the passage of the old elevated trains interrupted conversation every few minutes). Many of *Dissent*'s older readers will affectionately remember Sam Romer who fought in Spain, survived a Franco prison camp, became a first-rate labor reporter in Minneapolis, and died more than a decade ago. Sam told of his experience when, in 1933, as a young socialist at Detroit's Wayne College (now University), he made use of his spring vacation to do some organizing for the Socialist party in upstate Michigan. He had few contacts to work on and the going was tough. But in one small upstate town he was effusively welcomed by an old couple whose name he had found in a list of expired subscribers to the *Socialist Call*. Not having seen a Socialist comrade in years, the old man welcomed Sam enthusiastically and ecstatically remarked that Karl Marx had so accurately predicted that socialism would come first in the most industrialized countries of the world, and now Germany was socialist!

After recovering from the shock, Sam quietly explained that Hitler's National Socialism was not really socialism, and he described the growing concentration camps, the horrors inflicted on the Jews, the crushing of all labor unions, etc., etc. The old man's jubilation quickly turned to sadness, and he sorrowfully explained, "We didn't know all that; all we knew was that the *Detroit Free Press* was against it!"

Misled as he was by the *Detroit Free Press*, the old man in upstate Michigan was serious about being a socialist. Clearly the word connoted more than just a political party; it was an economic system, a philosophy of life, a revolution (he hoped peaceful) in human relationships. It could be defined. And it is the definition of socialism that prompted my query to *Dissent* with respect to an article on socialism by an ex-socialist.

It may well be that all dictionaries are wrong but, if so, they are united in their mistake. A half-hour at the Public Library produced the following:

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- *Webster's International Dictionary*: "Socialism: A political and economic theory of social organization based on collective or governmental ownership and management of the essential means for the production and distribution of goods." And Webster adds a second definition marked "*Rare*": "A state or system in which there is no private property."
- *The Oxford English Dictionary*, after indicating that "The early history of the word is somewhat obscure," also offers two definitions: "(1) A theory or policy of social organization which aims at or advocates the ownership and control of the means of production, capital, land, property, etc., by the community as a whole, and their administration or distribution in the interests of all. (2) A state of society in which things are held or used in common."
- *The American Heritage Dictionary* (1969): "A social system in which the producers possess both political power and the means of producing and distributing goods."

I CITE these dictionary definitions not to suggest that socialism always meant precisely the same economic and political system to all peoples in all lands. The fact, of course, is quite the opposite; socialism came to take on different meanings and applications in various countries, and even within various countries. But I would suggest that the far less radical versions of socialism in recent years differ totally from the original concept, namely, ownership of the means of production by the state as indicated in the dictionary definitions already cited.

I would submit the following questions:

- Is it not a remarkable fact of history that, despite the widespread continued use of the word. despite the great social upheavals throughout the world in the century and a half since the original concept was conceived and given a name, there is as yet not a single example of a genuinely socialist state . . . except those cases in which individual human rights have been totally sacrificed? Indeed, it is interesting that human rights are never mentioned in any of the formal definitions.
- Should not this simple and, in my view, undeniable fact give some pause to those who seek to carry on what seems a utopian, illusionary dream? Especially in the United States, what is the relevance of an effort to form a socialist movement?

IN 1949 I was privileged (with some financial help from a foundation) to make a survey of the postwar non-Communist left in Europe, a kind of political Cook's Tour of Western Europe, interviewing political leaders, mostly socialist but also some who called themselves liberals or Christian democrats. It was an enlightening experience, to put it mildly. I still find it enlightening to review my notes after almost 28 years. From the beginning of the trip in London, through all of Europe as far south and east as Greece, then north to the Scandinavian countries, I talked to chiefs of state (if they were of the democratic left), party leaders, journalists, intellectuals, parliamentarians, Marshall Plan Americans (some of whom I had known), a few State Department people (usually political officers), etc. Early on the trip I fell into the habit of asking all those who were socialists, or close to the socialists, what they understood by socialism. The answers were generally rather vague, but hardly Marxist. Prime Minister Tage Erlander of Sweden, for example, cited full employment as the key to his socialist government's policy. But from no socialist leader did I receive anything resembling the original "dictionary" definition of socialism. Indeed most answers sounded more "New Dealish" than socialist.

One evening Haakon Lie, then general secretary of the Norwegian Socialist party (which had briefly adhered to the Third International), took me to a workers' summer institute and served as my interpreter as the workers asked questions about the United States. As might have been expected, there were a number of questions having to do with the progress of socialism in the United States. Necessarily my answers were rather vague, stressing some of the New Deal measures (such as the Tennessee Valley Authority) but indicating that the Socialist party in the United States was still very small. But one worker spoke up to insist that socialism meant the public ownership of the means of production, and Lie whispered to me that the comment came from the only Communist in the group!

Perhaps the best answer, in a pragmatic sense, came from Norway's Economics Minister Erik Brofoss. His answer to my query about his definition of socialism was (as my rather rough notes remind me), "For us it means the extension of democracy to economic life. It does *not* mean nationalization, but rather that those economic decisions that affect the life of an entire nation must be made democratically—in other words, by the democratically elected government." (I recalled

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this answer some weeks ago when our steel companies again were raising their prices, not because of the great demand for steel but, on the contrary, because of the lag in demand and the "necessity" to maintain the profit margins of the steel companies!)

Although I had no formal or informal relationship to the State Department in those days, sometimes staff members, especially the political officers, were helpful in suggesting people to see, and even assisted me in getting appointments with them. In Greece, after almost three days of interviews, the political officer told me that I had seen just about everyone who might be considered related to the democratic left. But he added that there was one elderly man whose future was far behind him and who was a bag of wind but, if I had nothing to do before my plane left, I could easily see him.

His name, of course, was Georges Papandreou and he became the next prime minister of Greece! The political officer (whom I later met as a fellow ambassador in Africa) was at least correct on one point: Papandreou talked continuously until I had to leave to make my plane. But his major point, although perhaps more obvious than original, was important. Traditionally, he said, socialism had two major aspects: economic equality and human freedom. These two aspects were often in conflict, especially after the Russian Revolution. Those socialists whose major concern was economic equality tended to sacrifice civil liberties and many became Communists. Those whose major concern was civil liberties found themselves yielding on economic issues. Hence the division and weakness of the socialist movement. That issue is surely still with us in most countries.

Socialism is very much alive today but the original meaning of the word has, in effect, been taken over in great measure by the Communist movement. So far as socialism is concerned, Olof Palme, recently defeated socialist prime minister of Sweden and now elected vice-chairman of the Socialist International, told a group of students at Columbia University: "We long ago left the old idea that the nationalization of the means of production will solve our problems." *(New Yorker* January 10, 1977, p. 23). The dictionaries, it seems, should revise their definitions.

IN WESTERN EUROPE, an increasing number of countries are governed by political parties that may or may not call themselves socialist or social democratic but do consider themselves socialist political parties and belong to the Second International. These countries include Great Britain, West Germany, now Portugal, Norway, not Sweden for the moment (but even in Sweden the Social Democrats received by far the largest vote), and France may have a socialist government after the next election. And in Italy where most of the large cities are Communist-run there is more "good government" than any doctrinaire socialism, not to say communism.

This brings back another recollection from my 1949 political survey. In many cases, while the Socialist leaders offered mild reformist views, they admitted that much of their rank-and-file still demanded that the old socialist ideas and slogans be included in their party programs even though they were quietly aware that these basic concepts were more illusionary than realistic.

This leads us to a major point, perhaps the incentive for this article. It is surely an undeniable reality that socialism, however defined, is an acceptable, indeed inspiring, word for large masses of workers and intellectuals in Europe (and in the so-called Third World). After all, even Adolf Hitler made advantageous use of the word. But it is equally undeniable that the opposite is just as real in the United States, namely, that only tiny minorities openly advocate socialism in this country, and the number is not growing.

To put it crudely, socialism is an inspiring concept for large masses in Europe and elsewhere, but it is almost a dirty word among the great majority of Americans, a word used most widely by reactionaries in their attacks on the mildest forms of social reform or governmental activity. Thus, in the foreseeable future, we may develop a national health service program that will inevitably be attacked (with a degree of accuracy) as socialized medicine by the opposition.

I am reminded of the case of the late Tom Amlie, the very liberal Wisconsin congressman of the 1920s who was defeated when he ran for the Senate and again when he tried to regain his seat in the House. President Roosevelt then sent his name to Congress to fill a vacancy on the Interstate Commerce Commission. One newspaperman with a long memory and a deep desire for a sensational story uncovered a statement Amlie had once made calling for the nationalization of our railroads. (Let no one mention Amtrak!) The result was a headline in every paper in the country, and the pressure grew to such an extent that FDR had to withdraw Amlie's name as a nominee for the I.C.C. I often recall that episode as I ride on Eurail Pass in the

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wonderfully comfortable trains of such revolutionary countries as Switzerland!

IN HIS LAST published work, *Socialism Re-examined* (1963), Norman Thomas came far closer to the realities of American political life than in his more active years as the leader of the Socialist party in this country and its indefatigable presidential candidate. "It is an unfortunate fact," he wrote, "that if men and women are to work hard for a desirable reform, its blessings must be exaggerated."

Despite my profound respect for Norman Thomas with whom I worked closely until 1941, I prefer the more complicated reality of Reinhold Niebuhr whose deep pessimism never diminished his untiring devotion to progressive causes. Niebuhr, who had once been an active Socialist, expressed, in his own religious and philosophical idiom, his views in the following paragraph written in 1948:

> The children of light have not been as wise as the children of darkness. The children of darkness are evil because they know no law beyond self. They are wise, though evil, because they understand the power of self-interest. The children of light are virtuous because they have some conception of a higher law than their own will. They are usually foolish because they do not know the power of self-will.

Note: Because I am informed that the views I have expressed, if printed by *Dissent*, will be followed by comments from some of its editors, I would like to underscore that our agreements are far more significant than our disagreements. □

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Joseph Clark Responds:

In political action a liberal such as Jim Loeb will usually find more common ground than disagreement with many of us who consider ourselves democratic socialists. To cite a recent example, Loeb took the initiative in organizing support for Iberian democracy, including aid for those seeking to eradicate the remains of Francoism in Spain as well as support for the democratic socialists headed by Mario Soares in Portugal. The last time Loeb, Mike Harrington, and I voted and worked for the same candidate for president.

But now Loeb challenges us to describe how we differ from liberals such as he. I hasten to assure him that at least one democratic socialist agrees that "every step of real movement is more important than a dozen programs." Furthermore, it seems to me that socialists often do not address themselves with candor to the issue of socialism. And sometimes when they do get down to the matter of socialism, including the common ownership of the means of production and how that will be attained anywhere in the world, let alone in our own country, there is either a vagueness or a lack of reality in their approach.

Michael Harrington reminds us in his seminal work *The Twilight of Capitalism* that socialists should avoid giving the impression that their methods, "even" Marxism, give them a privileged insight into the future. The insights of Marx into the future in 1848 were unfortunate, as were his predictions of 1850. Those of Lenin and Trotsky, some 70 years later, were even less prescient; and Harrington cautions us about the hazards of assigning a time frame for the transition of one system into another. That from feudalism to capitalism "was a centuries-long process of anomalies and contradictions," Harrington writes. The clear implication is that the same goes for the transition from capitalism to socialism.

Now then, if we are talking about something that will happen a century or so from now, the importance of what we do in the next hundred years is as important, I hope, as theoretical ruminations about the transition to socialism.

The foolishness of *some* ruminations about the transition to socialism was underscored by a recent visit of a militant and nostalgic socialist to Italy, to interview Italian Communists about their concepts

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concerning the transition to socialism. This American socialist was mainly concerned about how this would take place in America, not just in Italy, and he wanted to learn from the free-wheeling Italian Communists how America would make the transition. The Italian Communists—now busy, among other things, with supporting a Christian Democratic government to enable that government to remain in power, so that eventually the Communists might share power with them—were amazed by this American socialist. The last thing they wanted to do was put the issue of Italy's transition to socialism to the fore. The Italian Communists are even reluctant to enter into a discussion with their Spanish Communist comrades as to whether the totalitarian regime of Russia and the other East European regimes are socialist; the Spanish Communists don't think the Soviet Union is socialist. Furthermore, the Italian Communists are concerned lest their constituents retain an image of socialism contaminated by comparisons with the police states of Eastern Europe. Beyond that they wondered about this American socialist, who had all of a few hundred comrades associated with his version of a socialist "movement," but who didn't have more important things to concern himself with than the transition to socialism in America.

The question is often asked in discussions about socialism, why is America so far behind many of the countries of Western Europe in this respect? *Failure of a Dream?* was the title of a recent book containing essays seeking "to examine the reasons for the relative weakness of American socialism." The discussion in the book suffered from the same fault, in my opinion, that has plagued all such discussions. It asks the wrong question. The question usually asked is, why the weakness of a socialist movement in America? Or, why no socialism in the most advanced capitalist country of the world?

But the real question is, why is there no socialism—as a social system—in *any* country of the world? Why is there no socialism in Germany, the homeland of Marx and Engels and a country governed by a socialist party? Why is there no socialism in England (where Marx toiled for so many years in the British Museum), ruled many times (and now) by a socialist party? Why is there no socialism in Sweden, governed for 40 years by a socialist party? And if anyone wants a real paradox, there is only one place in all the world where a small but vital part of the social-economic fabric is actually socialist—on the kibbutz in Israel.

So Jim Loeb is right, I think, when he asks us to see that the old definitions of socialism are obsolete; certainly the West European socialists act on the premise that the socialism of the *Communist Manifesto* hardly pertains to the politics and the future development of their countries.

It has been suggested that Jim Loeb is asking us to admit that we are really liberal democrats. Well, I, for one, do seek more common ground between liberals and socialists. But I want to go beyond the welfare state to the kind of liberal-welfare reforms that will establish democratic controls in a society that has been and is marked by the dominating influence of the corporations. I strongly endorse the comments of Norway's Erik Brofoss, quoted by Loeb, that, "For us it [socialism] means the extension of democracy to economic life. It does not mean nationalization, but rather that those economic decisions that affect the life of an entire nation must be made democratically."

Surely, in the immediate sense, in our own country, this means that the mandate of the last election must be carried out. The excessive moderation in moving toward reducing the scandalously high unemployment in this country is hardly the mandate of '76. Emphasis on the job-creating aspects of economic-stimulus legislation demanded by the labor movement should get more decisive general support.

Jim Loeb brings up another important matter when he notes that the socialist label is an asset in many other countries, but not in the U.S. Nevertheless, it is of some significance that members of the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee have achieved a kind of citizenship within the Democratic party and in various unions and liberal organizations. But since most democratic socialists would agree that socialism is not on the order of the day and that measures short of socialism are urgently required to cope with the energy crisis—with the decline and decay of many of our cities, with racial and sex discrimination, and other pressing issues—the bigger need is for a stronger, more effective, better led, more encompassing movement for extending democracy to economic life. The labor movement has been and remains the most essential ingredient of a coalition aiming at these goals. Socialists can be active in the coalitions and movements for greater economic and social democracy, but the socialist label will not be of any advantage.

BACK TO THE QUESTION, why am I a socialist? Because I refuse to accept the idea that cupidity,

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selfishness, and greed are proper incentives to enable an economic system to function. I understand only too well the pessimism of Reinhold Niebuhr about the advantages that the children of darkness enjoy, given the nature of man. But there is a sunnier side to that nature, evident at least in various calamities and crises. While adhering to realistic and rational modes of social and political behavior, I retain a vision of social justice as old as the Hebrew prophets and as recent as the letters and speeches of Sacco and Vanzetti that clinched my adherence to this dream 50 years ago.

In my rejection of the incentives that oil the economic system of capitalism, I bow as sorrowfully as Niebuhr, with the knowledge that such incentives have been motivating forces of economic development throughout recorded history. Nevertheless, in our epoch we've come up with modes of thought and social systems that meliorate and amend the rank evil that is seemingly required to make economic systems work. We have seen mixed economies in various countries where decided advantages were obtained through democratic regulation of enterprise, through social legislation affecting employment, health care and the quality of life, and even the use of just taxation, as well as countervailing power of labor and liberal movements, to secure some measure of redistribution of wealth and more equal opportunity.

Individual advantage and incentive have at times become intertwined with social organization and democratic planning and regulation. Perhaps then the *I* and the *We* can find better levels of coexistence. If so, and there are such trends, there may be hope for true equality and social justice, albeit in a more distant future than we anticipated in our youth. □

• The editors of *Dissent* want to express their pleasure at the fact that the Nobel Peace Prize has been awarded to Amnesty International, the splendid organization that devotes itself to defending political prisoners throughout the world. •

David Bensman Responds:

Despite all the butchery committed in its name, despite the hypocrisy, the betrayals, and the heartbreaking defeats, the socialist vision continues to inspire us. That is fundamentally why we do not abandon it. There is no longer a socialist blueprint, no timetable, not even a program we can be sure will solve our problems, yet socialism remains the name of our hope.

Liberalism is an inadequate substitute. No one in America is really proud of liberalism; even its adherents see it as a balancing act, a set of partial solutions. The idea of militant liberalism seems a contradiction in terms.

Perhaps liberalism deserves a better reputation; Abraham Lincoln was probably a wiser man than Eugene Debs. But people do not dedicate themselves to political wisdom; we want a noble ideal, something larger and better than ourselves.

Cynics usually underestimate the power of idealism in politics. But many actions cannot be explained on the basis of self-interest. Cold cash could not have organized the farm workers. That seems evident. How about the CIO? The Socialists and Communists who helped to organize industrial unions in the 1930s—some now revered, some entirely forgotten—were not primarily concerned with their own well-being, nor was their goal simply to improve the material welfare of the masses of working people. Had they been so motivated, they would not have worked so hard or risked so much.

Of course, idealism carries you only so far. Once you have a union contract, you need brains, skill, patronage, determination, sometimes even ruthlessness to build an institution that will survive defeats and disappointments. Many radicals did not have what it takes; they left the labor movement or were driven from it. Some are now bitter, cursing the very institutions they helped to establish. Yet their earlier idealism was a creative force, one for which there could have been no substitute.

If we abandoned the name socialism today, we might gain respectability in the eyes of some; a few people would join us who now stand at arm's length. We would go on with some effect, lending our will and intelligence to the struggle for human freedom. But I fear our motor would run down; our work would be more comfortable but less compelling. And it might no longer be the same work. □

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Michael Bernick

The Blood Debate and Altruism

In 1971, Richard Titmuss, professor at the London School of Economics, published *The Gift Relationship,* a study of blood-collection systems throughout the world.[1] The book contrasted American dependence on market sources for blood with Britain's fully voluntary system.

The book attracted wide attention among social scientists and was discussed in print by Kenneth Arrow, Robert Solow, and Nathan Galzer.[2] Each praised highly Titmuss's expose of the inefficiency of the American system: the wastage caused by lack of planning and centralized administration, the hoarding of blood by hospitals, the high incidence of disease caused by commercially acquired blood. sThese reviewers, however, were less enthusiastic about Titmuss's conclusion that British cooperation in blood collection is a model that might be extended to other services. Each argued that in a large, industrial society, the supply of altruism is strictly limited.

In the intervening years, Titmuss's work has been useful in the efforts toward better planning and administration of blood supply in America. But his ideas on voluntary cooperation have been, and continue to be, ignored by social reformers.

It should not be so. The arguments that in modern society altruism is of a fixed, limited supply are not convincing. And consideration of subsequent work on blood donations and other "gift relationships," such as free provision of foster parents and day care for the elderly, suggests that additional services might be supplied by altruism—an arrangement that should bring satisfaction to donors and recipients and would strengthen the bonds of social solidarity.

IN AMERICA, about one-third of the blood supply comes from paid donors; one-half from people exchanging their blood for free blood transfusions later on for themselves or their friends or family; 10 percent from volunteers; and 5 percent from "captive" volunteers—i.e., members of the armed forces or prisoners. (In some cases, members of the armed forces receive small rewards, like steak dinners; prisoners may increase their chances for parole [Titmuss, pp. 84-87]).

In Britain, blood is completely removed from the market: all blood is procured from volunteers and neither patients nor hospitals pay for it. There has been no shortage of blood in Britain. Though demand rose greatly between 1948 (when the National Health Service was established), and 1968, it was indeed more than met by an increase in the number of blood donations of 277 percent, and an increase in the number of blood donors of 243 percent.

In the course of his survey, Titmuss interviewed 3,800 British donors, querying them on their reasons for giving blood. Some saw donation as an opportunity to repay the National Health Service for blood or other health aids (e.g., surgical shoes, eyeglasses), which they had received without cost. Many more explained that they donated because they wanted to help others.

Some replies to Titmuss's questioning:

> I thought it just a small way to help people—as a blind person other opportunities are limited (man, age 49, piano tuner).
>
> Being in the construction side of building you see

[1] Richard Titmuss, *The Gift Relationship* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972).

[2] Kenneth Arrow, "Gifts and Exchanges," *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* Summer 1972. Robert Solow, "Blood and Thunder," *Yale Law Journal,* July 1971. Nathan Glazer, "Blood," *Public Interest,* Summer 1971.

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many people hurt and it makes you feel as though you have done a little bit to help (man, age 25, scaffolder).

Knowing I might be saving somebody's life (woman, age 40, power press operator).

Feeling of guilt at receiving so much and giving so little (woman, age 20, schoolteacher).

No man is an island (man, age 36, foreman maintenance fitter). [Titmuss, pp. 226-36.]

Titmuss concluded from his study that the market system stifled altruism, a desire to help others was widespread, and the role of altruism in social services could be increased.

Is Altruism Of a Fixed, Limited Supply?

IN THEIR REVIEWS, Arrow, Solow, an Glazer each disputed the idea that the market system should stifle altruism. They all maintained that persons still had the option to donate voluntarily in such a system. As Solow commented,

> I know that on none of the many occasions on which I have failed to appear at the local Bloodmobile has my realization of the existence of a market in blood played the slightest part.

They all asserted that what accounted for the reliance on the market for blood and other services was the limited supply of altruism. Arrow stated:

> I should add that like many economists I do not want to rely too heavily on substituting ethics for self-interest. I think it best on the whole that the requirements of ethical behavior be confined to those circumstances where the price system breaks down. . . . We do not wish to use up recklessly the scarce resources of altruistic motivation.

Yet none of these reviewers presented evidence or arguments to support this view of altruism. Arrow noted in passing that only 6 percent of the eligible population in Britain donated blood, and he remarked,

> The picture of a broadly altruistic society seems somewhat blurred when we realize what a small fraction of the population is in fact functioning altruistically.

But the supply of blood in Britain, as mentioned above, has increased continually to meet demand, *with nearly two and a half times as many donors in 1968 as in 1948.* And the donors have been broadly representative of the population by age, sex, income, and profession.[3] Further, a recent survey by researchers at Swansea University suggests that more persons would donate if additional blood was needed.[4] The British experience in blood suggests not that the supply of altruism is of a fixed, limited amount but that it will vary according to the degree to which it is called forth by society.

And there is good reason why a market in blood should stifle altruism. Not only does it pressure the indigent to sell their blood; it reduces the importance of donation to others. They no longer feel that fellow-citizens are dependent upon their donation. This is pointed up by the above-cited replies to Titmuss's survey, and especially by the following reply:

> You can't get blood from supermarkets and chain stores. People themselves must come forward, sick people can't get out of bed to ask you for a pint to save their life, so I came forward in hope to help somebody who needs blood (woman, age 25, machine operator). [Titmuss, p. 227.]

The variability of altruism has been emphasized by Marcel Mauss, the student of gift-giving in primitive societies, and by John Stuart Mill.[5] They each linked the amount of altruism displayed in a society not only to opportunities for altruism but also to the altruism displayed by others. And, at least on a microlevel, there have been a number of experiments indicating that altruism breeds altruism. For example, in one oft-cited experiment conducted by J. Bryan and M. A. Test, the number of persons who stopped to help someone standing beside a car with a flat tire was significantly greater when there was an example of altruism down the road—a motorist helping another to fix his car—than when no example was present.[6]

Reflecting on his own altruistic acts, the political theorist Peter Singer remarked that he found it hardest to act with consideration for others when the norm of the people with whom he associated was to act egoistically, while when altruism was

[3]Titmuss, pp. 125-29.

[4]David Oborne, "Why Give Blood," *New Society,* October 23, 1975.

[5]Marcel Mauss, *The Gift* (London: Cohen & West, 1954). John Stuart Mill, "Utilitarianism," in *The Philosophy of J. S. Mill* (New York: Modern Library, 1961), pp. 358-62.

[6]J. Bryan and M. A. Test, "Models and Help: Naturalistic Studies in Aiding Behavior," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* August 1967. For other experiments indicating how altruism breeds altruism, see Derek Wright, *Psychology of Moral Behavior* (London: Penguin, 1973), pp. 133-34; see also D.C. Krebs, "Altruism," *Psychological Bulletin,* April 1970.

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expected, he found it "much easier to be genuinely altruistic."[7] He compared the capacity for altruism to sexual potency: if much used it constantly renews itself, but if rarely called upon it begins to atrophy.

Multiplying the "Gift Relationship"

HOW CAN the capacity for altruism be utilized, the "gift relationship" multiplied?

For one, cities and towns in America might experiment with removing blood from the market, and relying entirely on volunteers. Such reliance was urged a few years ago in a report by the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB). The AABB concern was caused not only by the cost of commercial blood but by its high risk of disease. The Association suggested a number of ways in which commercial blood banks that use both commercially and voluntarily acquired blood could increase the number of volunteers—including lengthening their hours, opening on weekends, and providing transportation to potential donors.

There might be further experimentation with removing other goods from the market—e.g., reliance might be placed on altruism for day care. Perhaps such care will not be provided without remuneration—especially as day-care personnel will need to be screened and instructed. But, eventually, recognizing that children need attention, and are dependent upon altruism for such attention, enough suitable persons might volunteer such care. At present, private firms and churches donate space for day-care centers, and private individuals do volunteer labor. And already, many thousands of families voluntarily take children into their homes, often for many years, on foster care programs—in 1971, 331,000 children in America were in foster homes. (Such families do receive a small allowance for foster children. However, except for children with mental or physical handicaps, this allowance is no more than a token contribution toward the expenses of food, clothing, and personal incidentals, and can by no means be construed as payment for care.[8])

The Satisfaction of Benevolence

VISUALIZING improvement in the health of others is one motivation for giving blood. Replies in Titmuss's survey indicate, however, not only that persons desire the well-being of others but that they desire *to contribute* to their well-being. My own talks with students at Oxford University and at the University of California, Berkeley, who had donated blood, indicated a number of satisfactions.

Blood donation gave rise to a feeling that one was not so selfish; it offered an opportunity to express the virtue of benevolence. As one student said, "I felt better about myself after giving." Donation also gave rise to a feeling of community with others. Even though the recipient was anonymous, the act of giving caused donors to feel "less isolated," to feel that they were "linked to others in a common enterprise."

"Less isolated," "Linked to others in a common enterprise": these explanations may seem too vague to be accorded any significance. Yet, although they are imprecise, they are nevertheless likely to be understood by many readers who have experienced similar feelings of social unity through forms of social sacrifice.

The possibility of bonds of community, even across a large nation, is recognized by Solow. He suggests that the war effort in Britain created bonds between citizens, and he points to these bonds as a reason for the success of the voluntary system in blood. Yet, it was precisely the mutual sacrifice during the war—the knowledge persons had that they were sacrificing for others and others for them—that created these bonds.

Although the bonds created by altruistic acts will not be as strong as those formed during a war effort, nor, of course, as strong as the deep bonds formed in families and among friends, they will not be insignificant; for they will often soften and reduce the competitions and divisions that will arise in modern society. Indeed, it is these bonds that democratic socialists such as R. H. Tawney and Richard Titmuss meant when they spoke of socialism as fellowship. □

To Our Contributors

- When sending manuscripts, please make sure that you do not send your only copy.
- And please also be sure to enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope. —THE EDITORS

[7]Peter Singer, "Altruism and Commerce," *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* Spring 1973.

[8]See Virginia Peterson, "Payments for Foster Parents: Cost-Benefit Approach," *Social Work,* July 1974.

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Anne Farber

The Presidential Ear

A little while ago *Time* Magazine reported President Jimmy Carter to have said, "I listen to classical music eight to ten hours a day." Eight to ten hours a day? Astounding. Obviously a misprint.

But no, a later story, again in *Time*, cleared that up. Susan Clough, Carter's personal secretary, is in charge of "feeding the President's Panasonic phonograph with classical LPs. The background music plays all day. Clough types the musical program on a tidy series of yellow 3x5 cards and places them on the President's desk so that he can make mental notes of what he is hearing."

If he had said, "I read romantic poetry eight to ten hours a day," one might feel some concern about the amount of state business being neglected. "Well, no, I'm not actually *reading* it all the time, you see," he might assure us. "It's on the wall." And he would explain that his favorite passages of poetry were printed on wallpaper, and he—well—sat in their presence, so to speak.

So, of course, he did not mean that he "listens" to classical music eight to ten hours a day. He meant that he hears it. It is there, very much like auditory wallpaper. But since it is there, and he is hearing it, something may occasionally catch his attention and he will listen.

And what will it say to him?

First of all, it will remind him of its presence, and that will tell him something about himself—that he is a man of serious tastes, a man at home in a cultural community that includes the likes of Beethoven, Bach, and so on; that he is a man with historical connections.

Then, if he is still listening, it will inevitably speak to him about itself. But before pondering that mysterious moment, let us raise a procedural question.

Could he—should he—fit the sound track to the occasion? An important meeting on the energy crisis is impending. Will he buzz Susan to have plenty of Wagner on hand, or should it be Satie, that splendid wit on the uses of economy? The Shah arrives to confer. What to play? There is no precedent to serve the President here. Even imagining what others might have done offers little help. Nixon, of course, was not much interested in the musical possibilities of the audio technology at his disposal. Lyndon Johnson? Facing a conference with Sadat, LBJ, unrepentant low-brow that he was, would probably have pressed the button for some belly-dance music—to get them both in the mood.

CARTER, all on his own now, a pioneer of the presidential aural wraparound, chooses a Brandenburg. Serious people here. No nonsense.

But no, he doesn't fit the sound track to the occasion. The mere presence of the masters he reveres is what matters. He seeks to improve himself—and to adorn himself—by keeping their company. On the other hand, his reverence certainly has its practical limits; he reveres, but he is not unduly awed. That is, he thinks highly of his ability, in their presence, to stay in command of his own attention. He will tune in and out at will—as *his* thoughts and activities require. A mighty boast, that. And a dangerous way to live. Great art *is* splendid company, but it is unreliable, too. It may sit quietly in the background for a while, permitting itself to be glimpsed, pointed at, ignored—according to the whims and dictates of the people present. Then suddenly it will spring, snatching its host into its own realm, where it will speak to him of its own concerns, and he will, for the moment, forget everything else he knows.

This is why you will never, in your dentist's waiting room, or at the supermarket, or in an office-building elevator, hear snippets from the Brahms *Double*, or Schubert's *Death and the Maiden* or a refrain from the Berlioz *Requiem*. The compilers of Musak, in their wisdom, know exactly what to use and what not to use in their assemblages of organized sound crudely—but shrewdly—got up to resemble actual music. Their aim is to help you along but leave you alone. (For myself, I would vastly prefer to be left alone in silence and trusted to help myself along, but I recognize that while I experience the product as so much annoying aural litter, it is its intention to make no claims.)

Of course, Jimmy Carter would be properly outraged by the suggestion that he perform his duties to the accompaniment of the Melachrino Strings. On the other hand, he has chosen to surround himself with a form of sound that makes serious claims on the attention and sensibilities of

(continued on page 136)

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Elaine Hoffman Baruch

Of Mothers and Fathers

OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION, by Adrienne Rich. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 318 pp. $8.95.

THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HUMAN MALAISE, by Dorothy Dinnerstein, New York: Harper & Row. 288 pp. $10.95.

It may seem like a bad joke, but radical feminists sound like nothing so much as the thinkers they denounce as misogynists. In her most recent book, Adrienne Rich speaks of women's "'maternal' or 'nurturant' spirit" as opposed to "rapism and the warrior mentality" of men. Who does this sound like if not one of the feminists' favorite whipping boys, Rousseau, who writes that woman's reign is "a reign of gentleness, tact, and kindness"; man, on the contrary, is "a creature often vicious and always faulty."

Rich finds that for all women the female body is "a fundamental problem: its clouded meaning, its fertility, its desire, its so-called frigidity, its bloody speech, its silences, its changes and mutilations, its rapes and ripenings." This sounds uncomfortably close to the wife-murdering Comte de Germande in Sade's *Justine*, who speaks of woman as a "creature sick three quarters of her life."

And when Rich dismisses contemporary civilization as "the death-culture of abstraction" and "quantification," she offers unconscious support to Freud's statement in *The Future of an Illusion*: "The work of civilization has become increasingly the business of men, it confronts them with ever more difficult tasks and compels them to carry out instinctual sublimations of which women are little capable."

Rich urges women "to think through the body," that is, to fuse intellect with feeling, a mode not unknown to Donne, to name merely one male practitioner. Yet in her hands, thinking through the body becomes a tool of irrationality, precisely what women have been accused of for centuries. Here is one example: "We have been perceived for too many centuries as pure Nature, exploited and raped like the earth and the solar system. . . . " (I can understand the figure of exploiting nature and raping the earth—but carrying it to the solar system seems a bit much.)

Since thinking through the body gives rise to such generalizations as the following, one is tempted to suggest that Rich try thinking through the mind instead: "For one thing, in the original matriarchal clan *all* females, of whatever age, were called 'mothers'—even little girls." What was presented as speculation in earlier pages, namely, the possibility of matriarchy in prehistory, has become fact in the preceding passage, presented in the text with no qualification.

"To think through the body" seems to entail a cavalier use of biological terminology, as in the following passage:

> Patriarchal man created—out of a mixture of sexual and affective frustration, blind need, physical force, ignorance, and intelligence split from its emotional grounding, a system which turned against woman her own organic nature, the source of her awe and her original powers. In a sense, female evolution was mutilated, and we have no way now of imagining what its development hitherto might have been; we can only try, at last, to take it into female hands.

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But the theory of evolution holds that what survives must be adaptive, not mutilated, however unfortunate it may seem. Beyond this, however, if prehistory was not patriarchal—and Rich thinks that it was not, although as Sarah Pomeroy points out, this is impossible to prove—then no "mutilation" of female evolution could have occurred, since patriarchal history would have only existed for a mere several thousand years, hardly enough to affect the course of evolution.

A similar distortion occurs in her use of the term "imprinting":

> The woman awaiting her period, or the onset of labor, the woman lying on a table undergoing abortion or pushing her baby out, the woman inserting a diaphragm or swallowing her daily pill, is doing these things under the influence of centuries of imprinting.

Now the term "imprinting" as it is used by ethologists—if Rich is redefining it, she should tell us in what way—refers to a phase of development of precise duration in which there is readiness for certain kinds of behavior in such subhuman creatures as geese. If Rich is right, and women are at the mercy of "imprinting," then why assume that now for the first time in history women are free from those controls that Rich says have determined them. Following her point to its logical conclusion, one might say that the liberation movement itself is yet another patriarchal device designed to keep women in the place that men want them.

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II

RICH RIFLES SOURCES much the way she says that men have exploited women and nature. She invokes Horney's name, in what is surely a distortion of Freud, speaking of his "reduction of psychological qualities to anatomical causes, and his inherently dualistic thinking, in which . . . feminine and masculine, passivity and activity, are seen as polar opposites." This is to ignore one of Freud's most important statements:

> all human individuals, as a result of their bisexual disposition and of cross-inheritance, combine in themselves both masculine and feminine characteristics, so that pure masculinity and femininity remain theoretical constructions of uncertain content.

In "bodily thinking," the wish seems to be mother to the fact.

In her treatment of motherhood as institution, an institution controlled by patriarchy, of course, men are always villains and women always victims. Life for Rich is like a 19th-century melodrama. Male doctors are mutilators and destroyers as opposed to the always tender midwives—no Ilse Kochs here. Yet, in an example of the "doublethink" that she accuses males of engaging in, Rich blames men for not sharing their instruments with the midwives:

> The female hands of flesh that had delivered millions of children and soothed the labor of millions of mothers were denied the possibility of working with the tools later developed to facilitate the practice of obstetrics in difficult labor.

Granted that much of what she has to say about the medical profession's coldness, impersonality, and reduction of the patient to an object is true, the same complaints could be and have been made by male patients as well as by women.

The control over women's bodies that the author attributes to men, at least in kinship relationships, is in large part illusory. Most men have been no more in control of the rate of female reproduction than were most women. Yet why assume that women did not want to be mothers when maternity meant survival of the race?

> As the means of reproduction without which cities and colonies could not expand, without which a family would die out and its prosperity pass into the hands of

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strangers, she has found herself at the center of purposes, not hers, which she has often incorporated and made into her own.

In *The Modern Temper*, a book that still holds up remarkably well, Joseph Wood Krutch speaks of two types of humanism, one concerned with individual self-development, the other with the perpetuation of the race. Since Rich feels that women are the more humane sex, why doesn't she credit them with altruism? One should bear in mind that humanism of the former type was historically available only to a small minority of men and has only recently become part of our unofficial bill of rights. I do not deny that women should now have the right to be as narcissistic as men. But why conclude that women always wanted what we want now?

At the same time that she attacks women's forced participation in motherhood, Rich laments that the subjective experience of motherhood has been tampered with also. She asks why motherhood has been ignored in history and literature, her implication being that patriarchal selfishness has dictated the neglect. But there are other possibilities that one should at least mention. Until comparatively recently, historians were interested not in economic or social history but in contribution history, that is, the history of great achievements. Most men were no more participants in history in this sense than women were. As for literature, it is true that the great love stories have tended to divorce individual desire from biological consequence. But this might be offered as proof of literature's concern for women as individuals rather than as mere reproductive agents. Besides, the pervasive treatment of feminine inspiration in literature has long been recognized as an idealization of maternity. This is probably not the kind of treatment Rich would like, but it is nonetheless acknowledgment. What one misses in her book is any sense of the psychological power that women have exerted even in the most patriarchal societies (perhaps more there than elsewhere).

Since Rich describes her own husband, at least in the early part of their marriage, as "sensitive and affectionate" and speaks of passionately loving their three sons, one wonders where all the hostility toward men came from. One finds the answer to the question less in culture than in early childhood experience:

> My father's tense, narrow body did not seize my imagination, though authority and control ran through it like electric filaments. I used to glimpse his penis dangling behind a loosely tied bathrobe.

When Rich isn't fiercely misanthropic, she is intensely sentimental, mainly in regard to women. Sometimes she sounds unfortunately close to a romantic pulp-novel heroine, but her painful yearnings are directed toward her mother rather than toward any man:

> Emerging from the fear, exhaustion, and alienation of my first childbirth, I could not admit even to myself that I wanted my mother, let alone tell her how much I wanted her. . . . I wanted her to mother me again, to hold my baby in her arms as she had once held me; but that baby was also a gauntlet flung down: *my son*. Part of me longed to offer him for her blessing; part of me wanted to hold him up as a badge of victory in our tragic unnecessary rivalry as women.

In large measure, this is a book written in expiation of guilt over the mother by a woman who has felt the power of the father more intensely than most women. I am sure that Rich would not like to be so treated, but what her work reveals better than any clinical study is her bifurcation of the father as well as her bondage to him. Fathers after all are as much scapegoats and idols as are mothers (something that the next writer tends to ignore), although it remained for the 20th century to voice the feeling that Daddy is a bastard. Misanthropy is testimony as much to psychological as to political power. In the former regard, it is much like misogyny. For centuries, thinkers had interpreted the macrocosm in terms of the microcosm. Rich proves that the practice of reading out the meaning of the universe through contemplation of the self has not entirely disappeared.

Many a patriarchal myth such as that of Eve or Athena speaks of birth from the father only, no doubt evidence of some sort of womb envy. What Rich now wants is procreation through the mother only, advocating that women have the choice of reproducing through natural means, artificial insemination, or parthenogenesis. Parthenogenesis, in humans, of course, could produce only females; furthermore, it would have all the genetic disadvantages contingent on extreme inbreeding. But this is something that the author does not take into account. One wonders also how men would share in child-rearing under these conditions, a suggestion that Rich makes in other contexts. Despite a few exceptions, men hover in the background here like unwelcome ghosts.

Yet for all its problems, the book reveals considerable courage in dealing with motherhood

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at a time when motherhood itself is being questioned as a legitimate pursuit. The work explores a great range of feeling that the experience of motherhood gives birth to. Its power lies in conveying the intensity of the great Greek heroines, a Phaedra or even more so a Medea; but like those heroines, Rich must be seen as an ambivalent figure, who through her emotional force is both right and wrong.

III

WHILE Rich projects psychology onto culture, Dinnerstein reduces all of culture to psychology. But despite this oversimplification, in one respect at least her book is extremely important, for it counters most convincingly the conspiratorial theory of history:

> the male rule of the world is not a conspiracy imposed by bad, physically strong and mobile, men on good, physically weak and burdened, women. Male rule has grown out of bio-technological conditions which we are just now, as a species, surmounting, and out of the psychological impulses that inevitably develop under those conditions.

If women are oppressed, thinks Dinnerstein, it is because oppression is mixed in with mother's milk of the bottle as well as the breast variety. And it is an oppression that women accede to as well as men. Women as well as men, she feels, have wanted our present gender arrangements. The arrangements are outdated and cause pain. They persist, however, because they serve defensive psychological functions. Because we are all mother-reared, because the mother or a female substitute was the source of all nurturance as well as all deprivation when we were infants, the sexes grow up seeing women as both scapegoats and idols, as creatures who are quasi-human. According to the author, what this allows us to do, and women as well as men are thankful for it, is to project humanness, even omnipotence onto the male, in a division of emotional labor.

At first, the reader feels a good deal of excitement as Dinnerstein proceeds step by step to her conclusions. In her depiction of the persistence of our gender roles, she is often highly persuasive. In her projection of what will happen if we do or do not overthrow them, she is far less so.

Dinnerstein's main point is that by changing our child-rearing practices, by having fathers as well as mothers care for infants, we will solve not only our sexual but also our ecological and metaphysical problems. This is the leap that few readers will be prepared to take. Though she promises to answer the question, she never satisfactorily allays one's fears that if we were reared by fathers equally with mothers, we would have a great ambivalence toward both sexes instead of just one, arguing merely that we would be forced to grow up and give up our dependencies. But there is no arguing with an infant. Removing the object of a need or doubling the object does not remove the need. Dinnerstein does not consider the possibility that men would use their new power to institute even more patriarchal control or the fact that most women might resent being deprived of the power they have traditionally held as mothers. Nor does she consider the potentially incestuous consequences of fathers raising daughters.

Then, too, there is almost total disregard of biology. There is no recognition of the possibility that the mother/child dyad might be fundamental, something that Rich does take into account. Of our life in utero and the infant's experience of birth through the vaginal canal, there is barely a mention. Granted that Dinnerstein feels that what makes us human is our ability to surmount biology, she ignores the likelihood that our bondage to our mothers stems not so much from the fact that they have reared us as the fact that they have borne us. There is one way of escaping our biological inheritance that she does not mention—that of developing the embryo *in vitro*. Few feminists with the exception of Shulamith Firestone are willing to go that far. Yet this is the one measure—assuming that one could construct the necessary support system to effect it—which might insure that mother and father would achieve a rough equality in the neonatal life of the infant. But even that artificial container would bear a resemblance to the womb of which the child would be deprived—and who knows if some racial memory wouldn't cause resentment toward women for that deprivation?

So it seems to me that Dinnerstein doesn't go far enough back in time in her treatment of the mother's influence on the infant's psychology. It may well be that changing our arrangements after the infant's birth is already too late.

On the other hand, Dinnerstein may also stop too soon. Her treatment of psychology is primarily focused on the oral stage, for that is what she sees as crucial in the formation of our sexual attitudes. But many an individual or culture has managed to surmount the oral and even anal phases to fall into the slough of despond of the genital stage.

One is uncomfortable also with her ignoring of culture. If it is true that despotism and tyranny stem from our child-rearing arrangements, then why is it that not all cultures are despotic? After all,

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the gentle Arapesh and the warlike Mundugamor were both mother-reared. And what of economic differentiations within our own culture? How many women fit the gender pattern that she describes in the following lines, a pattern that she sees as necessarily following from our mother-centered child-rearing:

> woman traditionally agrees to listen to man's opinions and keep her own to herself, lets him hog the limelight and offers herself as audience, allows herself activity only as it nurtures his projects.

The kind of female, nurturant support Dinnerstein is talking about here is primarily an outgrowth of 19th-century industrialization and the consequent emphasis on the home and the woman in it who was supposed to provide a refuge from the outside world. Too much of the author's analysis, provocative as it sounds at first, is couched in terms of such Victorian stereotypes. The book is breath-taking until we realize that it does not address itself sufficiently to differences in history or class.

BOTH Rich and Dinnerstein (as in the preceding passage) praise female nurturance and bewail the male ego, as if men had never nurtured women and children through their labor (obviously different types of nurture are possible), and as if male flattery and gifts had never been used to cater to female egos. But these authors are hardly lacking in egos of their own. Rich finds Freud "terribly limited both by his culture and his gender." Dinnerstein, though admitting her indebtedness, finds that he, among others, doesn't go far enough:

> The account I offer here attempts, then, to resolve the contradictions between the Freudian and the Gestalt vision of societal processes (it amends and extends both these visions, moreover, to embrace the implications of Darwinism now supported by archaeological data, concerning human evolution).

While Rich places utopia in the gynocentric past, Dinnerstein places it in the future, feeling that the myth of matriarchy represents a psychological fantasy rather than an actual reality. Both views, however, are equally romantic and primitivistic. In place of polarization, Dinnerstein posits a kind of egalitarian future free of war (it would automatically disappear once changes in child-rearing were instituted) in which both sexes will hold part-time jobs and spend the rest of their time convincing infants that they are equally magical.

Just what the economic and political structure of this life would be is not made clear, nor is it clear what would be the sources of physical energy it would depend on. One wonders too what kind of strenuous intellectual achievement might be possible for either parent in such an arrangement. What is clear is that Dinnerstein like Rich rejects technology as a defect of patriarchal thinking:

> The term "progress" rings ugly in our present situation. And I use it in a bitterly qualified spirit, a spirit of the weariest and wariest possible hope. For it is surely clear enough by now that the confidence we rest upon our own reason and will as these have been exercised in our cumulative creation of civilization—in other words, in patriarchally governed enterprise—is a rash, ill-advised confidence.

Of course, this is not a view limited to women. Norman O. Brown, whom Dinnerstein draws on heavily, shares it. But the irrationalist spirit of which women have often been falsely accused is all too clearly revealed here.

The great irony in both Rich's and Dinnerstein's books is that it is only because of advanced medical and industrial technology that women can now speak of control of their own bodies, of freedom from unwanted childbearing and/or lactation, of child-rearing by fathers as well as mothers. Yet never once is there appreciation of that fact. □

Lewis Coser

Workers in America

CLASS AND COMMUNITY: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN LYNN, by Alan Dawley. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 300 pp. $17.50

"Labor now has become a commodity, wealth capital, and the natural order of things is entirely reversed . . . capital and labor stand opposed," stated a labor newspaper, the *Awl*, written for the shoemakers of Lynn and surrounding towns in 1844—four years before the publication of *The Communist Manifesto*. The author shows in instructive detail that such cries of indignation and revolt against the nascent power of industrial capitalism were to be repeated throughout the 19th century in Lynn, a major center of shoe production throughout the century, as in many neighboring

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industrial towns. And yet, even though there were major strikes, large-scale union organization, the rise and fall of a number of workingmen's parties in Lynn, the bulk of its working class remained still as much wedded to the American political system at the end of the century as it had been at its beginning. This sticks in the throat of the author, a young labor and social historian of the Neo-Marxist school. No matter how hard he tries to explain them away, the stubborn facts will not be denied.

Lynn remained throughout the century a major center of working-class activities. The strike of the shoemakers in 1860 was the biggest strike in any industry in America before the Civil War, and it was followed by other major confrontations in the following decades. Yet, though discontent and anger among the shoe workers often rose to the surface, only a very small minority among them turned to various socialist organizations in the closing years of the century. Why should that have been so?

Dawley is at his best when he shows how the later organizations of the shoemakers were decisively influenced by a working class that largely originated in the preindustrial culture of individual artisans and journeymen before the coming of factory production in the second half of the century. In contrast to the New England textile industry, which began at the factory stage, the shoe industry arose out of a previous system in which production took place in the household and a culture of sturdy independence. Factory shoe production, which initially had to rely mainly on a workforce of formerly independent operatives, had to deal with workers who perceived the factory routines as encroachments on established customs of work and life. Just as in many agrarian movements throughout the world, peasants were led to revolt not so much by visions of a better future as by the memory of past rights and immunities that were denied in the present, so the Lynn operatives were sustained in their resistance to the deprivations of industrial production by the memory of, and the partial persistence of, a working-class culture that involved them in communal solidarity. The tradition of *equal rights*, which as the author shows runs like a threat throughout the various forms of the labor movement during the 19th century, was rooted in the domestic production system that was still strong and unimpaired at the beginning of the century. As a Lynn poet wrote in the "Cordwainer's Song" at the time of the great strike of 1860:

> The workman is worthy his hire,
> No tyrant shall hold us in thrall;
> They may order their soldiers to fire,
> But we'll stick to the hammer and awl.

Fueled by the ideology of equal rights, the fires of discontent never died down in Lynn's labor history. Remembering the self-reliance of their artisan past, or transmitting this memory to their descendants or to more recent immigrant workers from Ireland and elsewhere, the Lynn factory workers built their strong unions, the *Knights of St. Crispin*, and later the *Knights of Labor*, to defend their rights. The latter had more than 10,000 members in Lynn when the total number of working people was around 15,000. Women workers, who according to received wisdom are said to be hard to organize, had their own organization in Lynn, *The Daughters of St. Crispin*, and were usually found in the forefront of strikes and other labor manifestations. Men and women joined in union picnics, strike parades, summer festivals, and joyous dances in the union hall. A dense network of communal activities tied the working class together; they surely were not a lonely crowd of atomized individuals. Nor were they politically disenfranchised. Throughout long stretches of Lynn's history representatives of workingmen's parties sat in the mayor's seat and occupied a majority of seats in the city council.

THE AUTHOR attempts to explain why, despite widespread communally rooted radicalism, the Lynn labor movement nevertheless did not go far beyond the mainstream of American political culture. Why was it, to use the shrewd distinction of Samuel Gompers, which the author quotes, that they developed a vivid *Klassengefuehl*, a fellow feeling among those who work for a living, while never reaching out for a Marxian *Klassenbewusstsein*, a clearcut awareness of labor's distinct class interests and a sense of class oppression? Dawley tries valiantly to contradict explanations advanced by other labor historians and social scientists. He attempts to show that upward social mobility was not very widespread, but is finally forced to admit:

> Among an entire group of shoeworkers who spent twenty years in the city, a minority never left their original occupation. Among the majority who changed occupations, far more moved up than down or across, and a substantial minority (though less than 20 per cent) moved up to stay. The fact that one of every two or three shoemaker families could point to someone in the family who had become a petty manufacturer, a small shopkeeper, or a clerk, was

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proof enough that upward mobility was a widespread and clearly evident feature of working-class experience.

After admitting this, Dawley continues to argue that this does not prove that most workers relied on individual mobility to get ahead, since the evidence indicates that the bulk of them at one time or another engaged in various collective actions to improve their conditions. But there is no contradiction here. Most workers clearly attempted to better themselves through both collective and individual strategies, switching from one to the other as circumstances dictated. As Irving Howe has so vividly shown in *The World of Our Fathers*, the Jewish immigrants of the Lower East Side perceived no contradiction in creating instruments of collective action to better the miserable conditions of their lives, and taking individual steps on the ladder of mobility whenever an opportunity presented itself. The same, *grosso modo*, seems to have been the case in Lynn. A labor historian should be aware of the fact that all the various socialist and populist journals and magazines around the turn of the century, while fulminating against the cross of gold, also contained advertisements for get-rich schemes and land speculation of various kinds.

Dawley tends to discount such factors as social mobility or slow access to property ownership as explanations for the lack of a Marxist class consciousness in America. He instead relies on a curious explanation: "Electoral politics, not faith in occupational success or property ownership, was the main safety valve of working-class discontents." Political parties, he avers, especially since the Civil War, were ladders to success and creamed off the indigenous working-class leadership. Lynn's political leaders came in significant parts from among former shoemakers, so that local politics provided a demonstration that men from their ranks could rise to top positions. Ever since the Civil War, when all Lynn's classes had closed ranks against Southern slavemasters, politics acted as a safety valve of social discontent. "The ballot box was the coffin of class consciousness," says the author with regret.

This seems to me a curious thing to say. It may be perfectly true that democracy prevents the emergence of a Marxian type of class consciousness, but does Dawley really wish to assert, as he comes near to saying, that had there been less democracy in America, the labor movement would have attained the pristine Marxist purity he so ardently desires, so that democracy is the major obstacle to the attainment of labor's "true interests"? The ballot box, as contemporary workers from Spain to Poland have learned in their flesh, is the essential prerequisite for any advance of the cause of labor, and if it hinders the development of a pure Marxian class consciousness, so be it.

Despite these caveats, I have learned a good deal from this vivid, painstaking and compassionate portrayal of an important page in the history of American labor. It deserves to stand next to other major works in British and American labor history that trace their origin to E. P. Thompson's masterful *The Making of the English Working Class.* □

Henry Pachter

Politics and High Finance

GOLD AND IRON: BISMARCK, BLEICHROEDER AND THE BUILDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE, by Fritz Stern. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 620 pp. $15.95

In this double biography of Prince Bismarck and his banker, Columbia professor Fritz Stern paints the portrait of an era and tells the story of a grandiose failure—that of the liberal middle class in the new German *Reich* 100 years ago. The parameters of his study are "Germans and Jews, power and money," and the symbol-charged protagonists of that complex relationship are the high-born first chancellor of the German Empire and the grandson of a Jewish gravedigger, Gerson Bleichroeder. For 30 years these two worked together for two purposes—to manage the statesman's private finances and to scheme diplomatic maneuvers for the glory of the fatherland. They saw each other almost every week and wrote each other more than 1,000 letters—the one addressing himself to "your highness," the other to his "esteemed friend."

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Yet, in his memoirs, Bismarck did not mention this friendship, and German historians so far have overlooked, discreetly and diligently, the valuable source material that Professor Stern now reveals in this book. No wonder, since in the German view of the state, government is not supposed to have an economic underside and great leaders are supposed to be aloof, disinterested civil servants. Business is by nature "dirty," and hence it is often symbolized in German novels by Jews. No less a critic than the young Karl Marx was outraged by the absence of idealism in business: "What is the secular cult of the Jew? Haggling. What is his secular god? Money. Emancipation from haggling and money would be the self-emancipation of the age." Richard Wagner saw in Bismarck the mythical Siegfried whose sword overcomes the materialistic dwarfs of the middle class. But Friedrich Engels, for one, saw through the ideological swindle and wrote to Marx: "Unless we study the financial shenanigans of the Prussian gentry we don't understand the Empire." Nietzsche too was painfully aware of the vulgarity of that upstart empire. Hence Stern explains the embarrassed silence of German historians regarding Bismarck's business contacts with the pithy verdict: "Bleichroeder is everything that has been left out of [the writing of] German history."

For instance, when Bismarck decided to resign from the exalted post he had occupied for 28 years, he first told Bleichroeder to sell all his (Bismarck's) Prussian State Bonds. A petty act of vengeance by an old man? Oh no; the paragon of Prussian virtue knew that his resignation would send the Stock Exchange into a panic, and both prince and banker were bound to make a killing. Similarly, when the Stock Exchange was apprehensive about a crisis in Russo-German relations, Bismarck (knowing that both governments were negotiating for an amicable settlement) instructed Bleichroeder bluntly: "Don't unload; I'll tell you when it's time to sell." Even if we accept Stern's assurance that Bismarck's political decisions were never influenced by his private financial interests, such disregard of decorum and discretion certainly does not agree with today's notions of "conflict of interest" or with the public image of a Prussian civil servant.

Stern writes that the age was not as squeamish as ours about Caesar's wife, and Bismarck himself voiced at least his own unconcern: "Why should I be prevented from using information I have come by honestly?" he said when outraged parliamentarians attacked his unscrupulous pursuit of private gain. Others certainly were squeamish, and Bismarck himself was at least circumspect in one significant instance: When he was preparing for the war with France, he did not inform Bleichroeder directly but dictated a letter to his wife in which she advised the banker to sell her railroad shares. Bleichroeder knew how to use such information. The banker's enormous influence was based largely on the great number of his clients who were diplomats, high civil servants, members of high society, politicians, and even princes in many countries. Thanks to his widespread correspondence, he was always well informed on political projects that might offer opportunities for alert investors and, vice versa, on financial projects that might interest a politician, be it in his official capacity or as a private investor.

THE GERMAN COURT SOCIETY had become infected with the spirit of stock-jobbing even while it looked down on "England, that stock-jobbing nation." Following the decline in land values and the development of overseas grain production, the Prussian squirearchy envied the rising wealth of the middle class. Hence high-born aristocrats endowed with 12 generations of noble ancestors turned to Bleichroeder, begging him to cut them in on his profits, and in one case—to which I shall return presently because it is paradigmatic—Bismarck practically ordered his banker to take care of a group of cronies who had engaged in a promotion swindle. Such connections provided Bleichroeder with a private intelligence network that reached into the embassies, the general staff, the Kaiser's antechamber and the empress's suite.

Only one politician resisted Bleichroeder's blandishments—the liberal leader Eduard Lasker. Lasker, a Jew and a commoner, was scrupulously correct and upright. I would therefore amend Professor Stern's remark on the lack of squeamishness in the Bismarck era. Not everyone disregarded—or could afford to disregard—conflict of interest, but that notion simply did not exist for the class that had always considered the state its private property. For the aristocrats, the wall that separates government from business had become quite porous; ordinary citizens, by contrast, stood in awe of the state. In the Prussian hierarchy of values, the two spheres were linked by a one-way street: business was allowed to serve the higher aims of the fatherland but was not supposed to set goals for its policy-maker. Stern's detailed study of Bleichroeder's archives leads him to conclude that wherever politics worked in tandem

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with business, the former was leading, except when agrarian interests were at stake. Where underlying interests determine overt political decisions, they do not stem directly from business needs or even from more general economic causes, but from the class structure of late 19th-century society, in this case, from the caste system in Prussie, then Germany's largest state.

This is especially true of Bismarck's colonial policies. Contradicting the Hobson-Lenin theory of imperialism, Stern finds that the German colonies were not profitable and offered no investment opportunities for surplus capital; nor were these ventures promoted by the banks. On the contrary, Bleichroeder and other solid capitalists advised against them. They were interested in Russian and other government loans, on the launching of which they collected a modest commission of 1 percent: they left the penetration of faraway countries to financial adventurers.

These swindle enterprises were frequently graced by the names of well-known noble families who lent their prestige to lure unsuspecting "small investors" into the broker's office. In the case to which I alluded earlier, a few audacious noblemen helped a Jewish promoter, the "railway king" Dr. Strousberg, to sell stock in a Rumanian railway that was never built. Since they were Bismarck's dear friends and pillars of the Conservative party, the Great Man was anxious to avoid a scandal. Hence the blame was placed at the door of the Rumanian government, an international crisis was allowed to develop, an international conference was convened, and Bleichroeder was asked to form an international consortium to bail out the Rumanian government so that it could bail out the foolish investors. Rumania was put under international tutelage, inaugurating a period of German ascendancy in its politics. Bleichroeder, aware of the role Jewish money would play in the transaction, used the occasion to extract from the Rumanian government a promise to grant equality to its Jewish minority—an obligation promptly abandoned the moment Bismarck's wrath had abated.

So personal and private, so uncapitalistic in spirit was Bismarck's economic imperialism. One wonders why governments are so often drawn into colonialist policies by the interests of weak and irregular factions rather than by the healthy members of the business community. Stern remarks that here this was not quite accidental. The former ruling class still thought it owned the state, though it was losing out in its struggle to maintain economic status and power vis-à-vis the newly rising bourgeoisie. Colonialism, militarism, and imperialism were means to perpetuate its prestige, its value system, its domination. J. A. Hobson called imperialism "the outdoor sport of the ruling class"; in Germany it was something worse—an instrument to keep the other classes in submission. In a nation where wealth (unless it was very old) had never provided status, the bourgeoisie had not succeeded in imposing its value scheme on the rest of society. To rise and gain in self-respect, a bourgeois had to adapt to aristocratic thought processes, perhaps obtain a commission in a regiment of the Guards (as Bleichroeder did for his son), follow aristocratic taste and manners (including little turrets and balconies on town houses) and, if possible, to marry into an aristocratic family. Many a bourgeois was happy to grovel before the throne and provide services for the Court. "To rise" meant to be accepted by one's betters, rather than to win recognition for one's abilities and accomplishments.

The honeymoon of liberal illusions lasted for less than a generation; in the late 1880s, Bismarck did dissolve his coalition with the National-Liberal party and returned to protectionism. For his own reasons of domestic policy, he held out to the masses (who eagerly accepted it) the new perspectives of "world politics" and forged a new alliance of imperialist ideologies with the militarist-agrarian aristocrats—and against the liberal bourgeoisie—thus restoring Germany's old class structure.

Bleichroeder was the epitome of the German bourgeois—servile and patriotic. With all the power his money wielded, he was constantly soliciting medals and honors; for all his diplomatic successes, of which any other man might have been proud, he was not happy until he had wangled the particle "von" from his protector—the first Jew in Prussia to be elevated for financial services to the nobility. But alas! That society was far from accepting him as a bona fide member. Bismarck and his son continued to make deprecating remarks behind his back. His aristocratic friends and the beneficiaries of his financial favors mocked his waddling gait, his accent and "Jewish" mannerisms; at a lavish ball von Bleichroeder gave for the diplomatic corps, one guest was overheard saying: "Were it not for our host, we would be *entre nous.*" They resented the man who had been the instrument of their own *embourgeoisement,* and they projected their shame into contempt of the *parvenu* who vainly tried to make up for his lack of

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education, pedigree, and prepuce, by ostentatious luxuries and prodigious gifts to the mighty.

To tell the truth, Bleichroeder had something of Molière's *Bourgeois gentilhomme.* He foisted his protection on the General Staff—during the French campaign (in the Franco-Prussian War) he provided the officers with amenities the army's logistics were unable to secure; after victory was won, he distributed hundredweights of caviar, carloads of wine, and thousands of cigars to the princes assembled at Versailles to found the "Reich." He maintained a luxurious mansion where he occasionally lodged influential persons, gave brilliant balls and concerts, and housed his business offices. Imagine the Kaiser smoking the Jew's cigars! The aristocracy grumbled that the sacred Reich had become a Jewish establishment.

At the end of Bismarck's regime, and still more after his resignation, the resentment of Bleichroeder degenerated into a ruthless anti-Semitic campaign, and though Bismark knew that the agitators were really aiming at *him* trying to tarnish him with the word *Judenfreund,* he did nothing to protect his friend, whom he continued to consult and receive at his estate, exploiting him for petty gains and using him as a channel to communicate with the Rothschilds and others.

THE ERUPTION of political anti-Semitism in Germany, as we saw, coincided with the beginning of colonial policy and the Chancellor's turn from liberal to conservative alliances. The bourgeoisie—which had allowed Bismarck to persecute Socialists and Catholics, and in fact had hidden its own interests under the umbrella of his "strong state"—had abandoned its historical mission to create a middle-class consciousness and a middle-class national state. Indeed, the German bourgeoisie identified its own future with that of an imperial power. Instead of tolerance and liberalism, it espoused the values of the feudal classes and recognized the state as the framework in which individuals might rise to wealth. As a supplemental inducement, this state held out for them the opportunities of "world politics," and its correlate, obviously, was racism. In an earlier work, Professor Stern has studied this "Politics of Cultural Despair"; here he gives the ideology a sociological underpinning: a bourgeoisie that failed to think liberal on its own behalf obviously could not fight against intolerance and illiberalism on behalf of minorities. Tragically, even the Jews themselves were tempted to join the party and, despite their economic liberalism, accepted the imperial values, in some noted cases even the racial ideologies of Bismarck's state.

Regrettably, Stern does not discuss the reaction of German Jews to the phenomenon of Bleichroeder; the respectable middle-class milieu in which this reviewer grew up was embarrassed by, rather than proud of, pushy and ostentatious coreligionaries who were "provoking anti-Semitism." Minorities in Germany tried to be unconspicuous, and this brings us to Professor Stern's last chapter: did Jews have to give up their identity in order to be accepted as equals?

In a moving chapter, Professor Stern draws mournful conclusions on the relationship of Germans and Jews, or what he calls the assimilationist illusion. Only for a brief period of one generation did the Jews enjoy the feeling that they were rising abreast with that urban middle class to which most of them belonged; that in the larger Reich they would be freer than in the narrow petty-states; that liberal policies would wipe out the old prejudices.

Alas!—more recent research by Wolfgang Mommsen has shown that the resurgence of anti-Semitism coincided with the decline of small enterprise, trade, and the professions—the occupations of most German Jews. These classes had been the backbone of liberalism, to which the Jews naturally inclined. Now Jewish liberalism became obsolete along with its economic foundations. It was confronted by the anticapitalist, antiliberal policies of the new masses, be they socialist or imperialist and racist. But being obsolete need not be tantamount to being abandoned. The bulk of the Jewish middle class held on to the liberal illusion, or even converted it into the conformist ideology of total assimilation. But by the end of the century, 16 anti-Semites were in the Reichstag, and the leader of the Christian-Social party was the anti-Semitic Court Preacher Adolf Stoecker. Still, Bebel's saying that "anti-Semitism is the socialism for morons" does not quite fit: the anti-Semites failed to win workers away from the Social Democrats, but found their support in the rural areas and the petty-bourgeoisie. Good historian that he is, Stern is careful not to extrapolate the Nazi experience into the lunatic fringe of the preceding period. Yet his deep pessimism with regard to the possibility of a German-Jewish symbiosis seems tinged by the horrors of the more recent experience. I doubt whether the two situations can be compared at all.

Under Bismarck, while the Germans were prosperous, powerful, and confident, a few

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individual Jews were allowed to thrive like eunuchs at the Byzantine court. In the Weimar Republic (and this, of course, was after the Empire's disastrous World War I defeat and its demise), Jews were part of the establishment in the arts and sciences, literature and professions, in the media and movies, while the bulk of the people faced humiliation and economic disaster.

In the first case, anti-Semitism was the ideology of a rising empire; in the second case, it was populist and anticapitalist. The anti-Semitism of the post-Bismarck era confirmed the prevailing value system and indeed was part of it; the anti-Semitism of the Weimar period was the debris of a shattered world view.

Stern insists that the relations between economic and political forces, between various ethnic groups, between money and power must be viewed in the specific context of each period. The vulgar-Marxist interpretations of anti-Semitism, imperialism, etc. are all on a level of abstraction where they lose contact with historical reality. And contrary to Hegel, what followed does not explain what preceded. Stern's brilliantly written book is a model of reconstructing a period from its own conditions. □

Erazim Kohák

Big Brother, Brown Brother

MODEL OR ALLY? THE COMMUNIST POWERS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, by Richard Lowenthal. New York: Oxford University Press. 400 pp. $12.95.

Just how enlightening can even an enlightened despot be? That is the underlying question of Richard Lowenthal's study of Communist policy toward the Third World—and a most welcome study it is. Lowenthal brings insight and erudition to an area in which most of us have little to guide us beyond a most ambiguous conventional wisdom.

For ourselves, we are utterly convinced that a despot can be neither enlightened nor enlightening. He might make the trains run on time but, in Europe or North America, it would no longer matter whether they did. Here, we are sure, personal freedom and human rights are what makes even precise technology worthwhile.

We are far less certain that this is also true of those who fail to match our technological accomplishments. Not so long ago, Lenin and Mussolini, while not benign, did seem to many Westerners peculiarly "appropriate" for their respective countries. Work before play: first let them modernize, then worry about freedom! Today, most Americans would include all of Europe, including gradually even Russia, in the privileged area in which freedom should be the justification for technology. In Africa and Asia, however, many entirely sincere Western liberals are still prepared to accept despotism as an unpleasant but necessary tool of modernization. Could it be that, in our heart of hearts, we still believe that while white humans need freedom and dignity, their "brown brother" really needs a Big Brother?

This had traditionally been the self-justification of colonial regimes: "white men" [sic] need freedom, "the natives" need discipline. The myth of the enlightening despot is, after all, at least as old as Voltaire who, while staunchly liberal at home, professed to admire such distant despots as Catherine the Great of Russia or the Emperor of China. Today his heirs, in a curious inversion of Marxist dogma, profess to regard Communist despotism as a necessary stage on the way to modernization—and tend to attribute to the Communists a special advantage in dealing with the Third World because, unhampered by humanitarian scruples, they are able to provide "brown brother" with the Big Brother's paternal hand.

That, at least, tends to be our conventional wisdom, but do the facts support it? The facts are there for the asking; but we seldom ask for them. The great value of Lowenthal's study is that he does.

WHAT OF the "Soviet socialist" model? As Lowenthal points out, it is, strictly, neither "soviet" nor "socialist." Rather, it is a classic modernizing despotism, the one-party state that Lenin developed *after* the civil war as a tool for what was to be a total transformation of the traditional Russian society. Its basic principle is the total monopolization of all economic, political, and intellectual

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initiative in the hands of a centralized apparat. To the generic characteristic of revolutionary power—that it is unrestricted by any legal constraints—Lenin added a freedom from restriction by any plurality of autonomous centers of economic, political, or intellectual initiative, ruthlessly eliminating not only his opponents, but even his erstwhile allies and any potentially autonomous followers. The instrument he designed, which Stalin perfected and Brezhnev inherited, is the enlightened despot's dream: a state totally subservient in all its aspects to a single will.

THAT MODEL understandably appeals to impatient men convinced that only the knavery and folly of their fellow humans blocks the realization of their right and good will. Yet, even apart from the corrupting effect of such absolute power, the model is deeply problematic. In assuming a monopoly of initiative, a ruler runs a risk of finding himself presiding over an inert society, obedient to his wishes but stripped of any life of its own. To counter that risk, the ruler can try to fire the initiative of his subjects with a messianic ideology but, as he succeeds, he is likely to become a captive of that ideology. Hitler is a classic example: having used the combination of monopolized initiative and a messianic ideology to mobilize his nation for war, he went down in defeat because that ideology demanded, inter alia, the destruction of Jewish scientists and the alienation of potentially friendly populations in the Ukraine and in Russia.

The model that Lowenthal examines is not unfamiliar. Lowenthal's great contribution, however, is his scrupulous documentation of its record in practice. It is anything but impressive. Certainly, Russia is far more industrialized today than at the time of the First World War—but what country isn't? Whether it is more "modern" is far less certain. The mark of modernity is the spontaneous dynamism of a society that makes possible an extensive replacement of the coercive and supervisory apparatus by popular initiative and so by greater freedom. Sixty years after the revolution, the Soviet empire is more dependent on its supervisory and coercive apparatus—and more constrained by it—than it ever was in the days of the Czars. The monopolization of initiative has certainly increased the might of Russia's rulers. It has not significantly increased the autonomy of its citizens.

It was a model of the one-party state with its monopoly of initiative, not the cumbersome Victorian freight of Marxist metaphysics, that appealed in the Soviet model to such revolutionary leaders as Chiang Kai-shek or Kemal Attaturk and their latter-day counterparts. But nowhere did the results bear out the expectations. While the local variables that Lowenthal documents are staggering, a common pattern does emerge. Without a messianic ideology, the monopolization of initiative is stultifying; with such an ideology, the real needs of development become subordinated to ideological demands. The one-party model may suit the predilections of ambitious leaders, but it does not suit the objective needs of development.

That discrepancy between emotional impulse and real need is crucial. As Lowenthal shows, colonial revolutionaries may respond to Soviet anti-Western rhetoric, but it is Western credits and expertise they need. Contrary to Western assumptions about "brown brother" and Big Brother, the objective needs of development are far more compatible with a Western conception of an open society than with the Communist model of a monopoly of initiative in the hands of an enlightening despot.

Certainly, this does not mean that many Third World countries have the prerequisites or the desire for duplicating the trappings of European parliamentary democracy. But this is not the point. The point is that, of the two alternatives to the stranglehold of traditionalism, freedom is a far more effective long-range tool than a repression that may produce spectacular immediate results but undercuts the dynamism of further growth. Even Western socialism is a case in point. Few developing populations include enough industrial workers and competent administrators to utilize the European model of a trade-union welfare state. But the Soviet model of state monopoly, capable at best of building steel mills, is even less adaptable to such conditions. Socialism here is relevant in its cooperative form, aimed explicitly at encouraging direct worker and peasant ownership of tools and land and direct initiative in generating efficient small-scale agricultural and basic manufacturing infrastructure. Where such initiative is missing the state may have to foster it, but to displace it with state initiative is a prescription for disaster. Although a Soviet-style command economy may appeal to the temperament of many Third World leaders, the objective needs of their lands are far more compatible with the Western conception of a pluralistic society.

This discrepancy between the needs of the Third World and its emotional preferences poses the chief problem for Soviet (and Chinese) foreign policy in

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the developing countries. In colonial days, the revolutionary anti-Westernism seemed bond enough. After some hesitation, the Soviets settled on a policy of supporting "national liberation" movements in the expectation that the Soviet Union would serve first as an ally, then as a model—that is, that the relatively few Communists in such movements would first infiltrate and then take over their leadership.

The postwar decolonization immensely complicated that scheme by bringing to power "national liberation" movements that still retained their nationalistic ideologies and their ties to the West. The Soviets responded first by labeling such regimes "neocolonialist" to justify continued support for the Communist hard core within (and against) them. The label salved ideological consciences but changed no facts: the new regimes were nationalistic, wanted to modernize, and needed Western aid. The Third World Communists, loyally adopting the "anti-neocolonialist" posture, found themselves increasingly isolated in their own countries. As a way out, the Soviets invented the face-saving concept of "reparations": a Third World regime might accept Western aid as reparations for past exploitation without incurring the odium of "neocolonialism." Once again, ideological consciences were salved while reality remained unchanged.

IDEOLOGICAL ACROBATICS simply could not eliminate the basic contradiction in the scenario of model-and-ally. As an ally, the Soviet Union had to tread most warily in seeking to export its peculiar institutions. But where it came to serve as a model for a native one-party state, its special connection to an autonomous faction within the state, the local Communist party, made it suspect. After a series of expensive failures, the Soviet Union made a last attempt to exploit its ideological advantage by treating as "objectively socialist" all regimes seeking to establish a monopoly of political, intellectual, and economic initiative, even if such regimes were jailing their native Communists and embracing conservative nationalist or religious ideologies. It is not clear whether the shift salved any ideological consciences, but, by acknowledging openly the Soviet equation between socialism and despotism, it did help discredit the Soviets in the field of their putative advantage.

Increasingly, the Russians discovered that not ideology but the Soviet Army is the most reliable tool for building an empire. In recent years, they have concentrated on a military consolidation and a mercantilistic subordination of the countries within the Army's reach while, beyond it, they sought to build a largely ideologically neutral system of shifting alliances by the traditional tools of imperial diplomacy—foreign aid backed up by gunboats and, in the case of Angola, by marine landing parties. From the "pillar of hope for the comradeship of nations" (*druzhby narodov nadiozhdnyi oplot*) of its anthem, the Soviet Union has become as anomalous as its ideology: a classical 19th-century aspiring imperial power set down in the latter half of the 20th century.

Whether Chinese Communists represent an alternative approach, as Lowenthal claims, or simply an earlier stage of the same weary road, as I would claim, seems a moot point. Lowenthal's reading has the advantage of bringing into relief the dogmatically "revolutionary" motif in ideological foreign policy. The Chinese, lacking virtually everything else, remained far more keenly aware of the need to channel rather than displace popular initiative, and they have treated revolutionary dedication as the driving force of history—an intriguing twist in what still purports to be a dialectical *materialism*. But the idea of a revolution is rational only as a means for breaking down an obstacle to development or for imposing a particular model of development. As self-justifying, it becomes irrational—and, in fact, the Chinese have at times encouraged their clients to sacrifice the goal of modernization to keeping the revolutionary means pure and unsullied. The result is a revolutionism that has far more in common with nihilism than with Marxism—and nothing at all with the needs of modernization.

Lowenthal's *Model or Ally?* is an incredibly rich book, essential for anyone who wishes to speak of the problems of the Third World and be taken seriously. But perhaps the most important point is one that the evidence Lowenthal presents makes of itself: that freedom, not repression, is the most effective way of breaking the stranglehold of traditionalism and accelerating modernization. The West errs tragically when it sets aside its fundamental commitment to human freedom and rights in the Third World in favor of the assumption that "brown brother" needs Big Brother. Even in the Third World, freedom is not a luxury: it is a birthright, the presupposition and the goal of all human striving. □

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LETTERS

On Lenin and Solzenitsyn

Editors:

Boris Souvarine (*Dissent*, Summer 1977) twists Solzhenitsyn's somewhat mythological *Lenin in Zurich* into a springboard for a peculiarly lopsided account of the evidence for the German subsidy to the Bolsheviks in 1917-18.

The tone of this lopsidedness is set by his throwaway reference (p. 327) to "every insinuation about German gold" as a "calumny pure and simple—until April 1917." The effrontery of this is all the more astonishing since it is precisely Lenin's penury *until* then that indicates the starting point of the subsidy.

Souvarine does not even mention the two articles written by Eduard Bernstein—never accused of corruption or stupidity—in January 1921 in the official organ of the German (Social Democratic) government. Bernstein sets down a specific figure—"more than 50 million gold marks." It was this staggering sum—the equivalent in today's currency of more than $800 million—that made me look into the question for both my *Encounter* articles and my *Trotsky*. Beforehand I had been mesmerized by the 50-year-old discussion in which Lenin's revolutionary integrity played the principal role.

Nor does Souvarine refer to the 41 Bolshevik periodicals published by August 1917: these came out at the rate of more than 300,000 a day and were often distributed gratis. Avowed Party revenues could not have covered a fraction of this. (This is all detailed in Leonard Schapiro's history of the Soviet Communist party.)

It was not I who "revealed" the German financing of the Bolshevik regime after the putsch: among other sources I mentioned Kurt Riezler, counselor of the Stockholm German Embassy, who in his memoir refers matter-of-factly to the allocation in July 1918 of 40 million gold marks between the Bolsheviks and some moderate monarchists. Souvarine attacks the plausibility of this like a rationalist ideologue: how could the Germans support "the confiscation of private property"? As though they were thinking of anything but the immobilization of the Eastern front!

Souvarine's remark that I "deduced" the German subsidy from the "sealed train" is, I should think, deliberately fraudulent. He may belittle the evidential value of the numerous sources I mention—in fact he simply omits them all—but how can he say I "made a blinding deduction from a luminous premise"? His authority explodes here in a puff of duplicity.

Anyone who read my *Encounter* articles will see that I was linking the train and the subsidy only in order to highlight a possible Marxist *defense* of the latter: if Lenin accepted the train for the Cause, why not the subsidy?

The notion that the Bolsheviks were given vast sums in actual banknotes is, of course, so silly that it is easy to sneer the fact itself out of existence. The transfer of funds highlights the key role played by Alexander Helphand (Parvus). It was precisely here that Helphand's business network played a primordial role: he owned not merely a coal-mining company, but a freight company registered in Copenhagen: with German funds he bought countless items, shipped them to Scandinavia, and from there to Russia via Lenin's agents Radek and Fürstenberg (Hanecki).

Souvarine tucks all this away in his Postscript, detaches it from Helphand, and at the same time refers to bookkeeping records as though it were all a matter of conventional commercial transactions. But how could ordinary records have been kept in this very dangerous relationship?

To my mind the factual data add up to a lot. The gaps are accounted for by the obvious necessary secrecy: this applied to both Lenin and Helphand. There is surely an element of high comedy in Souvarine's "dismissal" of von Kuhlmann as a plain "liar" when juxtaposed to his incredible acceptance of the institutionalized mendacity of the Bolsheviks, including Radek—*Radek*! This is surely of a piece with Souvarine's pious priggishness in saying that as soon as Lenin "got a whiff of Parvus's views he sent him packing" (p. 330). He could have got this only from a memoir by someone like Shlyapnikov, a cementheaded acolyte who may have believed everything Lenin told him. But Souvarine?

It is the psychological factors, however, that seem to me to complement the objective indications in a way that is even more convincing.

The most remarkable piece of evidence for the German subsidy is something intangible—the titanic fact of Lenin's flight. This is the core of the Bolshevik putsch: it explains Trotsky's cardinal function.

Trotsky devoted two chapters (one in *My Life*, one in his *History of the Russian Revolution*) to an overwrought denunciation of the story of the German subsidy as the "vilest slander in history." He is forced into this extravagant language because he must explain Lenin's flight from Petrograd in July 1917, in the aftermath of what seems to have been an abortive insurrection accompanied by the fragmentary disclosure of the German connection. This last involved high treason in wartime: all the Bolsheviks were in mortal peril.

Trotsky must disprove the commonsense reaction—especially among old-fashioned Marxists—that Lenin should really have stayed on in order to clear himself: to do this Trotsky must persuade his readers that the "Right wing" hated Lenin so much that they would have stopped at nothing, hence Lenin's flight was natural. Yet on the face of it, his version is nonsense. Sukhanov—quoted approvingly by Trotsky and by Souvarine, when it suits them—shows most circumstantially that any possibility of lynch law was "absurd, in the summer of 1917"!

But there is a still weightier aspect to all this.

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How could Lenin, aflame at the prospect of seizing power in a vast country as a preamble to the triumph of the World Revolution, abdicate his leadership at the crucial moment? Abdicate it, moreover, to someone whom he and other Bolsheviks had been denouncing for a decade, a man detested by one and all?

Trotsky did not merely stage-manage the putsch, he defined it as it were constitutionally. Since Lenin, throbbing with euphoria, thought the inevitable upheaval of the German proletariat would safeguard the Bolshevik sortie, he wanted the Bolsheviks to proclaim their seizure of power as *Bolshevik*. Trotsky wanted to camouflage the putsch by presenting it as a function of the Soviet. (Isaac Deutscher makes a particularly comic attempt to reconcile these two ideas.)

Trotsky was, of course, chairman of the Soviet, a priceless vantage point. Since the Bolsheviks were not to have any "enemies on the Left" for a decade or so, the parvenu dictators could claim and secure the support of the bulk of the population, e.g., of the peasants, too, until the Civil War was won and the swiftly consolidated apparatus could put the whole population through the mangling machine of the crash collectivization and industrialization programs that still constitute the fabric of life in the Soviet Union.

Lenin, remote from the scene of action, was forced to swallow Trotsky's initiative, including his version of the putsch. Once in power, the Bolsheviks could exploit the camouflage of the Soviet very effectively. The very name of the Soviet Union keeps the fiction alive.

Thus Souvarine, in saying I "tried to involve" Trotsky in the German subsidy, not merely falsifies what I wrote in *Encounter*, he succumbs to an unaccountable flash of foolishness. My whole explanation of Trotsky's brief eminence in the Bolshevik party is based on his *not* having been involved: that was just what made him indispensable.

I think Lenin's refusal to accept a trial, together with his eliminating himself from the putsch, is an overwhelming argument for the factuality of the German subsidy.

Souvarine is particularly harsh on Solzhenitsyn's blunders. He dismisses Radek's remark to Lenin in April 1917: "In six months we'll be either ministers or hanged." But the point of the anecdote, after all, is to illustrate the ardor of all Marxists at the time: a great state had fallen to the forces of socialism, as it seemed—who knew what the future held! Radek's quip is perfectly natural, indeed, banal—and Souvarine brings up passport formalities!

At the same time Souvarine seems incapable of grasping Solzhenitsyn's true interest. Not only does he refer, rather comically, to Helphand as a "Russo-German," but he is baffled by Solzhenitsyn's obsession with Lenin's ancestry.

Yet Solshenitsyn's preoccupation is the very axis of his mythology. He is saying something basic: the Russian people—simpleminded, *holy*—has been duped by aliens, i.e., Jews and Germans. For this mythology the figure of Helphand is ideal, indeed, indispensable—he was a caricature of all the required factors. With a huge head, heavy torso, and spindly legs, Helphand lived in a sea of champagne, large-scale business deals, and luscious blondes. From Solzhenitsyn's point of view, and of course from his own, he had not a drop of "Russian" blood. He was simply a shtetl Jew who became the only Marxist multimillionaire. Solzhenitsyn is so intent on establishing the links between the Jew Helphand and the German General Staff that he disregards the true point—the dimensions of the German connection. No doubt his homework was geared to his fundamental views; Souvarine has found it easy to exploit these on behalf of a different polemic.

Souvarine admits Lenin was "no paragon of morality." I suppose he means Lenin was a liar as well as, at the least, an architect of massacre, of course in the service of the Cause. He follows this low-key summation with a curious point: Lenin was nevertheless very careful "not to let himself fall into disrepute with the Russian people whom he aspired to . . . lead toward social revolution."

The Russian "people"! This piece of—for a Marxist—silliness tells us a lot about Souvarine. If the evidence of the German subsidy is all worthless, why does he weasel about so much in bypassing it? What, after all, is he defending?

Surely, I imagine, his youthful ardor. In this respect Souvarine seems to typify a category—all those who, while appalled by the monstrosity brought about by the rosy dreams of their youth, nevertheless balk at abandoning those dreams.

This comes out in his final piece of chicanery: in his starry-eyed description of the atmosphere in Petrograd around October 1917 he shows that the Bolsheviks did, after all, represent genuine opinion while functioning within the democratic arena of the Soviet: one could call oneself a "Bolshevik" while meaning no more than disgust with the war. His quotation from Pierre Pascal makes much of the absence of Marxism "either among the people or the poets or the October decrees."

But that's the whole point! The Bolsheviks took advantage of just that state of mind—which of course they shared—and, because they could not remotely represent the real interests of the people, installed the most ferocious apparatus of repression in history.

There German subsidy invalidates the "legitimacy" of the Bolshevik putsch—but not by much. Whatever the meaning of legitimacy, it was lost once and for all by the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and by the conduct of the dictatorship ever since. Since the Bolsheviks collided with the interests of the whole population—except the handfuls of idealists and the crowds of careerists—they were *in essence* wholly illegitimate—unless, of course, one believes in their mission!

I was, I admit, very surprised by Souvarine's disingenuous account of all this. Perhaps his deceitfulness, like Trotsky's, should also be construed as evidence for the German subsidy.

JOEL CARMICHAEL
New York City

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Boris Souvarine Replies:

My article on *Lenin in Zurich* (originally in *Est et Ouest,* Paris, April 1976) was somewhat abridged in *Dissent* (Summer 1977) with my consent. In consequence, some arguments and references were sacrificed. I am no longer in a physical condition that permits me to compare the two texts, for I am too old and half-blind. My reply to Mr. Carmichael's diatribe may allude to some passages that were omitted in the shortened English-language version. I would ask *Dissent* to indicate such passages, if any, in footnotes.

The unnecessarily irascible letter that takes issue with me is scarcely persuasive when it taxes me with not having read everything or quoted everything. A magazine article is not a doctoral thesis, and mine dealt with *Lenin in Zurich,* which implies certain limits. However, I have read Bernstein and Sukhanov and Leonard Schapiro, who are deserving of comment. The difficulty is that my accuser shows little concern for the meaning of words, and that what he terms "source" is mere hypothesis or echo or deduction.

Eduard Bernstein's articles were known initially in France only through unreliable press résumés. Because I had then—and have still—the highest opinion of their author, the articles perplexed me at the time in that they contradicted all the unquestionable, given facts. I was able to read the articles in full only later and, in English, in David Shub's book on Lenin. Then everything became clear. Bernstein's material is not a primary source or document but the echo of the gossip of unscrupulous bureaucrats. Two major statements he makes suffice to prove this: (1) the (pseudo-) sealed railway car becomes a "parlor car"; and (2) Lenin allegedly received more than 50 million gold marks. Such nonsense discredits even gossips.

(1) The railway car was a second-and third-class coach, and the travelers paid for their tickets. The car was coupled to an ordinary train in Zingen. Proofs of this exist.

(2) The German documents published by Hahlweg and by Zeman mention 1 million marks—only one—which Parvus claims he sent to Petrograd. (To whom? not to Lenin.) Parvus is obviously lying, for private letters of Lenin and statements of Zinoviev, Bukharin, and Molotov make it clear that at that time the Bolshevik committee in Petrograd was almost nonexistent. Only Shliapnikov managed sometimes to make fleeting contact from Stockholm. In any event, 1 million is not "more than 50 [million]." Parvus surely pocketed the money; there is no other plausible explanation. Lenin was in Zurich.

Solzhenitsyn has rightly noted that after January 22, 1916 the Wilhelmstrasse "paid Parvus not a pfennig" [p. 176]. In other words, the payment of 1 million in late 1915—the only such payment, and the fate of which no one knows—was unique.

With all my regard for Bernstein, I concluded that he had reported idle talk. In 1921, he was much younger, yet he would no doubt have checked such hearsay. Now, however, reliable documents and testimony are available, and in my article I quoted them. It is permissible to disagree with a respectworthy person on a specific point. *Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas.*

The same documents and testimony refute also the "sealed train" that, according to the article in *Encounter,* was offered by Ludendorff (sic) to Lenin alone. The German document signed by Captain Hülsen (No. 19 in Zeman) mentions 300 to 400 Russians who were to be transported. To deal with them by pretermission so as to take cognizance only of Lenin is "star-worshipping,"* not historical criticism. Martov, Axelrod, Riazanov, Lunacharsky, Bobrov, Angelica Balabanoff, and many others made the same trip as Lenin in a similar railway car (not sealed), for all that the fact thwarts a blind Leninophobia.

The role attributed to Ludendorff is quite simply comical. No more than any other non-Socialist at the time did he even know Lenin's name. The German General Staff merely approved the Wilhelmstrasse's proposal that a few hundred Russians (of all political colorations, not Bolsheviks only) be permitted to pass through Germany. The decision was natural enough: every government at war tries to encourage domestic difficulties within the enemy country. It is unnecessary to invent an imaginary connivance between Ludendorff and Lenin.

The initiative to cross Germany came not from Ludendorff, not from Parvus, not from Lenin, but from Martov—a man who was above reproach—and this has been proved to the hilt. The proposal dates from March 19, 1917. The available documentation shows that at first Lenin did not want to travel via Germany. He tried in vain to go via France and England. Only on March 30th, when he learned that Chernov had been refused permission by the British authorities, did he decide to carry out Martov's idea. Surely it suffices to consult correspondence of the period; it was not written to serve the ends of controversialists 60 years later.

The other German documents that mention transfers of funds—never of 50 million marks—indicate they were for "revolutionary propaganda," a term used in the vaguest sense. In those days, the Revolutionary Socialist party held center stage. The money seems to have been intended for separatist movements (one of Parvus's fixed ideas, by the way). It benefited primarily intermediaries and parasites. In any case, there is no question of Lenin's having been involved. The peak of the absurd is reached and overtopped in insisting that he was, for the German documents indicate that the most sizable remittances were sent after the October coup. So they were not intended for Lenin or for the Bolsheviks, who had seized

*In English in the original French text of this letter. EDS.

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public bank deposits, nationalized the banks, cleaned out the state coffers, nationalized the Mint, and taken possession of the plates for printing banknotes—in a word, they had at their disposal more money than one would know what to do with.

Furthermore, an appendix to the Treaty of Breast-Litovsk later stipulated that Russia pay Germany a war indemnity of up to 300 million gold rubles. Yet according to the article in *Encounter*, Berlin subventioned the Bolsheviks right up to the end of the war. I have said, and I repeat, here is the wherewithal "to make hens laugh" (a Russian saying).

The *Encounter* article sought support not in the available evidence but in the cogitations of two eminent, trustworthy personages who merit our full consideration. First, Sukhanov; he could not explain to his own satisfaction why Lenin went into hiding after the July 1917 riot. To him it seemed suspect, for, he believed, Lenin was in no danger. Then what was he afraid of? Of having some accounts to render?

Sukhanov was my friend. His wife (Galina Constantinovna, if memory serves me after a half-century) gave me hospitality when I was expelled from the Party and driven from my lodgings in 1924. I helped Sukhanov when, together with Volski, he founded the *Vie économique des Soviets*, in Paris. My sister was his collaborator. And the memory of this martyr I preserve in all affection. This said, I contend that he is in error about Lenin's flight in July on the following grounds: Sukhanov reasoned as a distinguished St. Petersburg intellectual, who was incapable of conceiving that one could inflict harm on a prisoner. He did not put himself inside Lenin's skin when Lenin was obsessed by "implacable" civil war.

We know from several unchallengeable sources that when Lenin returned to Russia, he was convinced he would be arrested en route, then sure he would be imprisoned on arrival. Later, during the troubles, he expected he would be shot, and still later, that he would be assassinated. He invested his opponents with his own terrorist's turn of mind. In a secret letter to Kamenev, in which he asked Kamenev to publish his manuscript on the state, he wrote: "Between us, if they kill me . . ." *(oukokochat)*. The idea haunted him. Sukhanov had no understanding of this terrorist mentality. Hence his mistaken line of reasoning. But that is not all.

Lenin's flight did not follow from his own wishes. One has to know how that milieu functioned: the question was debated secretly by the Central Committee of the Party. Stalin was of the opinion, Roy Medvedev tells us, that Lenin should place himself in the hands of the courts in order to vindicate himself. The majority decided otherwise. This Sukhanov could not know. What's more: the Sixth Party Congress, no more no less, had to confirm the Central Committee's decision.

The reference to Leonard Schapiro deserves, of course, a comment. With all the respect owed this peerless historian, I think that his error on this particular point is of the same order as Sukhanov's. It is the error of a British intellectual who transposes conditions obtaining in England to the Russia of 1917: he cannot conceive how the Bolsheviks were able to publish 41 periodicals without outside help. No doubt he believes that this calls for money to pay for offices, business staff, salaried editorial personnel, plus paper and printing costs. No such thing in the revolutionary storm of 1917. The devotion of the militants, in particular the typographers, made all kinds of improvisations possible. The success of the Bolshevik press is explained simply by its out-and-out pacifist propaganda in a country that could continue the war no longer.

Has Mr. Schapiro tallied the publications of the Mensheviks and the Revolutionary Socialists and analogous groups? The comparison would be interesting. There was a swarm of more or less short-lived news sheets, which had no German money. But there were financial contributions from well-to-do philo-Socialist, pacifist bourgeois who gave generously even if they were not Morozovs. Of interest in this connection is the response of Maxim Gorki to *Pravda's* slanderous charges about the source of funds for *Novaia Jizn* (No. 127 of the paper): it appears in the collection *Untimely Thoughts*. Gorki also was accused of receiving German money. As were my comrades and I in France, in the same circumstances.

To illustrate the point, may I be permitted a personal recollection of Lenin's making fun of French Socialists. He said to us, in the course of a rambling conversation,

> In *la Guerre Sociale* and in *l' Humanité*, I've often read the lists of contributors and come across such remarks as: "For the social revolution, 10 centimes." Hah! These French! Ten centimes for the social revolution! Hah, hah, hah! At home, the workers contribute one day's pay every week or every month to their newspaper! Just think of it: ten centimes for the social revolution! Hah, Hah, Hah!

(I am quoting from memory, of course, but the recollection is accurate.) It's one of the answers to the sempiternal question: Where does the money come from?

In an article dealing with Solzhenitsyn's book, and in particular with his sources, I did not have to discuss Mr. Schapiro's reflections. I mentioned *Encounter* only briefly among several references to texts that attest to the steadfast survival of legends about the sealed railway car and German gold, the one factually correct passage in the London magazine having to do with Lydia Dan, Martov's sister. My task was not to refute everything that touches indirectly on the same subject. Also, Riezler's book is not found among Solzhenitsyn's sources. There was enough to do in dealing with the German documents and the book of Zeman and Scharlau about Parvus—*The Merchant of Revolution*—which was Solzhenitsyn's principal source.

Having devoted 15 pages in *Contrat Social* (Vol. VIII, No. 4, December 1968) to an analysis of the Parvus biography, I am not inclined to begin anew. My review did justice to the authors as the first biographers of Parvus, but it also pointed out manifold errors, contradictions, misleading statements, as well as inadmissable insinuations. In retrospect, I do regret not

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having been more critical, for this book led Solzhenitsyn into error on many scores. However that may be, in the Introduction [to the *Merchant*], there is an embarrassed passage that completely clears Lenin in connection with "German gold." And on page 181, there is another passage that deserves to be quoted once more:

> The Bolshevik groups in Russia took no part in Helphand's [Parvus's] activities. Their cooperation depended on Lenin's consent, and their leader had never given this. Anyway, the Bolshevik underground organization was so weakened by the war that it was hardly in a position to take effective action. . . . Alexander Shlyapnikov, who supervised the Bolshevik organization on Lenin's behalf, has emphatically denied the suspicions that the Bolsheviks cooperated with Helphand at this point of the war. It is impossible to doubt his statement. . . .

Is it going too far to say that these few lines cancel out all the implications, the equivocations, the malicious allusions in the work, which influenced Solzhenitsyn, some of them involving various minor characters who were mixed up in the money affairs but were no part of Lenin's life?

Mr. Carmichael accuses me of having called von Kuhlmann a liar. Every fair-minded reader can verify that it is Sir Lewis Namier (*Avenues of History*, London, 1952) whom I quoted. It must be added that Kuhlmann does not altogether lie except when he credits himself with a role in the October coup. Certainly, he did dispose of funds for propaganda, as did all his counterparts in other countries. He never names Lenin. And as to such funds, generally they are money down the drain, for they have never brought one historic event to pass. I have said again and again that "money is not the measure of all things."

I am replying here to a polemic that entirely disregards the facts, arguments, proofs, quotations, and references that abound in my article. So it is useless to add others, for they would meet the same fate. However, addressing the readers of *Dissent*, I wish to defend the memory of my friend Shlyapnikov, who has been gratuitously insulted with deliberate lack of scruple ["sans-scrupule conscient"]. Shliapnikov was an upright man, a self-reliant spirit; he was not "cementheaded,"* but was endowed with critical intelligence, a person of intellectual and moral integrity. He was among those who resolutely opposed Lenin after the October coup. Later, he inspired the "workers' opposition" with courage and got himself read out of the Party, as a result of which he fell into the clutches of the GPU. His life was devoted entirely to the cause of the workers, and it ended in unspeakable sufferings. In the words of the French adage: "Don't insult him who tries."

As to the verbiage about Trotsky, which is as obscure as it is wanting in substance, I will confine myself to a single categorical denial: in 1921, I had a conversation with Trotsky about the "German gold." He expressed his opinion with persuasive, straightforward indignation and revulsion. When other Soviet citizens were questioned by French delegates who were disturbed by press campaigns at the time, they were astonished, especially that one could still pay any attention to such an old "calumny." Let us not forget that when the travelers arrived in St. Petersburg in their "sealed railway car" (which was not sealed), they were exonerated by the Soviet, which was composed of a large majority of "patriotic" Socialists.

It is not I who "brings up passport formalities" in connection with Radek. Like Hanecki, Radek was an Austrian subject and could not enter Russia: under the Provisional Government, you did not enter Russia the way you walk into a café. The frontier was guarded by French and British officers, there in their capacity as allies, as well as by Russian police. This is an incontrovertible matter of fact. "Facts are stubborn things." Radek was able to enter the country only after the October coup, which in March was unforeseeable. As for Lenin, in March he was still in agreement with Plekhanov and Martov in thinking that the imminent Russian revolution must be a "bourgeois revolution," whereas Trotsky, the theoretician of the "permanent revolution," thought otherwise. Lenin changed his mind when he came to consider the Provisional Government incapable of ending the war. In September he contemplated seizing power. The fictitious remark Radek made to Lenin in March (Solzhenitsyn, p. 266: ". . . six months from now we will either be ministers or we will be hanged") therefore struck me as incongruous even in a novel, and there is nothing in it to feed a base quarrel.

Solzhenitsyn has understood perfectly well, on the other hand, that it would have been impossible for Lenin to accept German subsidies: it would have meant giving up his freedom to choose his own direction and to maneuver, subordinating that freedom to silent partners. Solzhenitsyn writes:

"Should he ask what price the Russian Revolution would have to pay for German help? He refrained from doing so, but kept the question in mind for the future. It would be naive to expect such help for nothing" (p. 160). And further on: "'Let myself be tied to someone else's policy? Not for anything in the world!'" (p. 185).

Solzhenitsyn has read the German documents well and has well understood that they are not compromising for Lenin. At no point does he accept the doctored version of "German gold" paid out to Lenin up until the departure of the "sealed carriage" that was not sealed—i.e., up until April 1917. This date is not mine; it marks the conclusion of *Lenin in Zurich*. On this point, a fresh dispute from my disputant who disputes everything and nothing. There is nothing to quibble about.

What I have challenged about Solzhenitsyn's book is the use he made in it of the *Merchant*, which is a work filled with equivocations, unfounded insinuations, and risky deductions. I questioned the inadequacy of his sources regarding Zimmerwald no less than on the Russian Revolution of 1905. And fearing from certain allusions that in the book to follow the author might venture so far as to permit himself to be influenced by the false "Creel-Sisson" documents and by the genuine Nikitin documents (supplied by the very incompetent

*In English in the original text.

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French espionage service) when no doubt I would no longer be in a condition to comment on them, rightly or wrongly I spoke out in the hope of sparing the great writer's being misled. (The Nikitin documents have to do with business affairs of Parvus, Hanecki & Co.; see *Northern Underground*, Michael Futtrel, London, 1963). The rumors aroused by their business dealings induced the Central Committee of the Party to deprive Hanecki of his position in Stockholm, to Lenin's great displeasure. This decision alone explodes the legend of German gold accepted by the Bolsheviks.

Fair-minded readers who wish to know more will be interested to read the articles of Professor Alfred Senn on "The Myth of German Money During the First World War" and "New Documents on Lenin's Departure" (references previously supplied). Also *My Life as a Rebel*, by Angelica Balabanoff, who also traveled to Russia in a "sealed" (unsealed) train. And my analysis of the *Merchant*, entitled "L'or et le wagon," in *Contrat Social* (Paris, Vol. 7, No. 4, December 1968). I would like to suggest also the serious, circumspect review of the *Merchant* by Leo van Rossum, in the publication of the Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, which I happened upon only very recently.

Above all, it is important to be familiar with Lenin's secret letter to his Stockholm office, written from his hiding place between August 27-30, 1917, when he was expecting the worst. A short passage touches on the matter of money: it is decisive. One can even go so far as to say that these few lines should dispense with having to read the kilos of material about "German gold." The letter, which was recovered long after Lenin's death, appeared only in 1930 in Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. 8. Later, the outline of this letter—or rather, a laconic *aide-memoire*—was found and published, in 1933, also in the *Collected Works* (No. 21). The letter now appears in Lenin's *Complete Works*, Vol. 49. It cannot interest a prejudiced fanatic, but readers in good faith will appreciate it.

It is for them to appreciate no less the unseemly letter that has called forth mine, and to decide to whom are to be applied such choice terms as "effrontery," "fraudulent," "duplicity," "priggishness," "falsifies," "foolishness," "chicanery," "disingenuous," "deceitfulness," and other civilities of an uncommonly elevated mind, not to mention the letter's tone—which, as the French say, makes the message. And may they not overlook the inexpressible "Marxism," which is as out of place as hairs in the soup.

Translated by ADRIENNE FOULKE □

TERROR AND GREED IN ARGENTINA *(continued from page 2)*

transformed the majority of arrests into kidnappings and authorized unlimited torture and summary executions.[1]

In the course of this last year, more than 7,000 habeas-corpus appeals have been rejected. In thousands of other cases of disappearances, the habeas-corpus request has not even been presented, either because the families of the victims know in advance that to do so is futile or because they have not found a lawyer who could act for them—the 50 or 60 qualified members of the bar having been arrested in their turn.

In this way, you have abolished all temporal limits on torture. Since the detained person does not "exist," it is impossible to bring him before a judge within ten days following his arrest, as is required by a law heretofore respected in the darkest repressive periods of earlier dictatorships.

To the elimination of any temporal boundaries on torture must be added the abolition of any limits on the methods employed. One has reverted to the days when victims' limbs and organs were directly attacked—but this time by surgical and pharmacological means that earlier executioners did not have at their disposal. The rack, the wheel, the saw, and the flaying of medieval inquisitors have made their reappearance in victims' testimony, together with the electrified goad (*picana*), the acetylene torch, and *bain forcé*.[2]

The extermination of guerrilla groups is, according to you, the end that justifies all the means to which you have recourse. You have reached the extreme of absolute, intemporal, almost metaphysical torture, inasmuch as the initial objective—to obtain information—gradually fades in the sick minds of the torturers and gives way to a desire to pulverize the very stuff of humanity, to annihilate it, rob it of the dignity

[1] In 1977, the military junta began to publish incomplete lists of persons newly detained and of those "set free," the latter being actually accused who are no longer "at the disposition of the executive power" but who, for all that, remain in prison. The military secrecy surrounding the names of thousands of prisoners creates the conditions necessary for their torture and eventual execution.

[2] The Peronist leader Jorge Lizaso was flayed alive, the former Radical party deputy Mario Amaya was bludgeoned to death, and former Deputy Muniz Barreto's neck was broken with a single blow. A woman who survived torture states: "*Picana* on my arms, hands, thighs, and near my mouth every time I wept or prayed . . . . Every 20 minutes, they opened the door to tell me that they were going to make mincemeat of me with the electric saw one could hear buzzing continually."

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that the torturers themselves have lost. The dignity that you yourselves have lost.

The military junta's refusal to publish the names of arrested persons serves only to conceal the execution of hostages in uninhabited areas or at dawn or on the pretext of fictitious "armed fights" or imaginary "attempts to escape."

"Extremists" have been caught in the act of handing out leaflets in open country or painting slogans on pavements or piling themselves ten at a time into a car that then catches fire . . . . Such stereotyped phrases lifted from a shopworn scenario are obviously not intended to convince anyone; they serve only to forestall possible international reaction to what are in effect massacres. Those in high places know quite well that it is a matter of reprisals carried out on the very terrain where guerrillas have been active.

Seventy people were shot after a bomb exploded in Federal Security headquarters; fifty-five shot after the attack on the Police Department in La Plata; thirty after the attack on the Ministry of Defense; forty at the time of the New Year's massacre that followed on Colonel Castellanos's death; nineteen after the explosion that destroyed the central police offices in Ciudadela. Twelve hundred executions in all, carried out in the course of 300 so-called combats in which not one wounded man was counted in the antigovernment groups, and not one fatality among the forces under your command.

The hostages you take are "guilty" of a collective offense (the very notion of which is rejected by every system of civilized justice), and are helpless to change the course of a policy that has led to the actions for which they are arrested. In the main, they are shop stewards, intellectuals, relatives of guerrillas, unarmed opponents of your government, and even mere suspects who are killed in order to strike a balance in losses, in line with that bizarre doctrine of the body count that was used by the Nazis in Europe and by the invaders of Vietnam.

From just reading military communiqués, it seems evident that guerrillas who are wounded or captured in combat are systematically finished off: to report 600 dead from among guerrilla forces in one year, and only 10 to 15 wounded, constitutes a ratio that has never been noted before in even the most bloody conflicts. This impression is confirmed by reading a press report in clandestine circulation revealing that between December 18, 1976 and February 3, 1977 government forces recorded 23 dead and 40 wounded in 40 real armed encounters, whereas guerrilla units counted 63 dead and not one wounded.[3]

More than 100 prisoners have likewise been struck down during "escape attempts." The version of events supplied by the junta has only one aim: to warn guerrillas and political parties that even "official" political prisoners constitute a kind of "strategic reserve" of hostages of whom military commanders can dispose depending on the course of hostilities, tactical advantage, or a whim of the moment.

This is how General Benjamin Menendez, commander-in-chief of the Land Army Third Corps (Cordoba) won his laurels well before March 24, 1976 with the assassination of Marcos Osatinsky. Then, after the coup d'état, with the death of Hugo Vaca Narvaja and 50 others held in prison, Menendez simply resorted to various "applications" of the "escape law," which he carried out without pity and later talked about without shame.[4]

The murder of Dardo Cabo, arrested in April, 1975, and shot on January 6, 1977, together with seven other prisoners in the zone of the First Army Corps (commanded by General Suarez Mason), shows evidentially that these executions are not "blots" on the record attributable to the "outbursts" of a few hallucinating centurions; they devolve, in fact, from the policy that you map out among your general staffs, that you discuss during your Cabinet meetings, that you impose in your capacity as commanders of the three branches of the armed forces, and that you sanction in your capacity as members of the governing junta.

Since you forbade the release of information about the discovery of corpses, nearly 3,000 people have been secretly massacred. However, a certain

[3] *Cadena Informativa,* Message No. 4, February 1977.

[4] An exact account appears in the letter sent to the Bishop of Cordoba, Monseignor Primatesta, by inmates of the prison where accused persons are confined: "On May 17th, six comrades, on the pretext that they were to be taken to the infirmary, were removed from the prison and shot. The persons involved were Miguel Angel Mosse, José Svagusa, Diana Fidelman, Luis Varon, Ricardo Yung, and Eduardo Hernandez; the Third Corps of the Land Army states that they were killed during an 'attempted escape.' On May 29th, José Pucheta and Carlos Sgadurra were removed from prison; Sgadurra had been tortured to the point where he could no longer stand, for he was suffering from multiple fractures of the lower legs. It was announced later that they had been shot down during an 'attempted escape.'"

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number of cases have come to light, either because they have concerned neighboring countries, or because the genocide involved prominent people, or because the killings aroused horror even among your own troops.[5]

Twenty-five mutilated bodies were washed up on the coast of Uruguay between March and October 1976—a small part of the "cargoes" of torture victims taken to the Navy's School of Mechanics and then thrown into the Rio de la Plata by your warships. Among them, a 15-year-old boy, Floreal Avellaneda, was recovered with his hands and feet bound; according to the autopsy report, his body showed "injuries in the anal area and visible fractures."

In the light of heinous crimes such as these, the definition of war given by one of your military leaders assumes its full meaning: "The fight we are leading recognizes no moral or natural limit; it is beyond good and evil."[6]

These crimes, which revolt the conscience of the civilized world, constitute only a minimal part of the sufferings and the attacks on human rights that you inflict on the Argentine people. It is in the economic policy of your government that one must seek not only the origin of your crimes but an even greater atrocity inflicted on millions of human beings: *planned poverty.*

Within one year, you have reduced workers' salaries by 40 percent. By freezing wages when prices continue to rise, by abolishing every kind of collective bargaining, by forbidding union meetings, by increasing work schedules, by depriving 9 percent of the able-bodied population of jobs,[7] and by contemplating an increase in the number of unemployed by dismissing some 300,000 more workers, you have pushed labor relations back to what they were at the beginning of the industrial era. When workers have tried to protest, you called them "subversives"; you have kidnapped entire committees of union representatives. The corpses of some have been recovered; the others have never been seen again.[8]

The results of this policy have been lightning-like. In the course of the first year under the present government, food consumption decreased by 40 percent; purchases of clothing dropped by more than 50 percent. As for medicines, they have practically vanished from the budget of the poor.

In certain zones of greater Buenos Aires, infant mortality exceeds 30 percent, a figure that brings us down to the level of Rhodesia, Dahomey, or the Guaianas. Such illnesses as summer diarrhea, parasitic diseases, and rabies are on a par with or even exceed the worst world records. To top this—as if you were knowingly pursuing such goals—you have cut the public-health budget to less than one-third of military expenditures; you have closed the free hospitals at a time when hundreds of doctors and technicians are taking to the road of exile, driven by fear or low salaries or so-called rational dismissals.

It's enough to spend a few hours walking about in Buenos Aires to verify with what speed this policy is transforming the city into a vast shantytown of 10 million inhabitants. Some neighborhoods are plunged into half-darkness; entire sections are without water because monopolistic industries pollute the underground water levels; kilometers of streets have been transformed into sloughs because you keep up only the military sectors of town, just as you decorate only the Plaza de Mayo. The widest river in the world, the Rio de la Plata, has been polluted along all its banks because associates of Minister Martinez de Hoz pour their industrial wastes into it; the only measure you have taken with regard to this has been to forbid people to bathe in the river.

As for the abstract goals of the economy, with which you like to regale the "nation," you have scarcely been more fortunate. A decline of nearly 3 percent in the GNP; a foreign-trade deficit soaring to 600 dollars per inhabitant; an annual inflation rate of 400 percent; a decrease of 13 percent in domestic capital investments—here again are some world records, the strange fruits of cold calculation and total incompetence.

At a time when all creative and protective organs

[5] According to the newspapers, 63 corpses were discovered in the early days of the military regime. A yearlong projection yields the figure of 1,500 victims. This figure could be doubled, for since January 1976 information available in newpapers has been incomplete. A plausible overall estimate of the junta's victims is 600 killed in combat; 1,300 shot; 2,000 executed secretly and others, 100; total: 4,000.

[6] According to the June 12, 1976 issue of the newspaper *La Razon,* Lieutenant-Colonel Hugo Pascarelli, Commander of the First Artillery Group in Ciudadela, was responsible for 33 executions between January 5 and February 3, 1977.

[7] From the newspaper *Clarin.*

[8] Among the labor leaders who have been illegally confined are Mario Aguirre, of the Public Administration Union; Jorge di Pasquale, Pharmaceutical Union; Oscar Smith, Light and Power Union. Kidnapping and murder of union leaders have affected particularly the metallurgical and naval shipyard unions.

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of the government are atrophying and threatening to collapse from anemia pure and simple, only one continues to grow and to acquire an ever increasing degree of automony: 1.8 billion dollars—the equivalent of half the value of the country's exports—was allocated in 1977 to the budget of the Department of Defense and Security. In the Federal Police, 4,000 new jobs were created and 1,200 more in the Police of the Province of Buenos Aires, at salaries double that of a worker and three times that of a school principal. As for military salaries, starting in February 1977, they were secretly increased by 120 percent. All this goes to prove that there is no such thing as a freeze on wages, nor is there any unemployment in the kingdom of torture and death—the one sector of the national work scene where the GNP is still rising, and where the quotation on a liquidated guerrilla goes up more rapidly than that on the dollar.

The junta's policy, which is dictated by the International Monetary Fund according to a formula applied indiscriminately to Zaire, Chile, Uruguay, or Indochina, has as its sole beneficiaries the old land-owning oligarchy, the new oligarchy of speculators, and a group of international monopolies that includes, at the head of the list, ITT, Esso, the big automobile companies, U.S. Steel, and Siemens, to which Martinez de Hoz and the members of his Cabinet have close ties.

If a massive propaganda campaign—the deformed reflection of these countless crimes—did not claim that the junta is seeking peace, that General Videla is defending human rights, and that Admiral Massera respects human life, it would be possible to ask the Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the armed services to reflect for a moment on the abyss toward which they are leading the country on the pretext of eliminating the guerrillas. It is an illusory elimination, for even if the last of the guerrillas were struck down, the war would only begin anew in new forms: the causes that have sparked the resistance of the Argentine people for more than 20 years would not disappear, indeed would be aggravated by the memory of the massacres and atrocities that have been committed.

These are the reflections that, on this first anniversary of their baneful government, I have wanted to put before the members of the junta, with no hope of being heeded—rather with the certainty of being harried, but faithful nonetheless to the pledge I made long long ago: to bear witness in difficult times.

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Translated, from the French, by ADRIENNE FOULKE. □

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Michael Harrington

Full Employment & Social Investment

We print below the final third, largely self-sufficient, of a new pamphlet issued by the Institute for Democratic Socialism, 853 Broadway, New York City 10003. Readers who might wish to have the entire pamphlet should send $1, plus 25¢ for mailing charges, to the Institute—not, please, to Dissent.—EDS.

The democratization of the investment process is the key to a socialist strategy for full employment during the short and medium term.

In saying this, I do not suggest that we socialists have "the" answer. There is no such thing. But we do have an analysis that points public policy toward our common goal and makes it possible to begin exploring workable solutions. In outlining a few of them I cannot here cover all significant areas. For instance, the UAW contract negotiations in 1976 opened a campaign for the four day week. Here and now, that is an important tool for achieving full employment. In the middle distance, it poses the question of the very nature of work. We are not, after all, in favor of everyone having "a" job—any job—without regard to its impact on the individual and the society. We want to create an economy of meaningful, useful work. And in the longer run, as I have argued in my book, *Socialism*, we should try to emancipate more and more people from compulsory labor altogether, so that all may have the time to develop a full, multi-faceted personality.

Such themes could serve as the basis for a book-length discussion. But within the space limitations of a pamphlet, I must focus on those aspects of a socialist program that are most clearly and urgently related to the central demands of the full employment movement in this country.

The people versus the corporate minority

There are three reasons why democratic control of investment, while not the totality of a solution to our crises, is absolutely essential to it. *First, such a strategy is necessary to make the elected government of the people independent of the economic veto power of a corporate minority.*

I raised this point earlier in discussing the transition from candidate Jimmy Carter, a quasi-populist who spoke boldly of jobs for all and radical tax reform, to President Jimmy Carter, a leader who often seemed to subordinate everything to "winning the confidence" of the businessmen his coalition had defeated at the ballot box. The simplifications of the Phillips curve espoused by Mr. Carter, I argued, were poor descriptions of reality but excellent rationalizations of the corporate program for America. Let us now examine why Carter accepts the premises of his defeated opponents.

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In March, 1977, the columnists Evans and Novak reported that Bert Lance, then Carter's most intimate personal confidant as well as his budget director, met with "28 representatives of financial institutions aggregating $100 billion in investment power." "Lance's rhetoric," Evans and Novak said, "was as impeccably orthodox as William Simon's, if not Andrew Mellon's; the Carter Administration sees the route to recovery led by investors not consumers." The assembled executives from Morgan Guaranty, Lehman Brothers, the Oppenheimer Fund and other such companies responded, Evans and Novak commented, like "barricudas," demanding even more concessions from Carter.

Jobs as corporate supplements

So it was that Irving S. Shapiro of DuPont, perhaps the most prestigious corporate spokesperson in the country, described the political situation in 1977 in this way: "A new attitude is taking hold in Washington. It has been gaining momentum for some time. We hit a low point in the past when political rhetoric put business in the role of enemy of the people, but since then there has been a growing awareness that this sort of thing makes no sense. . . . President Ford knew this and it is clear that President Carter knows it. . . . He and his staff people have been sending out the signal that the nation should rely more on the private sector and be less dependent on the government."

It might be argued that Jimmy Carter never was a traditional liberal and perhaps his ideological transformation as President only marks a reversion to type. But the liberals are trapped in the same blind alley. Hubert Humphrey, explaining the job training feature of his full employment bill, says: "Federally funded job training, job placement, public works and facilities projects and public employment programs are included in the bill *as supplements to help meet private sector labor needs* and to *temporarily* provide jobs to fill the gap between private sector performance and the employment goals of the legislation" (emphasis added). In a similar vein, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan explained to his colleagues that the low rate of private investment in America was preparing the way for a drastic relative drop in our standard of living compared to that of our capitalist competitors. The problem is, Moynihan said, "that the economic return from investment has not been high enough. . . ." So, Moynihan concluded in defending his proposal for a special investment tax credit, he is for "an interest free loan to business in areas of high unemployment." And that man was elected with AFL-CIO support.

Jobs: for workers or for corporations?

How do we explain Moynihan's advocacy of a view identical with that of William Simon? Why did Humphrey insist that public sector employment must be a temporary supplement to private sector employment?

Essentially because they are content to leave the basic economic power—control over investment—in corporate hands. And as long as private corporations control the investment process in this country, the future of full employment inevitably will be decided in their board rooms, not in the Congress. If the elected representatives of the people pass a socially oriented law and the unelected representatives of capital refuse to cooperate, the law is effectively vetoed.

The out-and-out conservatives understand this, and they sincerely believe that if only the government will guarantee the private sector its profits, but otherwise leave business alone, all will turn out for the best. Liberals rightly reject this Adam Smith notion of harmony. They want Washington to push aggressively for the social priorities which the companies slight, ignore or undermine. But they do so *within* the framework of a corporate

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dominated system. In order to win the support of the executives, they must adapt to corporate values and priorities.

This is where a specifically socialist analysis becomes particularly relevant. As long as control over investment is in corporate hands, just so long will the most liberal government imaginable have to ransom itself to its political opponents in order to win their economic cooperation. The core of this problem is not to be found in the personal characteristics of liberals, and especially not in the preposterous (and arrogant) assumption that liberals are corrupt while those to their left are pure. Individuals may or may not be seduced by power, but the massive movements of American society are to be understood in terms of corporate domination, not as a drama of individual psyches.

Corporate decisions promote inequality

So the first reason for making democratic control of the investment process a central demand is that structural challenges to and changes in the private control of investment are the preconditions for the political possibility of making full employment the nation's decisive priority. *The second reason is that government economic policy, in an economy in which corporations are in charge of investment decisions, promotes inequality. This is wrong in terms of simple justice; it is also a source of the deficient buying power of the majority and therefore a major impediment to full employment.*

Conservatives have become remarkably—indeed indiscreetly—candid about their demands. They openly demand a reactionary socialization of investment on behalf of the rich, an approach which has such perverse clarity that it is almost the mirror image of a basic socialist strategy for full employment. John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson both handed out lavish subsidies to the private sector but they did so within the context of policies which also sought to increase mass consumption. The program of the Seventies conservatives, on the contrary, urges that capital become the dominant and all-embracing priority of the society. The Right is now talking openly about what has been happening all along.

Wages versus capital gains

Ironically, a great impetus to this development came from a liberal economist, William Nordhaus, who is now a member of the Carter Council of Economic Advisors. In an influential 1974 article, Nordhaus argued that there had been a significant fall in the after-tax share of profits in the national income, beginning in 1967. This thesis was picked up and embroidered by the conservatives. The New York Stock Exchange published an analysis designed to show that the Federal government must cut back its outlays, that "excessive current consumption" must be curbed, and that there should be more tax handouts for capital gains income, i.e. for the corporate rich. If this were not done, the society would not have the wherewithal to meet its needs and there would be a "savings gap" of $645 million by 1985. As *Business Week* made the point, there must be changes in the tax system which "would provide greater incentives for savings and investment and greater disincentives for consumption." Big business should get more; the people should get less.

The Chase Manhattan Bank took up the cry in a series of ads which threatened the nation with seventeen million unemployed in 1985 unless there was more preferential treatment for the unearned income of the wealthy. *The Wall Street Journal* wrote gloomy editorials predicting that huge Federal deficits would "crowd" private capital out of the money market. And Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon told the House Ways and Means Committee that the ratio of profits to GNP, when cor-

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rected for depreciation and the replacement cost of inventories, had actually turned negative. In other words, America was committing the most heinous of capitalist sins: it was living off its capital.

The most striking aspect of this conservative theory is that its method contradicts hallowed conservative principles. According to the traditional free enterprise doctrine it is impossible for a capital shortage to exist. The market, it is said, accurately prices investment funds. If the society really needs them then interest will be high enough to motivate people to save rather than to consume. In effect, the conservatives now reject this notion. Rather they establish planners' goals: they decide what the society "ought" to have in 1985, and figure out how much it will cost. Then, in a series of highly speculative projections, they estimate the amount of savings that will be available and discover the "gap." Finally, they casually suggest that Washington should fill this gap—that the public sector should provide the private sector its risk capital by lowering taxes on unearned income and raising the levies on earned income!

Socialism for the wealthy

Thus does conservatism embrace socialist methods for its own reactionary purposes. And it seems to work. Washington, in fact, intervenes massively into the investment process, the national pieties about "free enterprise" to the contrary notwithstanding. We have already seen how this is true in the area of energy policy where governmental subordination to corporate priorities led, at the cost of hundreds of billions of tax dollars, to a social disaster. The same holds, we have seen, in the handouts to agribusiness. One more example, chosen from among a multitude of inequities, should further illustrate this point.

Tax policy, as it is now conceived, is not simply an instrument for collecting money in order to pay for government services. It is also a key instrument for the management of the entire economy, with deficits used for stimulus and surpluses for restraint. This practice emerged fully during the Kennedy-Johnson Presidencies when Washington began to use the budget as its major tool for promoting full employment. Table IV shows one disturbing aspect of what this has meant over a decade and a half.

TABLE IV

FEDERAL BUDGET RECEIPTS
By Major Source—Per Cent Distribution

	1960	1965	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 (Est.)
Personal Income Taxes	44.0	41.8	44.7	46.5	46.7	45.8	45.4	44.4	44.9	42.2
Corporation Income Taxes	23.2	21.8	18.7	19.5	16.9	14.2	15.4	15.6	14.6	13.8
Social Insurance Taxes and Contributions	15.9	19.1	22.5	21.3	23.4	25.8	23.8	27.8	28.9	30.9
Customs, Estate and Gift Taxes	2.9	3.6	3.3	3.1	3.1	3.4	4.2	3.5	3.2	3.1
Miscellaneous Receipts	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.8	2.0	1.7	1.7	2.0	2.8

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1976.

As a source of Federal revenue, personal income taxes fluctuated quite modestly. But corporation taxes were dramatically reduced—almost halved—while social insurance taxes (mainly Social Security) were nearly dou-

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bled. The problem is that Social Security taxes are the most regressive Federal tax since they only cover a portion of the income of the middle class and the rich but are set at 100% of the income of working people and the poor. So the way in which Washington stimulated the economy was by increasing the inequality of the tax system.

This trend, however, is not merely the result of the reactionary politics of the decision makers (though this was obviously a factor during the Nixon and Ford years). It is an inherent tendency of the system which asserts itself even when liberals are in power. Since capitalism leaves it to private individuals and corporations to make the social decision of how the national surplus shall be invested, those individuals and corporations must have an enormous and disproportionate share of society's wealth. That is why, as Chart I (Page 10) showed the wages of the workers constantly lag behind their productivity, for a portion of what they produce is being appropriated by the wealthy. Therefore, when the government wants to stimulate the economy, it is "natural" to give privileges to the upper strata and hope that something will trickle down to the masses. This is not *a* policy of capitalist society; it is *the* policy. It not so incidentally makes full employment all the more difficult to achieve, since the stunted buying power of the people periodically can't purchase the output of publically subsidized private investment. Inequality, then, is built into the system; given private control of the investment process, government policy inevitably promotes it. This is the second reason why private control must be challenged.

Public needs versus private ends

The third reason why corporate domination of investment must be challenged has to do with what gets produced.

In 1974 Cadillacs were turned out and bought by the affluent in great numbers while workers making cars for ordinary consumers—who couldn't afford them—were being laid off. The system overbuilt Florida condominiums and Las Vegas casinos while construction workers in the Northeast lived under depression conditions and central cities rotted away.

Private investment decisions are based on where private profit is most readily maximized. Corporate investors cannot be counted on to arrest the rot in cities, to erect decent homes, to improve public transportation, to provide adequate health maintenance—in short to substitute public needs for private ends. And tax cuts designed to "stimulate" the economy simply increase the corporate power to make anti-social decisions. Investment tax credits are used by the private sector to mechanize and automate jobs out of existence—in the name of full employment. And income tax cuts buy goods and services in a market rigged by advertising that encourages the installment buying of consumer trash.

Thus, for all the modifications of American capitalism, private decisions designed to maximize profit still guide public policy and determine the collective fate of the society. And the reason this happens is that corporations control the crucial economic function—the investment process. The crises of the Seventies have put the nation on notice that it cannot tolerate this arbitrary condition much longer. That is why the people must move to control the investment process—to control it democratically for social ends. *To do that, there must be democratic national planning.*

Democratic national planning

Do socialists then propose that Washington make all of the investment decisions for this gigantic economy?

It would indeed be disastrously inefficient to centralize everything in a "command economy." Moreover, such a policy would carry within itself the seeds of totalitarian domination by a new class of bureaucrats, some-

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thing which can be seen in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. The challenge is to get democratic planning that develops appropriate definitions of efficiency yet gives the proper weight to social loss and gain, something that the private profit criterion does not, and cannot, do.

Let me give a specific example of what that might mean, a measure which could be adopted during the next ten years given the political will. It is, remember, only an example of one structural reform, not a description of an alternative social system (though it moves us in that direction). In the United States everyone has the right to present his or her views on various issues. Congressional committees and government commissions descend on an area and a stream of witnesses are heard. Today these hearings are dominated by well-financed and tightly organized lobbies that, more likely than not, are already tied in with the bureaucracy. Independent challenges of the bureaucracy's proposals are handicapped by lack of access to relevant data and knowhow. The hearings become travesties of the democratic procedure.

Expertise for the people

There is an alternative to this scene. The law setting up a democratic planning mechanism should provide that any significant group of citizens has the right to the resources that will enable it to develop its own serious counter-plan. That could be done in one of two ways. Such groups could be given access to the government's own planning technology, requiring, for instance, that Washington compute the consequences of a three-day week as well as of its own proposal for four days. Or funds could be made available to such groups to hire their own experts and computers.

A socialist concept of planning also envisions democratization within the enterprise itself. In large economic units, say a publicly-owned factory, there would be worker representation at every level where decisions are made, from the shop floor to the board of directors. Socialists also see an extremely important role for cooperatives in medium-sized and smaller units. In all these cases, there would be a democratic input into the formulation of the plan from the representatives of those who would actually carry it out. Obviously, there would have to be national economic priorities and each factory or cooperative could not be a law unto itself.

Thus far I have concentrated with ways of making planning democratic. What about the content of any plan? Obviously, the people would decide. But there are relevant guidelines which socialists would urge in the open debate which is central to this proposal.

Expanding the non-profit sector

There must be a vast expansion of the non-profit sector.

Probably no aspect of democratic socialist theory is more systematically, and sometimes maliciously, misunderstood. In part, this is because the enemies of socialism equate non-profit property with centralized, bureaucratic national ownership of the entire economy. That, as I have already noted, socialists reject. The non-profit sector includes publicly owned industries with decentralized decision structures including worker participation at all levels; an expansion of cooperatives; neighborhood enterprises; and individual efforts.

In addition, there is the pervasive American dogma that masquerades as common sense: private, corporate property is the only form of productive property. Never mind that private, profit-maximizing control of the oil industry has been socially disastrous. Against any and all evidence, many Americans *know* that private property is good and public property bad. And the second part of that equation is often rigged so that it turns out to

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be true. Because of the irrational prejudice against non-profit enterprise, such undertakings are normally designed for failure in America. In what follows, then, I am not simply presenting a socialist doctrine, but the empirical case for non-profit property.

Social funds for social use

Serious full employment planning must rest on expansion of the non-profit sector for three practical reasons.

First, this is the best way to guarantee that social funds will actually be put to social use. In the Kennedy, Johnson and Carter Administrations, as we have seen, a liberal version of "trickle-down" prevailed. You give the corporations and the rich privileges on the assumption that they are motivated to share their good fortune with the working people and the poor. Here, to take an example from the Carter Administration, is the comment of a "key member of the White House domestic staff" as quoted by the *Wall Street Journal*: "We presume in this administration that government simply doesn't have the resources to create long-term employment in these [older city] areas. . . . So to reverse the tide, we must find ways to make the private sector change its locational prejudices. With the right kind of incentives—for instance, low interest loans and other things we're working on—we are convinced we can induce the private sector to make business decisions it wouldn't make without these incentives."

The fallacy in this approach is exposed in the very effort to justify it. The "natural"—profit maximizing–tendency of business is to avoid old city areas. The incentives therefore run counter to what the corporations really want to do. They'll take the money but, following the ethic of private enterprise, try to shape and skew the public intervention so that it meets their private purposes. The most egregious example is when investment tax credits designed to spur employment are used to buy labor-saving machinery. And then there was the experience under Lyndon Johnson's JOBS program where companies took subsidies to hire workers they would have hired anyway.

Such "ethics" cannot prevail with non-profit property. If, for example, it was democratically decided to develop the Northeast railroads under public ownership as part of a program to make that area the center of a new solar energy industry, the money could not be diverted to any other purpose. Non-profit property, then, is the best way of ensuring that funds allocated for a social purpose will actually be used for that purpose.

Capitalism's creeping socialism

Secondly, it is essential to understand that private entrepreneurial ownership on an Adam Smith model is not the alternative to non-profit property. Under the conditions of late capitalism, the government is already engaged in underwriting–and in a sense socializing–the losses and risk capital of the giant corporations. (Small businesses are, however, still allowed to go under.) For example, Washington is, in effect, nationalizing broken-down, losing railroad lines while permitting the profitable systems to make even more money. Moreover, as I have already documented, business wants tax revenues to provide it with cash for investment. And, *Business Week* reported, in 1976 the government was paying for 62% of the nation's research and development, the results of which are turned over to the corporations for private exploitation. There are proposals on the boards to provide one hundred billion in easy money for the energy industry so that it can correct the calamities it did so much to generate.

Therefore the question is not, as corporate ideologists often pretend, whether Washington will keep its hands off the private sector. Big business wants the government to intervene, but only to federalize risks and losses,

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and not to shape the profits or take part in the decision making. The real issue, then, is whether the people of the United States are going to receive any equity for the billions they are plowing into the economy. Getting such a return is obviously a matter of simple justice; it is, as well, a precondition for democratic planning.

Non-profit property could give the public control of the surplus its investments had generated. Therefore the elected representatives of the people would not be afraid of the economic blackmail known as building "business confidence."

Planning away the roller coaster

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, expansion of the non-profit sector is an absolutely essential weapon in the struggle to eliminate the business cycle. There can be, as we have seen, no effective planning in a roller coaster economy. But the fluctuations derive, precisely, from the fact that profit-maximizing decisions dominate the economy and call for periodically disastrous non-allocations of resources. A non-profit sector would not have to behave in this way.

Does this mean that the non-profit sector would keep people at work on enterprises that don't pay their own way? Sometimes that might be done as a matter of conscious policy, i.e. the society could decide to subsidize some losses in order to achieve large social gains. But there are obviously limits to such practices. There must be a surplus in each year's annual production. How, then, would the non-profit sector be able to act differently from the corporate sector of today and be solvent at the same time?

Planning for non-profit solvency

Before this question can be answered, a critical distinction has to be made. *All* dynamic economies must produce a surplus to take care of depreciation and new investment. Even the most primitive agriculturists do not eat their seed corn. But that primordial necessity is not the same as the specific form which the surplus takes under capitalism (and only under capitalism): private profit. And this is even more obvious under current conditions when gigantic multinationals dictate their profit rates to the market. In 1974-75, General Motors did not throw people out of work because that was the only way to maintain its profits. It fired workers and raised prices, as we have seen, as part of a strategy to maintain profits *at a targetted level*. Those levels are fixed without regard to social consequences and without any necessary relation to efficiency. They are designed to avoid take-overs; to enhance the reputations of managers; to finance speculative adventures in unrelated industries—as when oil companies recently bought out both Montgomery Ward and the Ringling Brothers circus.

A non-profit enterprise would also have to yield a surplus (or rather the totality of such enterprises would have to), but it would not have to define that surplus in an anti-social way. A publicly owned auto industry, for example, could have maintained high employment, satisfied a social need, *and* recovered enough for depreciation and socially useful, democratically determined investment such as in mass transit.

Socially useful surplusses

This completely practical kind of planning is already being done. It enabled the Swedish socialists, governing in an economy which is 90% privately owned, to escape the recession of 1974-75. In good times, the government requires companies to pay a tax into a special account in the state bank. In periods of potential downturn, the company had the choice of either using that money for new, job-generating investments or surrendering it as a tax. And similarly, the government, with full employment its top priority, was able to get business to produce for stockpiles during what would "normally" be a crisis. As a result, there was no crisis. And there is no dictatorship in Sweden.

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In the United States, democratic planning and non-profit enterprise must operate in a hostile atmosphere and therefore the results of such efforts are more likely to be mixed. The Tennessee Valley Authority provides a concrete demonstration of the way in which regional planning can have enormously positive results. Per capita income in the Valley—which includes parts of seven states—rose from 44% of the national average in 1933, when TVA began, to 79% in 1976. TVA itself is now the largest utility in the country. But at the same time the Authority has been suffused by corporate values. In the early Fifties it moved from hydroelectric power toward steam and over the years underwrote strip mining of Appalachia by anti-union companies and further desecrated the environment by burning low quality coal. In other words, a publicly-owned enterprise does not inevitably follow societal priorities, not in the U.S. today. The point is to get the efficiencies but to subject the institution to truly popular, democratic control.

TVA demonstrates that huge, centralized private corporations are not the only instruments that can deal with the energy crisis. The Seven Sisters have not done so well with the world's oil that they should also be given the sun. Using the lessons of TVA, the Northeast should be developed, on a non-profit basis, as the solar energy center of the nation. This would mean jobs in an area of heavy unemployment by the development of a solar technology that could be operated at the community level. And it might provide an opportunity for the emergence of cooperative property as part of the solution to the crisis.

Paying for non-profit enterprise

How do we pay for these enterprises?

In considerable measure, they will pay for themselves. An efficient national rail network—which is unthinkable under private auspices—would produce high revenues because it would meet real needs in an environmentally benign, energy-saving way. National health security, funded through progressive taxation and operated by local units with community representation on all boards, would provide a valuable service at less cost than we pay now.

Secondly, socialists favor a society which is much more egalitarian than the present one. This is not only an ethical goal. It is also the basis of a full employment policy that would see increasing the buying power of the masses as the engine of economic development. It is precisely the restricted ability of the majority to consume that creates the conditions for a crisis of "overproduction" in the midst of underconsumption. Guaranteeing that majority the right to get enough is a central strategy for putting everyone to work.

Moreover, the expansion of the non-profit sector would undermine the rationale for maldistributed wealth. The only serious claim that the corporate rich can now assert is that their concentrations of money are necessary to the investment process. But as that process progressively comes more and more under democratic control, that faulty rationale loses even the semblance of a justification. The institution that could accomplish the work of redistribution is already in existence: the Internal Revenue Service. It now functions to discriminate in favor of the upper class. It can be programmed to serve the majority.

Pension funds for social investment

Thirdly, there is one area in which the Swedish socialists have pioneered and another in which they may be on the verge of a breakthrough. In Sweden, the pension system is the prime source of investment funds for the housing industry. In the United States, pension funds, even those set

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up by the most progressive unions, tend to be invested according to standard corporate priorities. For instance, one serious estimate figures that 40% of all corporate debt capital, and 25% of corporate equity, is now owned by public employee retirement funds. There is no reason why these monies cannot be put to social use. The business economist, Peter Drucker, claims that "pension fund socialism" exists in America because those monies are already so important to the investment process. The problem is, the "owners" of these pension funds have a totally passive relationship to them. They "own" them in the same way that a depositor at a savings bank "owns" the bank. But Drucker's slick argument for defending a bastion of the capitalist ethic could be taken seriously. There could be a pension fund socialism—without the quotation marks.

The Swedes have already moved in that direction. And now the Swedish labor movement is seeking to extend that concept to all of industry. According to the "Meidner Plan" every corporation will be required to place a portion of its profits, in the form of shares in the company, in an employee controlled fund with an elected board of directors. At the end of a given period of time, that fund would become the majority stockholder and the workers' representatives would make the basic policy decisions.

It is, then, quite possible to outline a plausible alternative to the present American system in which private corporations make investment decisions on the basis of a profit calculus which results in a business cycle. The funds for such investments would be more plentiful under democratic socialization than they are now. Their uses would be democratically determined on the basis of need and the people would be guaranteed an effective right of participation. Everything would not be centralized under Washington and non-profit property would take many forms, the public corporation only one among them.

Short term programs need long term goals

It is obvious that these ideas, reasonable and logical as they are, far exceed the bounds of the politically possible in American society today, and must be regarded as long term goals. In that case, why discuss them in a pamphlet addressed to a mass movement seeking immediate gains in employment? First, because the actual program of that movement already moves in the direction of the long-term goals. Second, and much more important is because that immediate program will work only if its proponents are ready and willing to take it to a much more radical conclusion.

Consider how the existing movement already points toward the long-term goal of structural change.

Non-profit sector is a must

The full employment coalition insists that every man and woman has a right to a job. But it is clear to all that the private economy will not fulfill that right. The economists of a liberal Administration admit as much and are explaining that this failure is a necessity for the system. So the movement is already committed to the expansion of public sector employment. But here it runs into the prejudice I have just defined. The public sector is thought of as second rate, inferior, its jobs a stopgap designed to give way to private employment as soon as possible. As long as this irrational dogma prevails—as long as the public sector is often programmed into inferiority, or worse—the immediate full employment program cannnot be realized.

There is a related point. The full employment coalition favors direct social spending rather than trickle down spending. But here again, the immediate program runs into the stonewall of corporate hostility to such social expenditures. That has already been a severe, and limiting, constraint for the Carter Administration. Unless this principled issue is resolved in favor of social spending, the full employment efforts are doomed.

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Social spending is a must

Third, the coalition has already moved in the direction of asserting democratic social control over investment. Credit allocation is an important example. There is the campaign against "red lining," i.e. savings banks refusing to invest money in the very neighborhoods in which they raise it. Community activists want banks to extend credit to areas of desperate need instead of sending funds to the anti-labor South, and even to the Third World. Arguing along the same lines, labor in the building trades, which are suffering from a depression, seeks Federal regulations requiring that credit be allocated to specific social uses, such as building new housing.

Social control is a must

Then there is the proposal made by the United Auto Workers and other unions which would deny corporations the right simply to leave town when higher profits beckon in some sweatshop area of the nation or the world. And there have been serious suggestions about putting employee and public representatives on the boards of major corporations in order to monitor price, technology and plant location decisions. Those choices are now much too important to be left to corporate executives seeking maximum profit. Such demands are, in effect, demands for democratic social control over the investment process.

Let me generalize these instances. If one thinks of corporate property not as a single "thing," but as a bundle of rights—the right to decide prices, to hire and fire, to move a plant, to start new products, and so on—then these various initiatives of the existing full employment movement could be thought of as proposals for "partial socialization." They do not challenge corporate property as such, but they encroach upon its prerogatives. On practical, non-socialist grounds, the coalition finds itself pointed in the direction of socialist structural reforms without defining them in these terms.

Why then insist that a movement go all the way? Why not be satisfied with immediate reforms now and talk about more basic change at some future date? The experience of the New Deal suggests an answer.

During the Thirties, as I pointed out earlier, business was in disarray and still clinging to pre-Keynesian concepts which were hostile to government intervention per se. On the other hand, the workers were making the most rapid, significant advance in their history. Richard Hofstadter went so far as to invest the New Deal with a "social democratic tinge." But the New Deal's liberal reforms turned out to be the salvation of capitalism. World War II taught patriotic businessmen that "cost plus" contracts were not socialism but subsidized capitalism.

Later, in the Eisenhower years and during the Kennedy-Johnson Administration, corporate Keynesianism became a massive trend, one that liberals had to adapt to. And in the Seventies we saw ideologues like William Simon come up with the reactionary socialization of investment on behalf of the corporations.

The long run can be sidetracked

This, again, is the reason why Jimmy Carter is considerably different from candidate Jimmy Carter: he is confronted by the veto power of corporations with a program of their own for extensive government intervention into the economy for the greater glory of private profit.

Our brief history yields an extremely important proposition: as long as the basic structures of the system are not transformed, just so long will liberal reforms, even bold and militant reforms won by a mass movement, eventually be co-opted by the corporate power which pervades this economy. It is ironic that big business, which fought the New Deal tooth and

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nail, benefitted more from its achievements than did the vast popular movement that struggled and sacrificed to bring them about.

This does not mean that socialists disdain immediate reforms, particularly if they are the work of people in motion. They support them enthusiastically. But socialists seek to orient those reforms toward the structural changes which alone will allow them to have their intended effect.

The long run is now

In short, the long run is now. In recent decades, the American economy has become even more dominated by corporate power than ever before. That is the basic reason for our unprecedented plight of simultaneous recession and inflation. So full employment, which was once only a liberal demand within the system, is now a much more radical goal, requiring structural changes of the system. That does not mean that instant socialism is the only answer to all our problems. There is no such thing. It does mean that the full employment coalition must fight for democratic planning, for a broadened and improved public sector, for a redistribution of wealth by taking the rich off the dole in the Internal Revenue Code, and so on. We socialists will struggle alongside people of every persuasion in this battle. We set no ideological preconditions for our participation. And, at the same time, we say candidly that the radical reforms which are necessary if we are to have full employment point toward a new society in which a democratized economy will be totally at the service of human need. □

NOTEBOOK *(continued from page 97)*

its hearers. The danger, however, is not that he won't listen but that he will. How can he be so confident of his capacity to respond only on his own terms? That is, of his capacity not to respond? That is, of his incapacity to respond? Probably he misjudges himself. Surely, he misjudges the masters.

Let us imagine him toward the end of the day, sitting alone in his office, musing over his meeting with the Shah, and turning the pages of a document that will authorize the shipment to Iran of the 10,000 pieces of hardware that the Shah has requested.

He leans back in his chair briefly, his eyes closed, and notices a lovely tune coming from the speaker. He listens with interest for a moment, then reaches for Susan's pile of cards. Mozart, *String Quintet in G Minor*, K. 516, he learns. Wonderful. Mozart, the thinking man's best musical friend. Order, clarity, depth. He has no reservations at all as he gives himself to Mozart, for whatever Mozart has in mind. The fact is that Mozart, in the *G Minor Quintet*, has considerably more than order and clarity on his mind, and whatever that poignant more is he pours it out to Jimmy Carter, and Jimmy Carter hears it, and his eyes mist, his soul stirs, his heart contracts, and then expands—and, as the third movement Adagio concludes, he signs the document for the Shah's tanks, rifles, radar equipment, whatever, having changed the number of pieces from 10,000 to 100,000.

Who is to understand what happened here? Was it a gesture of extravagant generosity inspired perhaps by Mozart's meditations on grief and yearning? Or simply a clerical mistake—who can count zeros at a time like this? There is no way to tell, and undoubtedly the extra zero will be spotted—and deleted—in another office along the way, so that no tarnish will collect on the good name of Mozart.

Still, this is clearly a risky business.

Mr. Carter has recently completed a speed-reading course, enabling him to process, much more rapidly than before, the many documents that require his attention. Perhaps it would be profitable for him now to enroll in a speed-listening program, so that his daily dose of music could be run through the loudspeakers doubletime for, say, four or five hours a day, assuring him at least another four or five hours of the random rustlings of an imperfect silence, in which his thoughts—on matters large and small—might be shaped by nothing more or less than their own content, where their lyricism or profundity or munificence would issue from the mind of the thinker himself, not from his sound system. □

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A Public Service Message from the American Income Life Insurance Company—Executive Offices, Waco, Texas—Bernard Rapoport, Chairman of the Board.

Progress

By Bernard Rapoport

Notes for a talk given at the MINNESOTA AFL-CIO Meeting—Hotel Kahler, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Tuesday, October 5, 1976. (Continued from the last issue.)

Let me cite a most poignant example. I was privileged to sit in on a meeting one time with the representatives of members from thirteen underdeveloped countries. We were talking about the plight of their people and the subhuman conditions under which they existed (note that I didn't use the word "live").

Some of the Americans in the group said: Well, we just need to supply you with more tractors . . . more scientific machinery. To the surprise of some of the members, the response from some representing the underdeveloped countries was: We have plenty of that kind of equipment, we just don't know how to operate the machinery.

I submitted to the group the idea that here in America we almost have come to the conclusion that work is onerous, and what they had in plentiful supply was labor. . . . I continued that what they needed were simple implements; such as hoes, rakes, etc., and that they needed technical people to show them how to make efficient use of the land in combination with the plentiful labor supply we had.

In other words, they were very short on capital and very long on labor supply. It really doesn't take a genius to figure out what their problem and their needs are.

For too long, we have looked at science and innovation to solve our problems and both are harnessed to the goals of saving labor and using more land and capital to do it.

Here we are . . . short of natural resources, recognizing now more than ever before the finiteness of the scarcity of natural resources, and using up what we can't replace and letting lie idle—workers, that is—those whose energy is regenerated on a daily basis. All you and I have to do to have as much energy tomorrow as we do today is to eat and sleep properly.

Mason Gafney, who is an English economist, says:

> "Along with short work we face a swelling array of derivative evils: crime, alienation, protracted apprenticeship periods, soaring welfare and dependency, frustration of idle housewives, forced early retirement, geriatric ghettos, imperialism to make jobs and acquire raw materials, weapons constituencies, other pork-barreling, glorification of waste, slowdowns, featherbedding, fear of change, stunting of creativity through grasping for tenure, seniority and security, suppression of competition, exclusionary local codes and zoning, loss of flexibility and mobility, and rejection of the free market. All these evils have their independent roots, but are inflated by unemployment and the fear of it."

Certainly, on a logical basis, one can fault unions for featherbedding, but such critics are dealing with a result and not the cause. If the union of which I were a member was working within an industry that was constantly taking advantage of the 10 percent investment tax-credit law, and thereby purchasing on an increasing scale equipment that would increase the productivity of labor (I use that term in its bad sense), I would be very proud of defending any kind of arrangement that promoted featherbedding. It is just downright uneconomical and morally reprehensible that any society plunges headlong into technological utilizations without consideration of the quality of the living of its people.

(To be continued in the next issue.)

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



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